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State of Play is a read on a sector: its size, its structure, where the money moves and what moves it. Each edition takes one market and sets out what is known, what is claimed, and what the difference between the two is worth to anyone deciding where to commit.
One of the world’s great buyers of medical devices, and one of its smaller makers. The import bill is the measure of the prize. A premium briefing on India’s medical-technology market, the size, the import dependence, the policy push, and the categories where India’s edge is real.
Figures carry their basis and their date. Where published estimates disagree, the range is given and the basis named rather than averaged away, and where a widely quoted number does not survive checking it is corrected here rather than repeated. Every chart plots a figure stated in the text, and nothing is projected beyond what a named source projects.
India has spent a decade promising to build a medical-device industry. The size of that promise, and the distance it still has to travel, are written in a single number.
India is among the world’s largest buyers of medical devices. It is among the smallest makers. It imports roughly 70% of them, and nearer 85% of the expensive sort, the CT scanners, stents and dialysis machines that fill its hospitals. The market they supply was worth about $16 billion in 2025. That is usually cast as a failure of industrial policy. It is better seen as a measure of the opportunity. Every dollar spent on an imported device is one a domestic maker might eventually capture.
The trouble is that the prize is unevenly spread, and the official ambition has run well ahead of the maths. New Delhi’s 2023 policy promised to grow the sector to $50 billion by 2030. By 2026 its own ministers were quoting $30 billion; independent analysts model $22–27 billion. Substitution is happening, but slowly, and only in places. Three things follow.
So the opportunity is real and large, but it is won category by category, by the firms that crack the component-and-capability problem, not by anyone chasing the headline number.
The figures most often quoted for the policy response were wrong rather than merely stale, and the correction should travel with this argument. Cumulative sales of ₹2,315.44 crore, exports of ₹508.12 crore and imports avoided of ₹1,807.32 crore have been widely repeated as the achievement of the medical-device production-linked incentive. They belong elsewhere. The bulk-drugs scheme carried them, and they have since been withdrawn. The device scheme's own measure is cumulative eligible sales of ₹13,624.52 crore to December 2025, of which ₹6,425.48 crore was exported, with 24 greenfield projects commissioned and 57 products in production (Department of Pharmaceuticals, 2026). The substitution achieved is accordingly some six times larger than the withdrawn figures implied, and still small against the market it is meant to displace.
The second mislabel runs the other way. The line "investment realised ₹33,534 crore against a projected ₹17,275 crore" is often cited as evidence
of the device scheme over-delivering. It belongs to the Pharmaceuticals production-linked incentive scheme and not to devices. On that scheme's own basis the realised figure now stands at ₹46,744 crore as at June 2026 (Department of Pharmaceuticals, 2026). No comparable over-delivery has been recorded for devices, where ₹266.64 crore had been released as incentives to FY2024-25 against the ₹3,420 crore outlay (Lok Sabha reply, 24 July 2026).
The prize itself has also been re-measured, and it is now carried as a range. Device imports stood at ₹89,000 to 94,700 crore for FY2025-26 depending on the trade basket applied, against exports of ₹28,106 crore (Medical Buyer, October 2026). Imports meet roughly 60 per cent of domestic consumption on the Government's own measure, a lower figure than the 70 per cent dependence usually quoted, the difference being one
of basket rather than of fact. Neither correction disturbs the argument. Both sharpen the scale at which it should be read.
India consumes medical technology like a giant and makes it like a minnow. The distance between the two is the whole story.
One asymmetry explains the rest. India runs the fourth-largest medical-device market in Asia, about $16 billion in 2025, yet holds barely 1.5% of the global business and imports some 70% of what it uses. At the top of the range, where the machines are dear and the margins fat, the dependence is near-total: 80 to 85% imported, and for implants alone, 88 cents on every dollar lands from overseas.
Dependence on that scale carries a bill, and the bill is the heart of this story. India’s device trade deficit hit roughly ₹66,558 crore in FY26, with imports running more than three times exports. Tellingly, the gap is widening rather than closing, because demand is outrunning anything the country can yet build. The same number is both the problem and the prize. It is the cost of buying from abroad, and the size of the industry waiting to be built at home.
The dependence is not evenly distributed across the import bill, and the concentration is the reason substitution policy has been able to target it at all. Some 40 product categories account for close to 85 per cent of total medical-device imports. The Centre is reported to be reviewing eight to ten priority categories for accelerated domestic production. The list runs to magnetic-resonance imaging systems and components, pacemakers and continuous glucose monitoring systems. Advanced ultrasound equipment is on it, with computed-tomography and X-ray components, intensive-care beds, and high-end diagnostic analysers with their associated reagents (India Briefing and Medical Buyer, 2026).
The sources of supply are similarly concentrated. The top five origin countries account for around 68 per cent of import value. They are China, the United States, Germany, Singapore and the Netherlands. The United States is the single largest source, with China close to 20 per cent, much
of it in monitors, imaging components, disposables and low-cost diagnostics (trade data, FY2024). The same multinationals that dominate the premium segments are themselves the import channel, so the import bill and the competitive landscape are two readings of one structure.
The headline share needs one qualification. The Government's own position, stated in October 2026, is that imports meet about 60 per cent of domestic consumption (Medical Buyer, October 2026). That sits against the roughly 70 per cent dependence figure drawn from a November 2024 source, and against the 80 to 85 per cent cited by industry bodies for the high-value segments. The three figures are not in conflict. They measure different baskets at different dates. The asymmetry they describe is unchanged, and so is its consequence.
How big the market is, everyone roughly agrees. Where it is going, not even the government can decide.
Estimates of India’s device-market size disagree by a quarter. Independent analysts put 2025 at $15–19 billion; the government’s own promotional figure sits near $14 billion, anchored to an $11 billion baseline from 2022. The spread is mostly definitional, what counts as a “device,” and which policy targets get quoted as forecasts. On direction, there is no argument: the market is growing, and faster than most of the economy around it.
It is the road to 2030 where the disagreement starts to matter. The 2023 National Medical Devices Policy set a $50 billion target and a 16% growth rate to reach it. By March 2026, ministers were quoting $30 billion. Analysts model $22–27 billion at a 5.5–8% pace. Read together, the numbers tell a quiet story of retreat: the official target has already fallen by a third, and even the reduced version sits comfortably above what the market is actually doing.
The market basis has been re-stated since this read was prepared, modestly, and the re-statement is worth recording. A FY2025-26 row is now
carried at about US$15 to 16 billion, against about US$14 billion for FY2024-25. The band of credible estimates is held at US$12 to 18 billion. The competing estimates are worth naming rather than averaging. EY and CII put FY2025-26 at US$12 to 15 billion, industry reporting at US$15 to 16 billion, and one research house at US$18.3 billion (re-based September 2026). The spread remains definitional. Quoting a single point estimate remains unsound.
On the growth rate, the reconciled basis is an organic pace of the order of 10 to 15 per cent a year. That is faster than the 5.5 to 8 per cent modelled by some independent analysts, and well short of the near 20 per cent the 2030 target implies. Industry projections sit between the two, and the Confederation of Indian Industry has reiterated a figure of roughly US$44 to
50 billion by 2030. A separate market estimate places the sector at US$18.30 billion in 2026 rising to US$26.66 billion by 2031, a compound rate near 7.82 per cent (Medical Buyer, 2026).
What this calls for is discipline rather than forecasting. The honest statement of the market is a range, with its basis named and its date attached. The honest statement of 2030 is a set of competing figures. Their spread, from the high twenties to fifty billion dollars, is itself the finding.
Not all of India’s dependence is equal. It clusters, precisely, where the money is.
Import dependence has a shape, and the shape is the strategy. India makes its own cheap, high-volume kit and buys almost everything sophisticated. The parliamentary record lays it out: 88% of implants imported, 63% of surgical instruments, 52% of electronic equipment, the CT, MRI, ultrasound and X-ray machines, with electromedical devices alone accounting for some 60% of the entire import bill.
The exact figure depends on who is counting: the government’s latest line is ~70% imported overall, and industry bodies and EY say 80–85%. The pattern holds, and the direction is wrong. Across FY21–FY25 India spent
more than $25 billion buying devices abroad; in FY26 alone, imports reached roughly ₹94,664 crore against ₹28,106 crore of exports. Dependence runs deepest exactly where margins, technology and strategic weight are greatest, which is why the localisation that matters most is the localisation that is hardest.
Sources: Parliamentary Standing Committee 2022/2024; Rajya Sabha reply 2025; DGCIS FY26. Country-level import shares are not officially published.
The import figure should now be carried as a range rather than a point, because two trade baskets are in circulation and they do not agree. Imports of about ₹89,000 crore are recorded for FY2025-26 on the narrower device basket, a rise of roughly 17 per cent on about ₹63,000 crore in FY2024. The wider basket records ₹94,664 crore. The defensible statement is therefore ₹89,000 to 94,700 crore, with the basket named (DrugsControl Media Services, 2026; Medical Buyer, October 2026).
The rise is not a single year's event. Imports had already risen by approximately 21 per cent to about ₹61,263 crore in the twelve months from November 2022 to October 2023. Some 2024 trade compilations, drawn across broader customs codes, report gross medical-equipment imports as high as US$18 billion. Of that, electromedical equipment accounts for US$5.4 billion and imaging US$4.2 billion, with consumables US$3.9 billion, implants US$2.8 billion and interventional devices US$1.6 billion (Business Standard, 2024). That wider scope is not the basis used in this read, and the two should not be set side by side.
One further measure cuts against the headline. On the Government's own statement of October 2026, imports meet roughly 60 per cent of domestic consumption. The number is lower than the dependence shares quoted above and is not inconsistent with them: consumption, value of devices in use, and the high-value sub-basket are three different denominators. The direction of travel is the point on which all three agree, and it remains adverse.
The pattern explains the opportunity and its cruelty at once. The categories India already owns are the ones with the thinnest margins; the categories worth real money are the ones it cannot yet build. Substitution, then, is
not a single climb but a series of separate ascents, each gated by its own mix of capital, components and clinical-grade quality.
Draw a line through India’s device industry by technical difficulty, and it sorts the market almost perfectly.
India’s device industry is not feeble everywhere: it is formidable at one end and absent at the other, and technical complexity separates them:
Beneath the finished-device split lies a second and harder dependence, and it is the one that determines how much of the apparent localisation is
real. Roughly 30 to 40 per cent of upstream inputs remain import-sourced, chiefly specialty materials and electronics, along with sensors. Much of it comes from China (Medical Buyer, 2026). Importing components inflates a startup's costs by an estimated 20 to 40 per cent. The conflict in West Asia is reported to have raised input costs on some lines by 10 to 50 per cent. A thin component base transmits external shocks straight into device prices.
The policy response has begun to move upstream accordingly. The ₹500 crore Scheme for Strengthening the Medical Device Industry, launched in November 2024, funds key-component manufacture specifically to substitute imports, and the Department of Pharmaceuticals has set out a plan to localise 113 affordable devices over five years. A one-time reimbursement capital subsidy of up to ₹10 crore is on offer under the associated Marginal Investment Scheme for components, raw materials and finished devices presently imported in quantity (Department of Pharmaceuticals, 2026).
Two further gates now sit across the same map. Conformity to the Bureau of Indian Standards Scheme X became a condition of lawful manufacture and import for notified devices from 1 September 2026. The Department's review of the 354-device Global Tender Enquiry exemption list, on which public-procurement access for imported equipment turns, remained pending decision as at October 2026. The categories India buys are
therefore being contested by standards and procurement rules as much as by factories.
Whatever happens on the supply side, the demand is not going anywhere. It is vast, and it is built in.
The market grows because the need is enormous and rising. India carries one of the heaviest chronic-disease loads on earth. Roughly 101 million people have diabetes and 136 million more are on its edge, with an estimated 315 million living with hypertension. There were about 1.46 million new cancer cases in 2022, heading toward 1.57 million by 2025. Cardiovascular disease kills more than one Indian in four. Every one of those numbers is a device market, for monitors, stents, implants, scanners and tests.
The capacity to treat all of it lags far behind. India has about 1.3 to 1.4 hospital beds per 1,000 people against a WHO benchmark of 3.5, and public facilities manage just 0.79. The shortfall is put at some 2.4 million beds. Demography only tightens the screw. The over-60 population is set to double to 346 million by 2050, roughly a fifth of the country. A vast, ageing, under-equipped population will need more devices every year for
decades. The open question is not whether the demand exists. It is who fills it.
The payment structure decides which devices win, and in India it is weighted unusually towards the patient. Out-of-pocket spending accounts for in excess of 60 per cent of total healthcare expenditure in India. That feature governs the pricing and the distribution of anything intended
for the Indian patient, and it dominates diagnostics and patient-facing devices in particular (reconciled basis, 2026). Private insurance reimburses typically 50 to 80 per cent of cost at more favourable rates but on lower volume. Corporate group cover is a smaller and concentrated pool.
The fastest-growing expression of that demand is care delivered outside the hospital. The Indian home-healthcare market was estimated at approximately US$11.9 billion in 2025, growing at about 18 per cent a year towards US$27 billion by 2030. Remote patient monitoring within it is growing faster still, at around 25 per cent (Mordor Intelligence, 2025). Hospital-at-home and virtual-intensive-care models are gaining ground. That moves demand towards monitoring, point-of-care diagnostics and software rather than towards capital equipment.
Parts of the demand remain conspicuously underserved. The Indian femtech market was estimated at approximately US$310 million in 2025. It is projected to grow at roughly 17 to 18 per cent a year towards US$3.87 billion by 2030, with some 346 active companies having collectively raised about US$271 million as at early 2026 (Frost & Sullivan and Tracxn, 2026). Paediatric and neonatal devices remain underdeveloped relative to need. The demand is not in question. Its distribution is.
Demand only becomes a market when somebody pays for it. In India, that somebody is now, overwhelmingly, the government.
A medical need turns into device demand only once it is funded. India’s funding has tilted toward public insurance. Ayushman Bharat, the PM-JAY scheme, now reaches some 12 crore families and over 50 crore people, with a ₹5 lakh annual cover per family and nearly 44 crore cards issued. More than 10 crore hospital admissions have been paid for across roughly 36,000 empanelled hospitals. A 2024 expansion swept in every citizen over 70 regardless of income, adding about 6 crore seniors.
The state has become the single largest force shaping what devices get bought.
But a hole sits in the middle of the system. Only about 20% of Indians hold health insurance, and roughly 30%, the “missing middle,” above the poverty line yet without employer or state cover, are exposed, with out-of-pocket spending still near 39% of all health spending. For device makers the arithmetic cuts both ways: public insurance drives volume and rewards cheap, locally-relevant products, but it also brings the procurement discipline and the price caps that grind down margins. Who pays, and how, decides which devices win.
The senior-citizen expansion is better specified than it is usually reported, and its mechanics matter more than its headline. It was approved by the Union Cabinet on 11 September 2024 with an outlay of ₹3,437 crore. Cover
extends to all citizens aged 70 and above irrespective of income, across some 4.5 crore families, and is delivered through a dedicated Ayushman Vay Vandana card. Seniors in families already covered receive a top-up that is not shared with younger members (PIB and PMO, September 2024). The clinical profile of that cohort is device-intensive, concentrated in cardiology, oncology and orthopaedics.
The mechanism rewards cost leadership rather than innovation. Reimbursement is fixed per procedure and inclusive of the device or implant, so the pull is felt as higher public-system volume rather than as higher unit price. Procurement is routed through the Central Medical Services Society, HLL Infra Tech Services, the Government e-Marketplace and the state medical services corporations, under pooled tenders and rate contracts modelled on the Tamil Nadu corporation. Procurement preference is given to Class-I local suppliers under the Public Procurement (Preference to Make in India) Order.
The commercial consequence is a channel of enormous volume and unattractive terms. Procurement timelines commonly run 12 to 24 months, payment cycles exceed 90 days, and government schemes reimburse high-volume assays at ₹50 to 200 per test. A manufacturer built for a low cost of goods, with a Government e-Marketplace listing and the patience for the public tender cycle, can reach scale through this channel. One that requires premium pricing should treat the public system as a reference customer rather than as the core market.
Break the market into its pieces and a clear story falls out, of where India is strong, and where it simply isn’t.
Slice the device market by segment and the rankings hold even as the exact shares wobble between sources. Diagnostic imaging is the biggest slice, around 30%, and almost entirely imported. Consumables and disposables come next, at about 16% of the product mix and more of the trade value. They are India’s home turf. In-vitro diagnostics sit near 10%. Orthopaedics, prosthetics, patient aids and dental trail below.
The shares matter because they show where substitution can bite, and where it can’t:
One caveat is in order. Most of these per-segment figures are 2020-vintage, and no fresh itemised breakdown has been published. Treat the shares as directional rather than precise. The shape is solid, imaging-heavy and import-dependent up top, with consumables strong at the base [Insert verified current segment-share table here when published].
A second and more recent cut disagrees with the segment shares quoted here, and the disagreement is instructive. On the reconciled eight-category basis used in Volge's internal work, in-vitro diagnostics is the largest segment at 25 to 30 per cent. Surgical and orthopaedic devices follow at 20 to 25 per cent, with imaging and radiology at 15 to 20 per cent. Cardiac
and vascular take 10 to 12 per cent, patient monitoring and wearables 10 to 15 per cent, and the ophthalmic, dental and other specialised group 5 to 10 per cent (reconciled basis, 2026).
Two categories escape that basis entirely. Consumables and disposables are large by unit volume and are frequently counted within other segments, and software as a medical device is an emerging cross-cut rather than a line item. The ranges do not sum to one hundred per cent, and they are presented as ranges because the underlying estimate predates the eight-category split. This is a weaker evidential position than a single table implies. No fresh itemised breakdown has been published.
What survives the disagreement is the ordering by capital intensity, which is the variable that actually governs India's position. Imaging and cardiac and vascular rank highest, with surgical and orthopaedic high. In-vitro
diagnostics and point-of-care sit in the middle, and monitoring, consumables and software low. India's position is close to the inverse. The share table is therefore best used to locate the money, and the capital-intensity column to predict who will make it.
Set aside the ambition and the subsidies. What India can actually make and sell to the world is narrow, but it is real money.
India’s strength is not an aspiration in a policy document. It is visible in what the country already ships. Consumables make up roughly 47% of medical-device exports. In a handful of categories Indian firms compete with anyone on cost and scale. Syringes and needles are one (Hindustan Syringes is among the world’s largest makers), cannulae and catheters another (Poly Medicure sells into more than a hundred countries), with basic in-vitro diagnostics a third (Transasia, Agappe). Ophthalmology, intraocular lenses and their consumables, is another genuine win.
What these winners share is telling. They are high-volume and cost-sensitive, where India’s manufacturing economics and engineering talent convert straight into advantage; they sit below the regulatory and capital bar of a Class III implant; and they reward scale, which a billion-strong home market supplies. The edge is real, and bounded. It lives at the value end
India has already conquered, not the frontier it still imports. Whether those same firms can climb higher is the question the next pages take apart.
The breadth of that edge is better measured in market reach than in share. Indian exporters now serve approximately 187 countries. The leading firms' individual footprints are substantial. Trivitron Healthcare reports exports across roughly 180 countries, Opto Circuits products in use in more than 150, and Poly Medicure in over 110. Transasia Bio-Medicals is in more than 100, Healthium Medtech in over 90, and Sahajanand Medical Technologies in more than 40 (company disclosures and Medical Buyer, 2026). The United States is the leading destination.
The economics beneath the edge explain why it holds. In-vitro diagnostics runs on razor-and-blade terms, an analyser placed at ₹5 to 15 lakh pulling through ₹2 to 5 lakh of reagent a year. Gross margins run 40 to 60 per cent, with capital to profitability of ₹50 to 100 crore. Point-of-care testing is the fastest-growing sub-segment within it. The ophthalmic cluster, led by Aurolab, Appasamy, Forus Health and Remidio, competes on frugal engineering rather than on scale alone.
The forward view on exports is more optimistic than the domestic substitution view, and it rests on better evidence. Bain & Company characterises India as an access-led innovator and export hub. It records device exports of about US$4 billion in FY2024-25 to more than 125 countries, and projects growth above 20 per cent compound to 2030, potentially doubling exports to nearly US$8 billion (Medical Buyer, July 2026). That remains well short of the industry's own US$20 billion ambition for the same date.
The component figure requires a note of care, because two measures are in circulation and they describe different things. The 70 to 85 per cent cited above is the imported share of high-value components in high-value devices. On a wider measure of all upstream inputs, specialty materials and electronics together with sensors, the import share is roughly 30 to 40 per cent, much of it from China (Medical Buyer, 2026). Both figures are
defensible on their own basis. Neither supports the claim that assembly in India amounts to indigenisation.
Almost every CT scanner and cardiac implant in India is foreign-made. The reasons are structural, and they stack.
At the top of the value curve stands a wall India has not climbed. Diagnostic imaging, CT, MRI, ultrasound, linear accelerators, and high-end implants belong to a handful of global firms (GE HealthCare, Philips, Siemens Healthineers, Medtronic, Boston Scientific), and India buys the overwhelming majority. The reasons are not incidental; they compound:
The PLI scheme is starting to chip at the wall. CT, MRI and ultrasound are now built in India in some volume. But assembly is not indigenisation, and the deepest value still flows offshore. This wall is why the $50 billion target is so punishing. The cheap categories are already won, and the expensive ones refuse to give.
The capital arithmetic is the second reason the wall holds. Setting up imaging manufacture requires capital expenditure of the order of ₹20 to 100 crore and more, with operating costs of ₹5 to 15 crore a year and breakeven at five to ten years. Surgical implants require ₹5 to 50 crore of setup and four to seven years. Total capital to profitability runs ₹300 to 600 crore and above for imaging systems and ₹150 to 400 crore for implants, against ₹30 to 60 crore for a software diagnostic (reconciled basis, 2026). Few domestic balance sheets reach that scale.
Where the wall has been breached, the gain is real. Devices produced under the production-linked incentive are reported to be approximately 10 to 30 per cent cheaper than the imported equivalents. The scheme's output now includes linear accelerators, magnetic-resonance and computed-tomography systems, mammography units and C-arms. Ultrasound equipment is on the list, as are heart valves, stents and dialysis products (Medical Dialogues and Lok Sabha reply, July 2026). The price advantage, not the flag of origin, is what will eventually move procurement.
For most of its history, India barely regulated medical devices at all. Then, almost overnight, it did, and the system is still absorbing the shock.
India’s device regulator, the Central Drugs Standard Control Organisation (CDSCO), runs a strikingly young framework. The Medical Devices Rules of 2017 took effect in 2018 and imported four globally-aligned risk classes, A (low, a thermometer), B (low-moderate), C (moderate-high, a
ventilator) and D (high, a heart valve or implantable defibrillator). The centre licenses the riskier Class C and D; the states handle A and B.
| Class | Risk | Example device | Authority · mandatory from |
|---|---|---|---|
| A | Low | Thermometers | State · Oct 2022 |
| B | Low–moderate | Hypodermic needles | State · Oct 2022 |
| C | Moderate–high | Ventilators | Central · Oct 2023 |
| D | High | Heart valves, implants | Central · Oct 2023 |
The hinge came in 2020. A gazette notification pulled every device under regulation as a drug, ending an era in which much of the market was effectively unpoliced. Licensing was phased in, Class A and B from October 2022, C and D from October 2023, and the effect cut both ways. The market formalised (there are now over 4,000 licensed manufacturers), but the same move exposed how thin the plumbing is, from a shortage of testing labs to a backlog of inspections. For any maker, foreign or Indian, CDSCO clearance is no longer optional. The regime is still maturing, but it is now a real gate.
The timelines are the part of this regime that determines whether a venture survives it, and they are routinely underestimated. Central Licensing Authority review runs typically 90 to 120 days for a Class C device and 120 to 180 days for a Class D device. Full registration takes nine to eighteen months where no clinical trial is required, and significantly longer where
one is. A clinical investigation commonly costs ₹1 to 5 crore and takes twelve to twenty-four months. It is mandatory for investigational Class B, C and D devices without a predicate manufactured in India and for new in-vitro diagnostics (CDSCO and CliniExperts, 2025).
Capacity and process are now moving to meet the backlog. A Risk Classification Module was brought online on 27 November 2025, allowing applicants to request a classification for devices not yet on the published lists. The sanction of 1,500 additional posts within the organisation has been confirmed, the stated intent being specialised scientific capacity and shorter evaluation times. The SUGAM portal became mandatory for post-approval changes from 1 July 2026. Draft notification G.S.R. 515(E) of 23 June 2026, proposing shortened licence timelines for Class B, C and D devices, closed for comment on 22 July 2026 (CDSCO and MoHFW, 2026).
Software has been brought inside the same frame. The final Guidance Document on Medical Device Software was issued in August 2026, superseding the draft of 21 October 2025. It covers software as a medical device, software in a device and in-vitro diagnostic software, with an Algorithm Change Protocol permitting pre-specified model updates without fresh approval. Final guidance of July 2026 additionally requires artificial-intelligence-enabled software to disclose training-data composition and bias across India-relevant sub-populations.
After eight decades, India is rewriting the law over its devices, and, for the first time, refusing to treat them as drugs.
The biggest regulatory shift is still sitting in draft. In October 2025 the drug controller unveiled a draft Drugs, Medical Devices and Cosmetics Bill, meant to retire the 1940 Drugs and Cosmetics Act under which devices have long been governed as though they were medicines. The headline change is structural: the bill gives devices their own chapter and their own category, instead of forcing a scanner or a stent through a rulebook written for molecules.
The reform lands on a long-running grievance. Clinical-trial and approval norms built for drugs fit hardware and software badly. Two cautions, though. The bill is not yet law; it was pencilled in for a parliamentary session and remains a draft. And despite the new chapter, a genuinely independent device regulator is not confirmed. Statutory power still appears to sit with CDSCO. For now the regime is modernising in intent more than in fact, and the operative rules remain those of 2017 [Insert verified enactment status here when the bill passes].
The draft has moved on since this chapter was written, and so has the opposition to it. The instrument is now the draft Drugs, Medical Devices and Cosmetics Bill, 2026. As at 28 October 2026 eleven industry associations
continued to contest it, pressing instead for a separate Medical Devices Act rather than a device chapter inside a combined statute (Medical Buyer, 28 October 2026). The Association of Indian Medical Device Industry reiterated at Medical Fair India in September 2026 that devices warrant regulatory treatment distinct from pharmaceuticals, given the pace of technological change.
Subordinate rule-making has not waited for the Bill. In October 2026 the regulator issued a consultation draft on licence-application content for domestic in-vitro diagnostic manufacturers, imposing no new obligations as yet. Alongside it came a proposed amendment to Rule 30(1) that would permit regulators to order a licensee to cease manufacture or sale of a device and to supervise its destruction (Medical Buyer, 28 October 2026). Enforcement powers are therefore being strengthened under the 2017 rules while the primary legislation remains in draft.
The practical position for a maker is accordingly unchanged in substance and less settled in prospect. The operative rules remain those of 2017, as amended, and the regulator remains the Central Drugs Standard Control Organisation. The question of a separate statute and an independent device regulator is now a live contest between the Government and the industry bodies rather than a drafting detail. Planning should assume the present regime, with the Bill treated as a risk to timelines rather than a relief from them.
No policy shapes the economics of an Indian device more than the price cap, and none divides opinion so sharply.
Nothing bends India’s device economics like price control. In 2017 the National Pharmaceutical Pricing Authority (NPPA) capped coronary stents, revised every year, with April 2026 ceilings of about ₹39,186 for a drug-eluting stent and ₹10,762 for a bare-metal one. Knee implants were capped too, with that ceiling now extended to November 2026. The cuts were brutal. Pre-cap knee-implant margins had run above 300%, and the stent cap more than halved some prices.
What it did to the market is genuinely contested, and both sides have evidence. The defining episode came when, after the stent cap, Medtronic and Abbott moved to pull their newest stents from India, citing economics that no longer worked, and the NPPA refused to let them leave. Industry says the caps scare off frontier technology and local investment; the regulator says they killed distributor mark-ups that did nothing for patients. Both are right. The lesson for any maker is plain: in India’s most valuable categories, the state sets the price, and a cap can arrive without warning. Every business case has to survive one.
Direct ceilings are only one of two instruments, and the second is now the more active. Under the Drugs (Prices Control) Order the National
Pharmaceutical Pricing Authority also applies trade-margin rationalisation, capping the margin between the price to the distributor and the maximum retail price. It has been used on oximeters, oxygen concentrators, nebulisers and hormone-releasing intra-uterine devices, with a further extension on oxygen concentrators notified in July 2026. The knee-implant ceiling stands extended to 15 November 2026 (NPPA, 2026).
The Authority widened the instrument's reach in late 2026, although not yet to devices. At its 284th meeting on 16 October 2026 it finalised a trade-margin cap of 30 per cent of maximum retail price, excluding tax and equivalent to a 42.86 per cent mark-up on the price to stockist. The cap covers 137 non-scheduled anti-cancer drugs, was gazetted on 17 October 2026 and takes effect from 9 November 2026. Estimated annual savings are about ₹2,500 crore, with prices falling by up to 70 per cent (Business Standard, 17 October 2026). Officials are reported to regard extension to devices such as intravenous kits and catheters as possible.
Industry is arguing over the basis rather than the principle. The domestic-manufacturer body has asked for a device framework covering imported and domestic product alike, with the importer treated as the first point of
sale. Its ground is that a 30 per cent cap measured from the distributor could still leave imports some 43 per cent above domestic prices. NITI Aayog and the Authority are considering a device cap in the 30 to 50 per cent band. The Government stated in a Rajya Sabha reply of 17 March 2026 that no nationwide price cap or single-price framework for devices was under consideration.
Public procurement compounds the damage. An industry analysis in 2025 turned up some 1,502 government tenders worth around ₹63,911 crore that flouted the local-preference rules meant to favour Indian makers, so even where the policy mandates a home advantage, the practice often defaults to imports. For a domestic manufacturer the duty structure and the procurement gaps weigh as heavily as any incentive; together they decide
whether making in India makes financial sense at all. Fixing them, correcting the inversion, enforcing the procurement preference, would do more for substitution than another headline target. It is the reform industry asks for most often, and gets least.
One line in the tariff schedule undoes more local manufacturing than any subsidy creates.
For all the policy aimed at building a homegrown industry, a single quirk works directly against it. That quirk is the inverted duty. A finished medical device can often be imported at zero basic customs duty, while the components needed to build that same device at home attract around 7.5%. The result is perverse. It is frequently cheaper to import the whole machine than to make it in India, which quietly undercuts the very localisation the PLI scheme is paying for.
The duty structure is now being reset by trade agreement rather than by domestic reform, which cuts against the localisation case at the margin. The India-United Kingdom Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement entered into force on 15 July 2026. Under it, customs duties on selected United Kingdom-origin devices, imaging systems, diagnostics and surgical instruments among them, are to be reduced in tranches from the prevailing 7.5 to 15 per cent band towards approximately 3 per cent. The generality of Indian device exports to the United Kingdom secures near duty-free access in return, and a mutual-recognition framework eases access for CDSCO and ICMED-certified product (Medical Buyer and Business Standard, July 2026).
The two industry bodies read the same agreement in opposite directions, which is itself the sector's politics in miniature. The multinational association has characterised it as a landmark for the affordability of high-end equipment; the domestic-manufacturer association continues to press for deeper import substitution and tariff protection. Both positions are coherent, and the Government has so far declined to choose, which is the inconsistency the chapter identifies.
A reform package covering precisely these points has been under consultation and remains undecided. The Department of Pharmaceuticals
invited comments on amendments to the Global Tender Enquiry exemption list, a schedule of 354 devices that governs public-procurement access for imported equipment. The window closed on 15 July 2026, and the review remained pending at October 2026. The measures under consideration include tariff review, component indigenisation, public-procurement incentives and tax rationalisation, with either an extension of the existing incentive scheme or a dedicated successor (India Briefing and Medical Buyer, 2026).
India’s answer to its import problem is an industrial policy with real money behind it. The question is whether real money is enough.
The government’s response is the National Medical Devices Policy, signed off in April 2023. The goal, now famous, is to grow the sector from $11 billion to $50 billion by 2030 and to lift India’s global share from about 1.5% toward 10–12% over a quarter-century. Six pillars carry it: single-window regulation, manufacturing infrastructure, R&D, investment promotion, skilling, and brand-and-export development. Unusually, it is backed by money rather than rhetoric alone.
The instruments are real: a ₹3,420 crore production-linked incentive scheme, a ₹500 crore programme to strengthen the industry and its components, a ₹5,000 crore research scheme (PRIP). The architecture is coherent and the intent is serious. And yet the headline target has already been quietly cut, and the deepest barriers, components, R&D, the inverted duty, are exactly the ones a target cannot touch. What the money has actually built is the subject of the next few pages.
The policy also carries an import target, and it is the least likely of its commitments to be met. Alongside the market and global-share objectives, the National Medical Devices Policy 2023 seeks to reduce import dependence
from roughly 70 per cent towards 30 per cent and to place India among the world's top five manufacturing hubs. On the evidence of the import bill, which rose in FY2025-26 rather than fell, that strand of the policy is moving backwards.
The instrument set has nonetheless been extended twice since the policy was signed. A dedicated medical-device investment fund of ₹1,000 crore was announced on 28 January 2026, the first government-backed vehicle for the sector alone. It provides equity, quasi-equity and debt in tickets of ₹5 to 50 crore to an intended forty to sixty companies, overseen by the Department of Pharmaceuticals and SIDBI, with approximately ₹500 crore routed through the Research, Development and Innovation scheme. The research scheme has also begun to disburse. In all, 41 projects were
approved under its first call, carrying ₹1,600 crore of government assistance against ₹3,020 crore of expected private investment. Nine of them are novel medical-device projects and nineteen are led by startups and small enterprises (Medical Buyer, 1 October 2026).
The architecture is therefore substantially complete, and the open question has moved from design to uptake. A guiding policy, a manufacturing incentive, a components-and-capability scheme, a parks programme, a research fund, a dedicated investment vehicle, a startup support platform and a clarified regulatory regime now exist together. What the money has built, and what it has not, is the subject of the pages that follow.
The production-linked incentive is the policy’s sharpest instrument. Its results are real, and modest against the promise.
The medical-device PLI, a ₹3,420 crore pot running to FY27, paying a 5% incentive on incremental sales across four segments (cancer and radiotherapy; imaging; anaesthetics and cardio-respiratory; implants), is the policy’s most concrete lever. By late 2025 it had cleared 28 applicants, commissioned 24 greenfield projects and put 57 products into production,
with about ₹157 crore disbursed to seven companies and cumulative eligible sales of roughly ₹13,625 crore, ₹6,425 crore of it exported.
The genuine achievement is what now gets built in India that never was before. The list runs to linear accelerators, MRI and CT machines, ultrasound and mammography, with C-arms and X-ray systems alongside. This is high-value imaging the country once bought wholesale. Two cautions temper the win. The eligible-sales figure is small against a $16 billion market, and “made in India” here often means assembled from imported parts, so the value actually localised is shallower than the output suggests. The PLI is closing the gap at the margin, in precisely the categories that matter, but at a pace that explains why $50 billion quietly became $30 billion.
Two figures in the published record of this scheme were wrong rather than merely out of date, and both should be named because a reader may hold them. Take the first. Cumulative sales of ₹2,315.44 crore, exports of ₹508.12 crore and imports avoided of ₹1,807.32 crore, reported for
September 2025 and widely attributed to the device scheme, belong to the bulk-drugs incentive and are withdrawn. The second is the line "investment realised ₹33,534 crore against a projected ₹17,275 crore". It belongs to the Pharmaceuticals incentive scheme and not to devices, and on that scheme's own basis now stands at ₹46,744 crore as at June 2026 (Department of Pharmaceuticals, 2026).
The device scheme's own disbursement is more modest than the eligible-sales figure suggests, and belongs beside it. Approved projects number 27, carrying ₹1,153 crore of committed investment, and ₹266.64 crore had been released as incentives up to FY2024-25, per the Minister's Lok Sabha reply of 24 July 2026. Cumulative eligible sales progressed from
₹10,413.40 crore by March 2025 to ₹12,344.37 crore in September 2025 and ₹13,624.52 crore by December 2025, so the growth is real and the base remains small.
The scheme now has an end date, which changes how its results should be judged. The ₹3,420 crore programme closes in March 2027, and the Department has said that no further application rounds are under consideration (Medical Buyer, 21 October 2026). Whatever has not been commissioned by then will not be commissioned under this instrument, and the open question is whether a successor is created or the Global Tender Enquiry and duty reforms carry the burden instead.
Most Indian device makers are too small to build their own labs. The state’s fix, shared parks, also shows how far announcement runs ahead of asphalt.
The policy’s fix is the medical device park: shared clusters where common facilities lower the cost of getting started. Roughly three-quarters of India’s device makers are small firms that could never afford their own testing labs, sterilisation and effluent plants. The scheme sanctioned around ₹400 crore, ₹100 crore a park, originally across four states.
The reality is a useful corrective to the press releases. The government now tracks three parks at an advanced stage. They are Greater Noida in Uttar Pradesh, Ujjain in Madhya Pradesh and Kanchipuram in Tamil Nadu, at a total cost of around ₹871 crore. Of that, ₹210 crore has been disbursed, with 194 manufacturers allotted land across nearly 299 acres and 34 units under construction by late 2025. The fourth sanctioned park, in Himachal Pradesh, has slipped and effectively fallen off the central count. The parks are real and filling up. The slide from four to three, and the distance between land allotted and units running, is the whole story in miniature, genuine, slower than billed, and still early.
| Medical device park | State | Status (late 2025) |
|---|---|---|
| Greater Noida | Uttar Pradesh | Advanced |
| Ujjain | Madhya Pradesh | Advanced |
| Kanchipuram | Tamil Nadu | Advanced |
| Himachal Pradesh | Himachal Pradesh | Delayed / dropped |
The disbursement record is more precise than the press releases and more modest than the sanction. Per the Minister's Lok Sabha reply of 24 July 2026, ₹209.80 crore had been disbursed under the Medical Device Parks scheme, of which ₹177.98 crore is reported utilised. Separately, under the Scheme for Strengthening the Medical Device Industry, projects of ₹101.50 crore stand approved and ₹88.67 crore has been sanctioned
for common facilities in device clusters. Money committed, money released and money spent are three different figures, and only the last builds anything.
The central scheme is also not the whole of the park landscape, and the benchmark lies outside it. The Andhra Pradesh MedTech Zone at Visakhapatnam, India's first dedicated medical-device zone, occupies some 270 acres and received a separate ₹25 crore common-facility grant. It remains the national reference for integrated shared manufacturing and scientific facilities. State-sponsored capacity continues to be added. The Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation announced on 20 October 2026 the allotment of plots at the 336-acre Gujarat Medical Device Park at
Nagalpar, Rajkot, with online applications opening on 26 October 2026 (Medical Buyer, 21 October 2026).
The parks should therefore be read as one instrument among several in a geography that is already highly concentrated. Licensed manufacturing is weighted heavily towards the western states, with Gujarat and Maharashtra alone accounting for the larger part of national capacity, against a national total exceeding 4,000 sites licensed since 2021. New parks are changing the margin of that distribution rather than its shape.
What makes Poly Medicure a 2026 story rather than a settled one is how it is climbing. In 2025 it bought the Dutch firm PendraCare (about ₹189 crore) and Italy’s Citieffe group (about ₹324 crore), purchasing its way into higher-value cardiology and orthopaedic-trauma products, and into European markets and know-how. The move is instructive. Rather than wait years for domestic R&D to scale the wall, an Indian champion is acquiring the capability abroad, a faster, capital-led route that other ambitious makers are likely to copy. At a market capitalisation near ₹16,700
crore by mid-2026, Poly Medicure is the template for what scaling looks like.
India’s clearest device success story never set out to replace an import. It exports, and it is now buying its way upmarket.
If the import bill is the problem, Poly Medicure is proof India can build the other half. The listed consumables maker booked revenue of around ₹1,782 crore in FY25, up 21%, and is the country’s largest device exporter, shipping cannulae, catheters and infusion products to more than a hundred countries. It is India’s edge made flesh: high-volume, cost-competitive, clinically-credible consumables, scaled on home demand and sold to the world.
The category this firm leads is the one in which India's position is least contested, and its structure explains the firm's economics. Consumables and disposables carry low capital intensity, low import dependence and regulatory classes of B and C rather than D, and scale and cost are the only durable moat. The peer group, Hindustan Syringes, Romsons, Sterimed and Healthium Medtech, competes on the same terms, and Healthium alone exports across more than 90 countries (reconciled basis and company disclosures, 2026). It is also the category with the thinnest margins.
Acquisition is not the only route up the value curve, and the public markets have opened as an alternative during 2026. Molbio Diagnostics completed a ₹939.70 crore initial public offering in August 2026, comprising ₹200 crore of fresh issue and ₹739.70 crore of offer for sale at a band of ₹768 to 807 a share. It was subscribed 70.27 times overall, with the qualified-institutional portion at 186.39 times, and listed on 17 August 2026
(BioSpectrum India, August 2026). Biorad Medisys raised a reported ₹400 crore pre-listing round in July 2026.
Read together, the two routes describe how an Indian device champion now scales. Capability at the high-value end is bought abroad, because domestic research and development cannot be grown fast enough to clear the clinical and regulatory bar in time. The capital to buy it is raised at home, from public markets that have become receptive to device and diagnostics issuers. Both halves of that sequence were unavailable a decade ago, and both are more replicable than a single firm's success suggests.
Implants are the category India imports most of all. Two homegrown firms are the rare exception that proves it can be done.
If imaging is the wall, implants are the citadel, 88% imported, the highest-value, highest-trust corner of the market. Two Indian firms have breached it. Meril Life Sciences, a Gujarat maker of cardiovascular, orthopaedic and surgical devices, booked around ₹1,730 crore in FY25. It won a landmark vote of confidence in July 2025, when the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority paid roughly $200 million for about 3%, valuing the company near $6.6 billion. A PLI-backed plant and plans to multiply revenue make it the country’s most credible high-value challenger.
Sahajanand Medical Technologies (SMT), a cardiac-stent and structural-heart specialist with revenue around ₹1,040 crore, filed for an IPO in July
2025 and won the regulator’s nod in November. That market debut will test whether investors believe in an Indian implant maker. Between them, Meril and SMT show the citadel is not impregnable; Indian firms can compete in stents and structural-heart devices, where dependence runs deepest. But the fact that only two names stand out is its own verdict on how thin the layer of high-value champions remains. The implant frontier is being contested. It is not yet being won.
| Implant champion | Focus | FY25 revenue | 2025 signal |
|---|---|---|---|
| Meril Life Sciences | Cardiovascular, ortho | ~₹1,730cr | ADIA ~$200m at ~$6.6bn EV |
| Sahajanand (SMT) | Cardiac stents | ~₹1,040cr | IPO approved (Nov) |
The category these two firms contest is narrower than the word implant suggests, and India's position within it is uneven. Cardiac and vascular devices account for 10 to 12 per cent of the market, at very high capital intensity and in regulatory classes C and D, and India is genuinely competitive in coronary stents. Sahajanand Medical Technologies ranks among the world's larger makers there and sells into more than 40 countries, with Translumina a third domestic name. Rhythm management, pacemakers, defibrillators and heart valves remain import-led (reconciled basis, 2026).
Meril's significance lies in having crossed from stents into structural heart, which is where the value and the evidence burden are greatest. Its Myval transcatheter aortic valve is the clearest instance of an Indian firm
competing at the frontier of the category rather than at its commodity end, alongside orthopaedics, endosurgery and in-vitro diagnostics in the same portfolio. Heart valves, stents and dialysis products now feature among the output of production-linked incentive projects (Lok Sabha reply, July 2026).
The capital arithmetic explains why the layer of such firms is thin. An implant business requires ₹5 to 50 crore of manufacturing setup and ₹150 to 400 crore of total capital to reach profitability, over four to seven years. Price ceilings are set by the regulator in exactly its richest lines. The sector's new institutional capital is being raised by people who have made that journey. The ₹1,000 crore dedicated device fund announced in January 2026 is being established as MedArtha Capital by a group led by Ganesh Sabat, formerly chief executive of Sahajanand Medical Technologies.
And it is a pattern, not a one-off. Sovereign wealth (ADIA into Meril) and global PE (KKR into Healthium) now sit alongside domestic IPOs (SMT) and overseas acquisitions (Poly Medicure in Europe). The capital arriving is patient and institutional, drawn by the thesis this read keeps returning to: a big, structurally-growing, under-supplied market with a vast import bill to substitute. For an investor, Healthium is the proof the opportunity is investable at scale; for the sector, it is the consolidation that turns dozens of sub-scale makers into a few national champions with the balance sheets to climb.
The surest sign Indian medtech has become an asset class is the calibre of investor now writing the cheques.
In May 2024 the global private-equity firm KKR agreed to buy Bengaluru’s Healthium Medtech, a maker of surgical sutures, needles and arthroscopy kit, from Apax Partners, at an enterprise value of roughly ₹7,000 crore, about $840 million. The size is not the point. It is one of global private equity’s largest bets on an Indian device maker, and it marks the moment the sector stopped looking like a fragmented cottage industry and started looking like something institutions can own.
The terms of the transaction matter as much as its size, because they establish what the market will pay. The business changed hands at roughly twenty times earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation. The buyer prevailed over a competing consortium of Mankind Pharma, ChrysCapital and Novo Holdings, which is to say that the price was tested rather than negotiated in isolation (Bloomberg, Business Standard and Apax, 2024). The asset had already passed from TPG to Apax in 2018, so the sequence is a private-equity chain of custody rather than a first institutional entry.
Beneath the landmark deal, the aggregate flow has moved by an order of magnitude. Private-equity and venture inflows into the Indian device sector rose from about US$180 million in 2019 to roughly US$1.25 billion in 2025 (BioSpectrum India and IBEF, 2026). Healthcare investors are reported to be redirecting capital from hospital chains towards device makers and diagnostics businesses, steep hospital valuations being cited as the proximate cause (Medical Buyer, 2026).
No second transaction of comparable scale has followed. Indian healthcare merger and acquisition value in September 2026 stood at ₹19 billion. Of that, 88.8 per cent was pharmaceuticals and biotechnology and about 10 per cent healthcare technology, with hospitals leading private-equity value and no large device deal reported (Equirus via Medical Buyer, 8 October 2026). The consolidation thesis therefore rests on one control transaction, a rising flow of growth capital and a thickening public-market route, rather than on a run of comparable deals.
The commitments are larger and more specific than the chapter's summary conveys. Medtronic committed approximately ₹3,000 crore in March 2024 to expand its Hyderabad Engineering and Innovation Center, operating since 2011 with more than 1,400 engineers and its largest research site outside the United States. Siemens Healthineers is building an integrated Bengaluru campus. The cost is €200 million. It is intended to be the firm's largest global site by built-up area, with a further ₹91.9 crore to localise computed-tomography and magnetic-resonance production.
Philips has committed about €174 million over six years, including a Pune research campus of some 300,000 square feet and around 1,900 staff.
The same global giants that fill India’s import bill are quietly starting to build inside the country.
The firms that dominate India’s import bill are no longer just selling into the country. They are putting down roots. The pull comes from PLI incentives, the scale of demand, and the cost of Indian engineering. Medtronic runs its largest R&D centre outside the United States in Hyderabad. Wipro GE HealthCare committed more than ₹8,000 crore of manufacturing and R&D over five years in 2024, a PLI-backed factory included. Siemens Healthineers has stood up PLI-backed CT and MRI lines in Bengaluru, where Philips also runs one of its biggest global innovation campuses.
The shift is strategic, and double-edged. The multinationals India leans on for imports are localising production and research, partly to capture incentives, partly to serve a huge market cheaply, partly to harden their supply chains. That brings high-value manufacturing onshore, which helps the deficit, but keeps the core technology and the deepest value with the
| Multinational | India footprint |
|---|---|
| Medtronic | Largest R&D centre outside the US (Hyderabad) |
| Wipro GE HealthCare | >₹8,000cr over 5 yrs; PLI-backed factory |
| Siemens Healthineers | PLI-backed CT & MRI lines, Bengaluru |
| Philips | Major global innovation campus, Bengaluru |
global firms, which makes for a shallower localisation than a homegrown industry would deliver. The multinationals are part of the answer to India’s dependence: on their own terms.
Several others are building at similar scale. Stryker opened a 140,000 square foot research facility at Whitefield, Bengaluru in September 2025, complementing a 220,000 square foot Gurugram campus running since 2006. Boston Scientific has a second research centre at Pune with 170
engineers, and Becton Dickinson has manufactured needles and syringes at Bawal, Haryana since 2011. Zimmer Biomet stood up a Bengaluru capability centre in 2024 and 2025. Foreign direct investment of up to 100 per cent is permitted in device manufacturing under the automatic route, for greenfield and brownfield alike.
The scale of the surrounding capability base is the part most often missed. India hosts more than 1,800 global delivery centres employing close to two million professionals. Export revenue of around US$64.6 billion was generated in FY2023-24, with roughly 110 centres added between early 2024 and late 2025 and a trajectory towards 2,100 to 2,400 by 2030 (NASSCOM and industry reporting, 2026). Healthcare and medical technology is among the faster-growing verticals within it.
Capital is pouring in from every direction, sovereign, strategic, public, foreign. The one channel still running dry is venture.
The money has two registers. At the top, big strategic and institutional capital flows freely. Foreign direct investment into the sector hit about $627 million in FY25, up 30%, on cumulative FDI of roughly $4.24 billion. Sovereign wealth and global PE have placed landmark bets (ADIA–Meril,
KKR–Healthium), and the public markets are opening to device makers (SMT’s approved IPO, Poly Medicure long since listed). For scaled, proven businesses, India’s device sector is now firmly investable.
At the early stage the picture thins and turns cyclical. Venture and growth funding into Indian medtech and healthtech, hard to prise apart from the wider digital-health flows, ran around $1 billion in 2025, a reset year after the pandemic boom. Roughly $310 million followed in the first half of 2026. A much-quoted “$9.9 billion” is cumulative all-time funding, not annual, and should not be mistaken for a flood. The capital mirrors the market exactly. It is deep and confident for the handful of firms that have reached scale, shallow and choosy for the many that have not. The money goes where the edge is already proven.
The device-specific funnel is the figure to hold, because it is far smaller than the health-technology totals it is routinely confused with. The base stood at approximately 1,087 device startups as at November 2025, up
from about 908 a year earlier. Of those, 318 are funded, 48 have reached Series A or beyond and 31 Series B or beyond, on cumulative all-time device funding of roughly US$1.23 billion (Tracxn, 2025). Medical-device ventures account for only some 2 to 3 per cent of Indian venture activity.
The annual flow is correspondingly small and highly cyclical. Device funding ran at about US$132 million across 36 rounds in 2024 and about US$12.5 million across 18 rounds in early 2025, a pullback rather than a trend break. Globally, medtech venture funding of about US$4.1 billion in the second quarter of 2026 sustained the firmest pace since 2021, with capital concentrating in fewer and later-stage assets. Bengaluru leads on company count at roughly 175 firms, while Mumbai has become the leading hub by value.
Late 2026 shows the same selectivity at the level of individual rounds. Ultrahuman raised US$70 million on 3 September 2026, US$65 million of
equity and US$5 million of debt, at a reported valuation of US$365 million against US$120 million in 2023 and an annual revenue run-rate of US$140 million. Sunfox Technologies raised US$7 million in a Series A on 7 October 2026, and HRS Navigation raised about US$5 million. Bioscan Research raised approximately US$1 million in seed on 22 July 2026. Ayati Devices raised ₹15 crore in its first institutional round. Several weeks of the period record no verifiable device deal at all.
Turn the import story over and you get the export story: a precise map of where India already wins.
For all the focus on the import bill, India runs a real and growing export business in exactly the categories where its edge is genuine. On the government’s narrower trade basket, exports climbed from about ₹18,173 crore in FY19 to ₹31,120 crore in FY25, an 88% jump, around $3.6 billion,
while the broader DGCIS series puts FY25 nearer ₹42,360 crore. The biggest buyers are the United States (about 16%), Germany, France, China and the Netherlands, and consumables make up close to half the total.
The export profile confirms the read’s central split. India sells the world what it makes well, cost-competitive consumables and disposables, with basic diagnostics alongside. It buys what it cannot yet make. The firms that anchor those exports (Poly Medicure foremost) are the same ones now climbing the curve. Exports are not a story apart from substitution; they are the record of where substitution has already succeeded, and a guide to where it goes next. The prize is to push that export edge upward, from disposables toward devices, even as the import bill is attacked from below.
The two export series in circulation move in opposite directions, so read the basket before the trajectory. On the dollar series, exports rose from about US$1.87 billion in FY2017-18 to about US$2.92 billion in FY2021-22 and about US$3.8 billion in FY2023-24, a compound rate of roughly 12 to 14 per cent. They reached about US$4 billion in FY2024-25 (IBEF and India Pharma Outlook, 2026). On the narrower trade basket, exports of ₹28,106 crore are recorded for FY2025-26, which is below the FY2024-25 figure quoted above. The comparison is between baskets, not between years. It should not be presented as a decline.
The forward estimates diverge by a factor of two and a half, which is the honest state of the evidence. The Confederation of Indian Industry
projects exports of up to ₹1,69,000 crore, about US$20 billion, by FY2029-30. That ambition is carried under the industry's '30@2030' framing. It is supported by the Export Promotion Council for Medical Devices, which concluded a memorandum with the Ministry of Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises on 19 July 2026 to strengthen smaller manufacturers' export readiness. Bain & Company, by contrast, projects growth above 20 per cent compound to 2030, which would take exports to nearly US$8 billion.
The one measure on which the sources agree is reach. Indian device exports now travel to approximately 187 countries, against something closer to 125 on a narrower count, and the industry's own framing has shifted from net importer to production and export hub (Medical Buyer,
September 2026). Reach has widened faster than value, which is consistent with an export base still weighted towards low-unit-cost consumables.
India may not build the scanner. But it can write the intelligence that reads the scan, and that is the one frontier where it can leap ahead.
The hardware wall has a software door. India’s deepest advantage, engineering and software talent, maps straight onto the fastest-growing layer of medical technology, clinical AI and software-as-a-medical-device (SaMD). Firms like Qure.ai (which raised $65 million), Niramai in breast-cancer screening and Tricog in cardiac diagnostics are building algorithms that read scans, triage patients and stretch scarce specialist capacity. That is the exact bottleneck a bed-and-doctor-short system runs into.
The logic is hard to argue with. SaMD draws on the input India has in abundance (software talent) rather than the ones it lacks (precision components, capital-heavy fabrication, decades of hardware IP). It scales without factories, and it tackles India’s real clinical shortage, not of machines so much as of the expertise to use them, which AI multiplies. The frontier has friction. Clinical-AI regulation is still maturing under CDSCO,
and reimbursement is unsettled. But of every route up the value curve, software is the one where India can lead rather than follow, building global products from a home base, exactly as its IT industry did a generation ago.
The flagship case is now documented well enough to be measured rather than asserted. Qure.ai, founded in Mumbai in 2016, has raised approximately US$123 million across nine rounds from forty-eight investors. It was valued at around ₹2,230 crore in November 2024, and reported revenue of ₹190 crore for the year ended 31 March 2025, with deployment in more than ninety countries. Its defining asset is regulatory rather than technical. There are eighteen United States Food and Drug Administration clearances, with six further chest-radiograph indications cleared in February 2026, and a Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation grant in January 2026 for point-of-care ultrasound in low- and middle-income countries.
The regulatory frame has hardened considerably since this chapter was written, and it now favours the serious entrant. Artificial-intelligence diagnostic software is a Class C device under the Medical Devices Rules 2017. The final Guidance Document on Medical Device Software was issued in August 2026, superseding the draft of 21 October 2025. It provides an Algorithm Change Protocol permitting pre-specified model updates without fresh approval. Guidance reported in July 2026 additionally requires disclosure of training-data composition and of bias across India-relevant sub-populations (CDSCO, 2026).
The data-protection clock is also now running rather than pending, which is a correction of some consequence for any venture whose moat is its dataset. The Digital Personal Data Protection Rules were notified on 13 November 2025 under G.S.R. 846(E) on a phased timetable. Consent-manager obligations begin from about November 2026. Full compliance is due by 13 May 2027. Penalties under the parent Act of 2023 reach ₹250 crore per instance for serious failures. The same proprietary data that constitutes the product is therefore also its largest compliance exposure.
There is one comparison India cannot escape, and it measures both the size of the prize and the difficulty of claiming it.
Every assessment of Indian medtech is, underneath, a comparison with China. China set out on the same road two decades earlier and arrived where India now wants to be. It built a large domestic device industry on sustained state support, hard localisation mandates, deep component supply chains and heavy R&D. It now exports high-value devices, India included, where it is poised to become a leading source of imports. The contrast stings. India’s device R&D runs below 1% of revenue where China’s leaders spend many times that.
But the comparison points to India’s own opening as much as its lag. India need not retrace China’s hardware-first path. It can lean on different strengths instead, software and clinical AI, frugal innovation for cost-sensitive markets, a vast English-speaking engineering base, and a democratic, IP-respecting setting that appeals to Western partners wary of concentrating in China. The “China-plus-one” reshuffle of medical supply chains is a genuine tailwind. India will not out-manufacture China this decade. The real question is whether it can carve out a position of its own, in software, in consumables, in chosen high-value niches, rather than a smaller copy of China’s.
The comparison can be set out on six measures, and on each of them the gap is wide rather than marginal. India's domestic market stands at roughly US$15 billion against a Chinese market well in excess of US$100 billion, the world's second-largest. India is a net importer, with exports of about US$4.1 billion in FY2024-25. China is a large net exporter. India's import dependence runs 70 to 80 per cent overall and 80 to 85 per cent at the high end, while China is substantially self-reliant across most segments. India holds about 1.6 per cent of the global market and targets 10 to 12 per cent, while China is among the top two (India Briefing, IBEF and Invest India, 2026).
The two remaining measures are the ones that govern the pace of catch-up. On component supply, India carries a 30 to 40 per cent upstream
dependency, much of it on China itself, against a vertically integrated Chinese component base. On policy vintage, India's national policy dates from 2023 and its manufacturing incentive from FY2021-22. Chinese localisation mandates go back decades. China is also close to 20 per cent of India's own import bill, in monitors, imaging components, disposables and low-cost diagnostics, so dependence and competition are the same relationship viewed twice.
The useful reading is positional rather than competitive. India stands roughly where China stood a decade and more ago: large domestic demand, rising policy support, and a manufacturing base climbing from assembly towards components. The gap is widest exactly where capital intensity is highest, in components, advanced imaging and high-end implants, and narrowest in software, consumables and diagnostics, where India already competes.
One distance matters more than any other in this story: the gap between what was promised and what is actually happening.
The defining tension of Indian medtech is ambition against arithmetic. The 2023 target of $50 billion by 2030 needs about 16% growth a year. The market is doing 5.5 to 8% by independent counts, which lands it
at $22–27 billion. The government seems to have absorbed the miss. By March 2026 its ministers were quoting $30 billion, roughly halving the goal without ever formally dropping it. Read plainly, $50 billion was always an aspiration dressed as a forecast, and the realistic destination is the mid-to-high twenties of billions.
That reframing changes how the opportunity should be judged. A $26 billion market in 2030 is still big and still fast-growing, but it is not the transformation the headline sold, and the import bill will likely still be large. Substitution is real but gradual, biting where India can compete and stalling where it can’t. For an operator or investor the move is to discount the target and trust the trend: build the thesis on realistic growth and category-by-category substitution, not on a number the government no longer quite believes.
The spread of 2030 estimates is wider than the chapter's two figures imply, and the spread is itself the finding. Against the policy target of US$50 billion, the Confederation of Indian Industry has repeatedly projected roughly US$44 to 50 billion, while other reporting has carried US$41 to 44 billion. Ministers were quoting US$30 billion by March 2026. A separate market estimate places the sector at US$18.30 billion in 2026 rising to only
US$26.66 billion by 2031, a compound rate near 7.82 per cent (Medical Buyer and Business Standard, 2026). Four credible figures for one year, differing by a factor of nearly two, is not a forecast.
On the organic growth rate, the reconciled basis used in Volge's internal work is 10 to 15 per cent a year. That sits above the 5.5 to 8 per cent modelled by some independent houses and below the near 20 per cent the target requires. The arithmetic of the target is therefore demanding rather than impossible. The market would need to multiply roughly 3.6 times in five years from its FY2024-25 base. The target has never been formally withdrawn, which is why the lower official figure and the original one continue to circulate together.
What should be discounted is the number, not the direction. A market in the high twenties to mid forties of billions of dollars by 2030 is in every version of the estimate far larger than today's, and in every version the import bill remains substantial. The operator's and the investor's thesis should be built on the growth rate and on category-by-category substitution, both of which can be observed, rather than on a destination figure that four reputable sources cannot agree.
The demand is certain and the capital is here. What holds India back is a stack of constraints that reinforce one another.
The barriers are no mystery. They are well documented, they feed on each other, and five of them gate the climb:
None of this is intractable, but none of it is quick. Each demands sustained, unglamorous reform rather than one decisive stroke. The work is fixing the duty inversion and building testing capacity, funding component manufacturing and growing the talent base. How fast those happen sets the pace of substitution, which is why the realistic path runs below the target.
Two of these constraints can be quantified more closely, and the quantification is unflattering. On quality and regulatory capacity, the sanction of 1,500 additional posts within the regulator was confirmed in 2026. That is an admission of the scale of the existing shortfall rather than a solution to it. Conformity to the Bureau of Indian Standards Scheme X became a condition of lawful manufacture and import for notified devices from 1 September 2026. ISO 13485 qualification takes six to twelve months and costs ₹10 to 30 lakh, a real barrier for an industry that is 70 to 75 per cent small enterprises.
On research, the binding constraint is translation rather than invention. Medical technology and biotechnology together account for roughly 10 per cent of patents filed in India, comparable to computer technology, yet most published research does not reach a market. The clearest evidence is the output of the strongest translational centres. The Healthcare Technology Innovation Centre at IIT Madras has carried six products to market. The Biomedical Engineering and Technology Innovation Centre at IIT Bombay reports 450 documented unmet needs, 55 patents filed, 25 devices, 16 startups incubated and 14 products licensed to industry. Those are commendable numbers for a centre and small ones for a country.
The attrition this implies is steep. Between 30 and 40 per cent of funded Indian medtech startups are expected to fail or be acquired within a two-year horizon, and only 48 of 318 funded device companies have reached Series A or beyond. None of the five constraints is intractable; each
requires sustained and unglamorous reform; and the pace of that reform, not the ambition above it, sets the pace of substitution.
The way into Indian medtech is navigable. The hazards along it are specific, and worth naming.
For a maker or investor, market access now runs through a defined gate. That gate is CDSCO licensing by risk class, the price caps in regulated categories, public-procurement preference rules, and, for anyone building locally, the PLI incentives and the device parks. The workable strategies cluster into three: localise to capture PLI and procurement preference; partner a domestic champion for distribution and regulatory navigation; or compete in software and consumables, where the barriers are lowest and India’s edge is real.
Three risks could bend the path. The first is policy inconsistency, the gap between the duty schedule and the localisation goal, or a price cap landing without warning, can void a business case overnight; the Medtronic-and-Abbott stent affair is the warning. The second is that substitution simply stalls, leaving the import bill stubbornly high and the target out of
reach. The third is that “China-plus-one” disappoints: the supply-chain reshuffle India is counting on may favour other low-cost makers, or China may tighten its grip on the Indian import market instead. None of these reverses a structurally growing market. Each decides who captures it, and how fast.
The gate has become more specific since this chapter was written. The dates are now the operative detail. Conformity to Bureau of Indian Standards Scheme X has been required for notified devices since 1 September 2026. The 354-device Global Tender Enquiry exemption list, which governs public-procurement access for imported equipment, closed for consultation on 15 July 2026 and remained undecided at October 2026. The India-United Kingdom trade agreement entered into force on 15 July 2026, carrying a mutual-recognition framework that eases United Kingdom access for CDSCO and ICMED-certified product. Full compliance with the data-protection rules falls due on 13 May 2027.
The support instruments are equally specific and are open rather than announced. Under the Scheme for Strengthening the Medical Device Industry, assistance of up to ₹5 crore per applicant is available for clinical investigation and post-market follow-up studies. A one-time reimbursement capital subsidy of up to ₹10 crore is also on offer, for domestic production of components, raw materials and finished devices presently imported in quantity. The Startup India Fund of Funds 2.0, a ₹10,000 crore scheme notified in 2026, widens the runway for device, diagnostics and software ventures.
One risk, in its 2026 form, now sits closer than this chapter allows. The trade-margin instrument, applied to 137 anti-cancer drugs with effect from 9 November 2026, is reported to be under consideration for devices such as intravenous kits and catheters. A proposed amendment to Rule 30(1) would permit regulators to order a licensee to cease manufacture or sale and to supervise destruction of a device. Policy inconsistency remains the sharpest hazard, and it is now a question of which instrument arrives first rather than whether one does.
The binding question is whether the structural reforms move fast enough to push substitution past mere assembly. Those reforms are the duty
inversion and component manufacturing, with testing capacity and talent alongside. The market reaches the mid-to-high twenties of billions by 2030 either way. Whether India captures a growing share of it, or stays a great buyer, comes down to those unglamorous fixes.
What Indian medtech should look like by 2028, if the next three years run true to form.
Over the next two to three years, the device market will keep growing hard and substituting selectively, its centre of gravity shifting in ways you can already see. Four developments look most likely:
Several of these developments now carry dates. The next three years are unusually legible. The medical-device production-linked incentive closes in March 2027, and the Department has said that no further application rounds are under consideration. A successor instrument or a duty-and-procurement reform must therefore carry the substitution agenda from that point. Full compliance with the data-protection rules falls due on 13 May 2027. The draft Drugs, Medical Devices and Cosmetics Bill, 2026 remains contested by eleven industry associations seeking a separate Medical Devices Act, so the regulatory modernisation listed above should be read as probable rather than scheduled.
The research and capital instruments, by contrast, are already disbursing. The research and innovation scheme approved 41 projects under its first call, with ₹1,600 crore of government assistance against ₹3,020 crore of expected private investment. Nine of them are novel device projects and nineteen are led by startups and small enterprises. A dedicated ₹1,000 crore device fund is being stood up to deploy equity, quasi-equity and debt in tickets of ₹5 to 50 crore. Both are instruments of the component-and-capability problem rather than of final assembly, which is the right target.
The likeliest shape of the period is accordingly export-led rather than substitution-led. Bain & Company projects device exports growing above 20 per cent compound to 2030, potentially reaching nearly US$8 billion. India is estimated to be capable of emerging as a US$7 billion contract-manufacturing hub by 2035 (Medical Buyer, 2026). Both of those routes build capability for other people's products. That capability comes first. Whether it converts into Indian-owned high-value devices is the question the decade after this one will answer.
So the opportunity is real but uneven, taken category by category. India already wins the low-value end and exports it. It still imports the high-value end and struggles to build it. Its clearest path to lead rather than follow runs through software, clinical AI and SaMD, where it can draw on the
talent it has instead of the components it lacks. The capital has worked this out. It pools where the edge is proven.
The whole argument, in one place, with the evidence behind it.
India’s medtech market is big, structurally growing, and defined by one asymmetry. It buys far more than it makes. The roughly $8 billion import bill, widening, not closing, is the exact measure of the opportunity. The policy machinery behind closing it is real: a national policy, a ₹3,420 crore PLI scheme, device parks, a modernising regulator. But ambition keeps outrunning arithmetic. The $50 billion-by-2030 target has quietly become $30 billion against an analyst trend of $22–27 billion. The deepest barriers, component dependence, thin R&D, price controls, the inverted duty, are the ones no target can fix.
For the operator and the investor, the read is to discount the headline and trust the structure. The structure is a vast, under-supplied, growing
market, substituting selectively, won by whoever solves the component-and-capability problem one category at a time.
Three corrections should be carried forward with this read, because a reader may hold the superseded figures. Take the first. The production-linked incentive numbers most often quoted for devices, cumulative sales of ₹2,315.44 crore, exports of ₹508.12 crore and imports avoided of ₹1,807.32 crore, belong to the bulk-drugs scheme and are withdrawn. The device scheme's own cumulative eligible sales stood at ₹13,624.52 crore to December 2025, of which ₹6,425.48 crore was exported, with 24 greenfield projects commissioned and 57 products in production. Second, the line "investment realised ₹33,534 crore against ₹17,275 crore" belongs to the Pharmaceuticals scheme and now reads ₹46,744 crore as at June 2026. Third, the device scheme closes in March 2027 with no further application rounds.
Two measurement bases have also moved, and both should be stated as ranges. Device imports are now carried at ₹89,000 to 94,700 crore for FY2025-26 depending on the trade basket applied, against exports of ₹28,106 crore. The Government's own statement is that imports meet about 60 per cent of domestic consumption. The market is re-based to a FY2025-26 row of about US$15 to 16 billion, with the band of US$12 to 18 billion held and the competing estimates named rather than averaged. EY and CII put FY2025-26 at US$12 to 15 billion, industry reporting at US$15 to 16 billion, and one house at US$18.3 billion.
None of this changes the argument, and all of it changes its precision. The import bill remains the measure of the prize, and the prize remains uneven across the eight categories. The component layer and the research intensity beneath the finished device remain the binding constraints. The data-protection rules notified on 13 November 2025, phasing to full compliance on 13 May 2027, are now a live obligation for every connected and software-led device rather than a prospective one.
Nine conclusions for the people who must act on this market.
The engineering work the sector asks for, and the form it takes on an engagement.
Medical devices are now networked products under regulatory supervision, so the engineering they need sits across security, data and compliance at once. The work below is what device makers, hospital groups and investors in this market commission. Each is delivered by senior engineers working inside the client's own team, with the Global Delivery Centres running what has been built once it is in production.
A manufacturer in India should settle its regulatory classification and its quality system before it designs for scale. The licensing regime sorts devices by risk class, and the evidence required differs sharply between those classes (Central Drugs Standard Control Organisation, 2017). Class decides the evidence, and the evidence decides the timetable. Getting that wrong late is expensive. Volge's first pass is usually a gap review against the applicable class rather than against a general standard, because a general standard flatters almost everybody who reads it.
Quality management is an operating discipline, not a certificate on a wall. The international standard for medical device quality systems requires design history and change control that are current at any moment, not at audit time (International Organisation for Standardisation, 2016). Digitising
that record is ordinary engineering and it is rarely done well. Submissions then draw on it directly. A manufacturer whose design history lives in spreadsheets pays for it twice, once at licensing and again at the first field complaint.
An engagement of this kind runs in sequence, because the artefacts depend on one another. Product and asset data have to exist before quality digitisation can be scoped, and the quality record has to exist before a submission package is credible. The opening quarter is therefore narrow. It covers one product family, with a digitised design history and a surveillance pipeline behind it. Volge embeds engineers inside the client's own quality and regulatory functions, under an architect who stays through the first submission.
Measurement should track the record, not the project. Time from design change to approved documentation, and time from field complaint to closed investigation, are the two numbers that predict whether a licence survives inspection. Neither is expensive to measure. The common failures are familiar enough, in that firms digitise the quality system without changing who owns it, and scope cybersecurity for the device alone when the regulator is now asking about its gateway and its cloud service too.
The bodies cited in this read for market size, trade, policy and funding figures, with the year the text attributes to each.
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