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The $5 Trillion Patient : State of Play of MedTech in the GCC

GCC MEDTECH · STATE OF PLAY 2026
The world’s heaviest disease burden meets a market that can buy any device and make almost none, and the sovereign capital now trying to change that.
~94%
devices imported (Saudi)
25.6%
diabetes (Kuwait)
$159B
health spend, 2029
GCC 2026

State of Play is a read on a sector: its size, its structure, where the money moves and what moves it. Each edition takes one market and sets out what is known, what is claimed, and what the difference between the two is worth to anyone deciding where to commit.

The world’s heaviest disease burden meets a market that can buy any device and make almost none, and the sovereign capital now trying to change that. The Gulf’s medical-technology market read in full: the disease burden that drives it, the import dependence that defines it, and the sovereign capital trying to localise it.

Figures carry their basis and their date. Where published estimates disagree, the range is given and the basis named rather than averaged away, and where a widely quoted number does not survive checking it is corrected here rather than repeated. Every chart plots a figure stated in the text, and nothing is projected beyond what a named source projects.

Contents

01Introduction
  1. 02The Gulf can buy any device. It cannot yet make them.
  2. 05The $5 trillion patient
  3. 06A market sized in a band
  4. 08The import dependence
  5. 10The heaviest burden on earth
  6. 11The demand chain
  7. 12The payer: the state, and the mandate
02Deep dive
  1. 16The build-out
  2. 17Medical cities, privatised
  3. 19The regulators
  4. 20Procurement: NUPCO and the joint buy
  5. 21The fragmentation problem
  6. 22The localisation levers
  7. 23The registration reality
03Real-world application
  1. 26Sovereign capital: the defining feature
  2. 27Saudi Arabia: PIF and Vision 2030
  3. 28The UAE: the Abu Dhabi triad
  4. 30Qatar and the smaller states
  5. 31The regional champion: PureHealth
  6. 32M42 and the AI hospital
  7. 33The multinationals, pulled onshore
  8. 35The manufacturing reality
  9. 36Digital and AI adjacency
  10. 37The capital and the deals
04The read
  1. 40Saudi Arabia versus the UAE: two models
  2. 41The localisation gap
  3. 42The workforce constraint
  4. 44Market access, and what could go wrong
  5. 45The next two to three years
  6. 46The read, on a page
  7. 47Key takeaways
  8. 48Volge's expertise in MedTech
  9. •Sources
MedTechState of Play01 •

The Gulf can buy any device. It cannot yet make them.

A single gap drives everything that follows: the world’s heaviest demand for medical devices, met by one of its smallest abilities to make them.

The Gulf car­ries one of the planet’s heav­iest per-cap­ita dis­ease bur­dens. Dia­betes rates are among the highest on earth, and car­di­ovas­cu­lar dis­ease is the lead­ing killer. It pays for the treat­ment without flinch­ing, the state foot­ing a bill head­ing to­ward $159 bil­lion a year by 2029. And yet it makes al­most none of the in­stru­ments that treat­ment needs. Saudi Ar­a­bia im­ports about 94% of its med­ical devices, the UAE around 98%. That gap, lav­ish and well-fun­ded de­mand against near-total im­port de­pend­ence, is the de­fin­ing fea­ture of Gulf medtech. The whole stra­tegic con­test is the fight to close it.

The fight is un­like any other mar­ket’s, be­cause the Gulf is try­ing to buy its way to a do­mestic in­dustry with sov­er­eign cap­ital. Saudi Ar­a­bia’s Pub­lic In­vest­ment Fund, Abu Dhabi’s Mubadala and ADQ, Qatar’s QIA: all are de­ploy­ing state wealth and loc­al­isa­tion man­dates (re­gional-headquar­ters

rules, local-con­tent pref­er­ences, cent­ral pro­cure­ment) to turn the im­port bill into home-grown cap­ab­il­ity. The at­tempt has three con­sequences.

  • The de­mand is real, struc­tural and state-fun­ded. The dis­ease bur­den is not cyc­lical and the payer is sov­er­eign, so the mar­ket grows al­most re­gard­less of con­di­tions: the surest found­a­tion in global medtech.
  • The sup­ply is al­most en­tirely for­eign. The Gulf makes low-value con­sum­ables and im­ports everything else; the deep value flows to a hand­ful of mul­tina­tion­als.
  • Sov­er­eign will is being tested against sov­er­eign cap­ab­il­ity. Cap­ital and man­dates can com­pel loc­al­isa­tion of headquar­ters and as­sembly, but whether they build a genu­ine man­u­fac­tur­ing base, against a tiny in­dus­trial base and six frag­men­ted mar­kets, is the open ques­tion.

The Gulf medtech op­por­tun­ity is thus the richest de­mand in the world bolted to the thin­nest sup­ply. Value goes to who­ever helps con­vert the im­port bill into local cap­ab­il­ity, on the sov­er­eign’s terms.

Two con­di­tions should be added, and both sharpen the ar­gu­ment. The first is the com­par­ator for the dis­ease bur­den, which the chapter leaves im­plied. Adult dia­betes pre­val­ence across the six states runs from 18.7 to 25.6 per cent on the In­ter­na­tional Dia­betes Fed­er­a­tion's 11th edi­tion, pub­lished in 2025 on 2024 es­tim­ates. The global rate is 11.1 per cent. At its low­est the re­gional fig­ure is more than half again the world rate, and at its

MedTechState of Play02 •

highest well above twice it. The re-based series also re­orders the re­gion, Qatar now stand­ing second ahead of Saudi Ar­a­bia.

Even the lowest Gulf diabetes rate is well above the world rate
per cent of adults
07.51522.53011.1World18.7Lowest Gulf state25.6Highest Gulf state
Source: International Diabetes Federation

The second is the mag­nitude of the cap­ital ar­rayed against the gap. The Gulf's largest sov­er­eign funds com­mand in the order of $5 tril­lion, a fig­ure ex­pec­ted to ap­proach $18 tril­lion by 2050. The Pub­lic In­vest­ment Fund, Mubadala and the Qatar In­vest­ment Au­thor­ity de­ployed close to $25 bil­lion between them in a single quarter of 2025. No com­par­able con­cen­tra­tion of pa­tient cap­ital is avail­able to any other im­port-de­pend­ent device mar­ket. That is why the Gulf case is not a vari­ation on the In­dian or South-East Asian one.

The con­test is also nar­rower than the re­gional fram­ing sug­gests. Of roughly 400 Gulf health­care trans­ac­tions re­cor­ded between 2021 and April 2025, Saudi Ar­a­bia and the UAE ac­coun­ted for about 92 per cent. Whatever in­dustry is built will there­fore be built in two mar­kets, and the re­main­ing four will par­ti­cip­ate as buy­ers and as part­ners in pooled pro­cure­ment.

The reg­u­lator's own li­cens­ing ledger states the con­di­tion more plainly than any trade stat­istic. At the end of 2025 the Saudi Food and Drug Au­thor­ity held 9,155 li­censed fa­cil­it­ies across all its sec­tors, against 7,750 a year earlier. Within the med­ical devices sec­tor it li­censed 25 factor­ies and 1,313 ware­houses (Saudi Food and Drug Au­thor­ity, 2026). One fact­ory for every fifty-two ware­houses. A re­gister which grows mainly in stor­age de­scribes an im­port and dis­tri­bu­tion eco­nomy rather than an in­dus­trial one.

The same ratio ex­plains why li­cence counts flat­ter the loc­al­isa­tion story. Ware­house per­mits fol­low im­port volume and im­port volume fol­lows the hos­pital build-out, so a re­gister ex­pand­ing at eight­een per cent in a single year can be read as in­dus­trial pro­gress when it is in fact rising through­put (Saudi Food and Drug Au­thor­ity, 2026). The ques­tion to put to any loc­al­isa­tion claim is which of the two lines it moves. Factor­ies, or ware­houses. Only one of them nar­rows the gap this read is about.

MedTechState of Play03 •

The part in brief

  1. 01The state bill for treatment is heading toward $159 billion a year by 2029, yet Saudi Arabia buys about 94% of its devices abroad and the UAE 98%.
  2. 02Adult diabetes across the six states runs between 18.7 and 25.6 per cent, against a world rate of 11.1 per cent on the 2025 Federation series.
  3. 03Sovereign funds in the region hold on the order of $5 trillion, a sum expected to near $18 trillion by 2050, which no other import-dependent market can match.
  4. 04Three sovereign investors put close to $25 billion into play in a single quarter of 2025, pairing that capital with localisation mandates on headquarters and content.
  5. 05Saudi Arabia and the UAE took about 92 per cent of roughly 400 regional healthcare deals from 2021 to April 2025, so any industry gets built in two markets.
MedTechState of Play04 •
01

The Problem

The heaviest demand on earth, met by a market that makes almost nothing.

The $5 trillion patient

The Gulf spends like a patient who can afford any treatment, and cannot make the instruments of its own care.

Treated as a single pa­tient, the Gulf would be wealthy and age­ing, car­ry­ing one of the heav­iest dis­ease loads in the world, with the means to pay for any care it needs. It spends prodi­giously. Re­gional health ex­pendit­ure is on track from about $109 bil­lion in 2024 to $159 bil­lion by 2029, grow­ing nearly 8% a year, and the state pays the bill. The “$5 tril­lion” of the title is rhet­or­ical, the cu­mu­lat­ive weight of a re­gion pour­ing vast sums into its own health. The lit­eral medtech mar­ket is a more mod­est $11 to $17 bil­lion. But the meta­phor holds. The Gulf is a for­mid­able buyer of med­ical tech­no­logy.

What it is not is a maker. The de­fin­ing fact of Gulf medtech is the chasm between this lav­ish, state-fun­ded de­mand and an al­most non-ex­ist­ent do­mestic sup­ply. Saudi Ar­a­bia im­ports roughly 94% of its devices, the UAE around 98%. The pa­tient can buy the finest scan­ner, the new­est im­plant, the most ad­vanced dia­lysis ma­chine; it pro­duces vir­tu­ally none of them. The gap is the sub­ject of this read: why it ex­ists, what it costs, and how sov­er­eign cap­ital is now try­ing to close it.

Key takeaways
  • The Gulf is a great buyer, neg­li­gible maker of med­ical devices.
The Gulf can afford any treatment on earth. It simply cannot make the instruments of its own care, yet.
  • Health spend runs from $109B (2024) to $159B (2029), state-fun­ded.
  • Im­port de­pend­ence is near-total: ~94% Saudi, ~98% UAE.

The pa­tient's means are un­even, and the un­even­ness gov­erns how the mar­ket is ap­proached. Gross do­mestic product per head ranges from about $23,000 in Oman to roughly $81,000 in Qatar, among the highest fig­ures in the world. Cur­rent health ex­pendit­ure runs from 2.6 per cent of GDP in Qatar to 6.0 per cent in Oman (Gulf Health Eco­nom­ics As­so­ci­ation, 2024). Dubai alone spends around $1,200 per head. Will­ing­ness to pay is there­fore high across the re­gion. The fiscal head­room be­hind it dif­fers by a factor of three.

In­stalled ca­pa­city is thin­ner than the spend­ing im­plies, and that gap is it­self a de­mand driver. Hos­pital beds run at only 1.2 to 2.2 per 1,000 pop­u­la­tion and phys­i­cians at 1.0 to 3.1 per 1,000 (World Bank, 2017 to 2021), both below de­veloped-mar­ket norms, against life ex­pect­ancy of 74 years in Oman and 82 in Qatar. A wealthy pop­u­la­tion with premium care stand­ards and sub-OECD ca­pa­city sus­tains a con­tinu­ous build-out of fa­cil­it­ies and equip­ment rather than a one-off re­place­ment cycle.

MedTechState of Play05 •
GDP per capita across the six states
US$
Qatar81,000UAE49,000Saudi Arabia33,000Kuwait33,000Bahrain29,000Oman23,000
Source: World Bank and IMF, 2024
Beds and doctors both run below developed-market norms across the Gulf
per 1,000 population
012341.2Beds, lowest2.2Beds, highest1Doctors, lowest3.1Doctors, highest
Source: World Bank, 2017 to 2021

The cost of the bur­den has been quan­ti­fied in at least one dis­ease. Dia­betes alone cost the six states more than $13.2 bil­lion in 2019, which is of

the same order as the en­tire re­gional device mar­ket on a nar­row defin­i­tion. The meta­phor of the title there­fore holds in a more exact sense than rhet­oric: the pa­tient's treat­ment bill for one con­di­tion ap­proaches the value of all the in­stru­ments used to treat every con­di­tion.

A market sized in a band

There is no single trustworthy figure for the Gulf device market, only a band, and a warning not to mistake it for the region around it.

The Gulf med­ical-device mar­ket res­ists pre­cise siz­ing, and an hon­est read ad­mits it. Es­tim­ates for 2024 run from about $11.3 bil­lion (Statista’s con­ser­vat­ive, in­tern­ally-con­sist­ent meas­ure) to about $17.2 bil­lion (Mar­ket Re­search Fu­ture’s broader bas­ket). The spread is driven not by error but by defin­i­tion, by whether the fig­ure folds in in-vitro dia­gnostics, con­sum­ables and di­gital health. The de­fens­ible fram­ing is the band: roughly $11 to $17 bil­lion in 2024, grow­ing 6 to 7% a year to­ward the early 2030s.

Two cau­tions for any­one siz­ing the prize. First, never mis­take the GCC for the wider Middle East and Africa. Fig­ures of $11 bil­lion (Grand View, Middle East) or $24.6 bil­lion (For­tune, MEA) de­scribe lar­ger geo­graph­ies and must not pass for Gulf-only. Second, Saudi Ar­a­bia and the UAE dom­in­ate, to­gether more than 80% of re­gional health spend­ing, Saudi alone around

MedTechState of Play06 •

60%, so “the Gulf mar­ket” is really two large mar­kets and four small ones. The cleaner an­chor than any device es­tim­ate is the health-ex­pendit­ure back­drop, which is well-sourced and un­am­bigu­ous: up, fast, and state-driven.

Two of the four published estimates are not the Gulf at all
US$ bn
06.212.518.82511Grand View, Middle East11.3Statista, GCC narrow17.2Market Research Future,GCC broad24.6Fortune, Middle Eastand Africa
Source: Statista

The band should be widened at the lower bound. On the re­con­ciled basis now car­ried in­tern­ally, a nar­row device defin­i­tion sits near $8.3 bil­lion for 2025. A broad med­ical-equip­ment defin­i­tion reaches about $17.15 bil­lion for 2024, so the de­fens­ible range is roughly $8 to $17 bil­lion rather than $11 to $17 bil­lion. Growth of about 7 per cent a year takes the broad basis to ap­prox­im­ately $36.21 bil­lion by 2035, a mul­tiple of about 2.1 times. The floor moves with the defin­i­tion, not with the evid­ence.

On the reconciled basis the broad market more than doubles by 2035
US$ billion
0102030408.3Narrow, 202517.1Broad, 202436.2Broad, 2035
Source: Market Research Future
Medical-device market by country, latest available
US$ bn
UAE (2024, broad)3.8Saudi Arabia (2024)2.3Kuwait (2025)0.7Qatar (2024)0.7Bahrain (2024)0.4
Source: MarknTel, Market Research Future and Statista, 2025

The coun­try fig­ures carry the same haz­ard in a sharper form, and it is a haz­ard of arith­metic rather than of re­port­ing. Per-coun­try val­ues are drawn from dif­fer­ent re­search houses on dif­fer­ent scopes and are not

MedTechState of Play07 •

strictly com­par­able. The UAE fig­ure of about $3.8 bil­lion for 2024 rests on a broad basis, while Saudi Ar­a­bia's $2.34 bil­lion for the same year rests on a device basis. Read without that flag, the series ap­pears to show the UAE as the lar­ger mar­ket, which no source ac­tu­ally claims. Coun­try val­ues should never be summed to a re­gional total.

Growth is fast­est where the mar­ket is least like hard­ware. Wear­able health devices are pro­jec­ted to rise from about $1.05 bil­lion to­ward $3.12 bil­lion by 2032, roughly 17 per cent a year and more than twice the mar­ket av­er­age. That is the clearest nu­mer­ical sign that the fast­est seg­ment of Gulf medtech is also the one least gated by man­u­fac­tur­ing.

The import dependence

The single defining number of Gulf medtech is the share it does not make, and it is almost everything.

Im­port de­pend­ence is the heart of this read, and the Gulf wears it more starkly than al­most any­where. Saudi Ar­a­bia, the re­gion’s largest mar­ket, im­ports about 94% of its device de­mand, on fig­ures from the of­fi­cial Saudi In­dus­trial Cen­ter. That is against a do­mestic mar­ket of roughly SAR 20 bil­lion served by some 45 local man­u­fac­tur­ers hold­ing per­haps 6% of it. The UAE is more de­pend­ent still, im­port­ing an es­tim­ated 98%, its local

pro­duc­tion lim­ited to pro­to­types, spare parts and basic dis­pos­ables like gloves and syr­inges.

The de­pend­ence has a shape. High-value devices come over­whelm­ingly from the United States and Ger­many, with Japan and China climb­ing. Those are the ima­ging sys­tems and the im­plants, along with sur­gical ro­bot­ics and dia­gnostic equip­ment. What little the Gulf makes sits at the low-value end, in con­sum­ables and com­mod­it­ies. Saudi Ar­a­bia’s own fram­ing is can­did, the coun­try is “re­pos­i­tion­ing from a man­u­fac­turer of low-value com­mod­it­ies (band­ages, gloves, syr­inges) to high-value med­ical products,” which is an ad­mis­sion that, today, the high-value end is im­por­ted whole­sale. No source pins a single pre­cise GCC-wide fig­ure, but the coun­try num­bers leave no doubt. In med­ical devices, the Gulf is a buyer, and al­most noth­ing else.

Quick facts: the import dependence
Saudi devices imported~94%
UAE devices imported~98%
Saudi local manufacturers~45
Saudi local market share~6%
High-value source countriesUS · Germany

A share of spend­ing is the bet­ter meas­ure than a count of factor­ies, and on that meas­ure the de­pend­ence is starker still. Re­gion-wide, about 96 per cent of med­ical devices are im­por­ted, chiefly from the United States and

MedTechState of Play08 •

Ger­many, and less than 3 per cent of Saudi device spend­ing reaches loc­ally made product, al­most all of it low-tech­no­logy con­sum­ables. A li­cence count re­wards per­mits; a spend share weights value, and it is the spend share that meas­ures the prize.

Local makers hold 6 per cent of the Saudi market and less of its spending
per cent
025507510096Imported, region-wide6Local makers' share3Local share of spend
Source: Saudi Industrial Center

The de­pend­ence also runs below the level of the fin­ished device. Com­pon­ents, in­tel­lec­tual prop­erty and high-end cap­ital equip­ment are al­most wholly ex­ternal, so even the mod­est local as­sembly that ex­ists re­lies on im­por­ted in­puts. The con­sequence is that loc­al­ising final as­sembly moves the im­port line down the bill of ma­ter­i­als rather than off it, and any claim of local con­tent must be read against the ori­gin of the com­pon­ents.

The shape of the de­pend­ence maps cleanly onto device cat­egory. It is near-total in ima­ging and ra­di­ology, and very high in sur­gical and

Imports supply at least 94 per cent on every measure
per cent of devices imported
025507510094Saudi Arabia96Region-wide98UAE
Source: Saudi Industrial Center

or­tho­paedic im­plants and in car­diac and vas­cu­lar devices. De­pend­ence is high in in-vitro dia­gnostic in­stru­ments and re­agents and in pa­tient mon­it­or­ing. It is mod­er­ate only in con­sum­ables and dis­pos­ables, where the lim­ited local pro­duc­tion sits. Soft­ware as a med­ical device stands out­side the logic en­tirely, being gated by tal­ent and data rather than by man­u­fac­ture.

This bur­den is the en­gine of device de­mand, and it is struc­tural, not cyc­lical, the product of rapid life­style trans­ition, diet and demo­graph­ics, not a passing shock. Its con­sequences cas­cade straight into spe­cific device mar­kets: dia­betes and hy­per­ten­sion drive end-stage renal dis­ease and a vast dia­lysis-equip­ment need; car­di­ovas­cu­lar dis­ease drives car­diac devices and ima­ging; obesity drives meta­bolic and sur­gical de­mand. Saudi Ar­a­bia is already the Gulf’s largest dia­betes-care-device mar­ket. The

MedTechState of Play09 •

de­mand side of Gulf medtech needs no spec­u­la­tion. It is vis­ible, meas­ured, and among the most acute in the world.

The heaviest burden on earth

The demand that funds all of this is not a forecast. It is a present, measured, exceptional disease load.

The Gulf spends so much on med­ical tech­no­logy be­cause, by sev­eral meas­ures, it is among the sick­est pop­u­la­tions on earth for chronic dis­ease. Dia­betes is the head­line: on the In­ter­na­tional Dia­betes Fed­er­a­tion’s age-stand­ard­ised fig­ures for 2024, Kuwait runs at 25.6% of adults, among the highest rates any­where. Qatar is at 24.6%, Saudi Ar­a­bia at 23.1%, Bahrain at 22.1%, the UAE at 20.7% and Oman at 17.0%. Obesity tracks along­side, Kuwait, Saudi Ar­a­bia and Qatar all near the global top. Car­di­ovas­cu­lar dis­ease is the lead­ing cause of death across the re­gion, roughly 45% of all deaths.

The fig­ures above are the In­ter­na­tional Dia­betes Fed­er­a­tion's 11th edi­tion, pub­lished in 2025 on 2024 es­tim­ates, on age-stand­ard­ised com­par­at­ive pre­val­ence for adults aged 20 to 79. The cita­tion needs stat­ing pre­cisely. The 9th-edi­tion series has been su­per­seded and is still widely quoted. The com­par­ator that gives the fig­ures mean­ing is a global rate of 11.1 per cent. The su­per­seded val­ues put the Gulf range at about 15 to 22 per cent. On

the re-based series Qatar ranks second, ahead of Saudi Ar­a­bia, a re­order­ing that any coun­try-level read­ing must now re­flect.

Adult diabetes prevalence, against the global rate
% of adults, age-standardised
Kuwait25.6Qatar24.6Saudi Arabia23.1Bahrain22.1UAE20.7Oman18.7World11.1
Source: International Diabetes Federation, 11th edition, 2025

The wider bur­den is quan­ti­fied on the same basis. Adult obesity runs from roughly 23 per cent in Oman to about 38 per cent in Kuwait, and dia­betes alone cost the six states more than $13.2 bil­lion in 2019. The can­cer bur­den is the fast­est-mov­ing com­pon­ent. An es­tim­ated 42,475 new cases were re­cor­ded in 2020, at age-stand­ard­ised in­cid­ence of about 96.5 and mor­tal­ity of about 52.3 per 100,000. The case­load is pro­jec­ted to rise by between 116 per cent in Saudi Ar­a­bia and 270 per cent in Qatar, reach­ing roughly 104,000 cases by 2040 (Alessy and oth­ers, 2024).

Demo­graphy com­pounds all of it. A matur­ing cit­izen pop­u­la­tion and large ex­pat­ri­ate work­forces con­tinu­ously broaden the pa­tient base, so the

MedTechState of Play10 •
Gulf obesity runs higher still than its world-leading diabetes rates
per cent of adults
01020304038Obesity, Kuwait25.6Diabetes, Kuwait23Obesity, Oman11.1Diabetes, world
Source: International Diabetes Federation
Every Gulf state sits above twice the world diabetes rate except Oman
per cent of adults, 2024
Kuwait25.6Qatar24.6Saudi Arabia23.1Bahrain22.1UAE20.7Oman17
Source: International Diabetes Federation

bur­den is ad­dit­ive rather than cyc­lical, and the device cat­egor­ies it feeds are pre­cisely those the re­gion can­not yet make.

The demand chain

A disease burden becomes a device market through a specific, traceable chain, and the Gulf’s runs at full strength.

Sick­ness con­verts into device de­mand along a chain worth tra­cing, be­cause it shows ex­actly where the Gulf’s spend­ing lands. It starts with the meta­bolic bur­den, world-lead­ing dia­betes and obesity, and runs through the com­plic­a­tions to the equip­ment that treats them:

  • Dia­betes and hy­per­ten­sion drive end-stage renal dis­ease, Saudi Ar­a­bia alone counts tens of thou­sands of dia­lysis pa­tients, cre­at­ing a large and grow­ing mar­ket for dia­lysis ma­chines, con­sum­ables and the ser­vices around them.
  • Car­di­ovas­cu­lar dis­ease, the re­gion’s lead­ing killer, drives de­mand for car­diac devices, stents, pace­makers and the ima­ging that dia­gnoses them.
  • Dia­betes man­age­ment it­self drives con­tinu­ous gluc­ose mon­it­ors, in­sulin pumps and de­liv­ery devices: in­sulin-de­liv­ery alone makes up over half the Gulf dia­betes-device mar­ket.
  • An age­ing, ex­pat­ri­ate-heavy pop­u­la­tion and rising can­cer in­cid­ence drive ima­ging, on­co­logy and sur­gical equip­ment across the build-out of new hos­pit­als.

The chain mat­ters be­cause it tells a maker or in­vestor pre­cisely which cat­egor­ies the Gulf’s epi­demi­ology guar­an­tees de­mand for, whatever the

MedTechState of Play11 •

eco­nomic cycle does. Those cat­egor­ies are dia­lysis and car­diac work, to­gether with dia­betes man­age­ment and ima­ging. It is also the chain loc­al­isa­tion policy aims at. If the Gulf must im­port the very devices its own dis­ease pro­file de­mands, the im­port bill is at once the cost of the dis­ease and the map of the loc­al­isa­tion prize.

The chain can be set against a formal cat­egory frame­work, which is how the in­ternal re­cord reads it. Eight device cat­egor­ies carry the ana­lysis. They are in-vitro dia­gnostics; sur­gical and or­tho­paedic; ima­ging and ra­di­ology; car­diac and vas­cu­lar; pa­tient mon­it­or­ing and wear­ables; soft­ware as a med­ical device and ar­ti­fi­cial in­tel­li­gence; con­sum­ables and dis­pos­ables; and a re­sid­ual group cov­er­ing oph­thal­mic, dental, ENT and re­lated fields. Each is read on three axes: reg­u­lat­ory risk class, de­gree of im­port de­pend­ence, and strength of re­gional de­mand.

Read that way, the chain ter­min­ates in the cat­egor­ies hard­est to loc­al­ise. In-vitro dia­gnostics car­ries the largest de­mand, driven by dia­betes and chronic dis­ease, with re­cur­ring re­agent rev­enue and point-of-care test­ing as the first real­istic loc­al­isa­tion open­ing. Car­diac and vas­cu­lar devices sit in the highest risk classes and carry very high im­port de­pend­ence. Ima­ging is near-total in its de­pend­ence. It is also cap­ital-in­tens­ive, which is why the hos­pital build-out con­verts so dir­ectly into im­port volume. Mon­it­or­ing and wear­ables is the fast­est-grow­ing cat­egory of the eight.

The on­co­logy leg of the chain de­serves sep­ar­ate weight, since it is the one grow­ing fast­est from a low base. A case­load pro­jec­ted to roughly

double and more across the re­gion by 2040 pulls on­co­logy, ima­ging and ra­dio­ther­apy equip­ment in par­tic­u­lar. Med­ical tour­ism adds a fur­ther pull to­ward ac­cred­it­a­tion-grade equip­ment, con­cen­trated in the UAE.

The payer: the state, and the mandate

Most emerging markets are gated by who can pay. The Gulf is not. The state pays, and that changes everything.

The struc­tural ad­vant­age of Gulf medtech is the one most emer­ging mar­kets lack. It has a payer. Across all six states, the gov­ern­ment funds uni­ver­sal care for na­tion­als, and the state is both the dom­in­ant payer and the dom­in­ant buyer of med­ical tech­no­logy. On top of that sits man­dat­ory private health in­sur­ance, mainly for the large ex­pat­ri­ate pop­u­la­tions. It runs through Saudi Ar­a­bia’s Coun­cil of Co­oper­at­ive Health In­sur­ance, the long-stand­ing man­dates in Abu Dhabi and Dubai, and, from Janu­ary 2025, an ex­ten­sion of com­puls­ory cover to all the north­ern emir­ates, so every emir­ate now en­forces it.

This ar­chi­tec­ture is why Gulf de­mand is so de­pend­able. Where In­dian or African device mar­kets live or die on what pa­tients can pay out of pocket, Gulf de­mand is un­der­writ­ten by sov­er­eign budgets and in­sur­ance

MedTechState of Play12 •

man­dates, so it con­verts straight into pro­cure­ment. It also con­cen­trates power: be­cause the state buys most of the devices, through the cent­ral pro­cure­ment bod­ies, it can set terms, in­clud­ing the loc­al­isa­tion pref­er­ences that run through this read. The payer is the Gulf’s great strength on the de­mand side and, through its pur­chas­ing power, the chief lever of its loc­al­isa­tion am­bi­tion on the sup­ply side. Here, the buyer and the poli­cy­maker are the same en­tity.

The payer's com­mit­ment is bet­ter read from budget share than from the share of GDP, be­cause hy­dro­car­bon out­put dis­torts the de­nom­in­ator. Cur­rent health ex­pendit­ure ranges from 2.6 per cent of GDP in Qatar to 6.0 per cent in Oman (Gulf Health Eco­nom­ics As­so­ci­ation, 2024), which ap­pears to rank Qatar last. Yet Qatar al­loc­ates close to 11 per cent of its na­tional budget to health. The in­verse re­la­tion­ship between wealth and health share of GDP is there­fore an arte­fact of the de­nom­in­ator, and the GDP ratio should not be used to rank state com­mit­ment.

The in­sur­ance man­dates ex­tend fur­ther than the Emir­ates, and two of them are still ar­riv­ing. Bahrain's SEHATI pro­gramme, es­tab­lished under Law No. 23 of 2018 and over­seen by the Su­preme Coun­cil of Health, ob­liges em­ploy­ers to cover non-Bahraini work­ers. The roll-out is still phased. Oman's Dham­ani plat­form was launched by the Fin­an­cial Ser­vices Au­thor­ity on 1 Janu­ary 2025, con­nect­ing in­surers and private pro­viders elec­tron­ic­ally and broad­en­ing private-sec­tor de­mand in the re­gion's most pub­licly fun­ded sys­tem. In both cases the fin­an­cing re­form, not the dis­ease bur­den, is the prox­im­ate driver of new private de­mand.

Qatar ranks last on health share of GDP and gives health 11 per cent of its budget
per cent
03.87.511.21511Qatar, budget share6Oman, GDP share2.6Qatar, GDP share
Source: Gulf Health Economics Association, 2024
Current health expenditure as a share of GDP
% of GDP
Oman6Saudi Arabia5.7Kuwait5.3Bahrain4.5UAE3.5Qatar2.6
Source: Gulf Health Economics Association, 2024

The buyer's power is ex­er­cised through re­gis­tra­tion as much as through tender. In Saudi Ar­a­bia a for­eign man­u­fac­turer must hold re­gis­tra­tion with

MedTechState of Play13 •

both the Saudi Food and Drug Au­thor­ity and the Na­tional Uni­fied Pro­cure­ment Com­pany be­fore it may com­pete at all. The payer there­fore con­trols not only the award but the right to bid for it.

The com­mit­ment can now be read dir­ectly off the ap­pro­pri­ation rather than in­ferred from ra­tios. Saudi Ar­a­bia al­loc­ated 259 bil­lion riy­als to health and so­cial de­vel­op­ment for 2026, the largest single sec­toral line in a budget car­ry­ing 1.31 tril­lion riy­als of ex­pendit­ure, and well ahead of the 202 bil­lion riy­als given to edu­ca­tion (Saudi Min­istry of Fin­ance, 2026). The line came in slightly below the pre­vi­ous year. Sup­pli­ers should note the dir­ec­tion of travel. Growth in Gulf health ap­pro­pri­ations is no longer auto­matic, even where the in­sur­ance man­date is.

The in­sur­ance side of the ar­chi­tec­ture is bet­ter un­der­stood through its com­pos­i­tion than through its total. The Coun­cil of Health In­sur­ance put private cover at more than thir­teen mil­lion people (Coun­cil of Health In­sur­ance, 2025). About 7.2 mil­lion of them are non-Saudi prin­cipal be­ne­fi­ciar­ies and 1.4 mil­lion their de­pend­ants, against two mil­lion Saudi prin­cipals and 2.4 mil­lion de­pend­ants. Ex­pat­ri­ate lives thus carry around two-thirds of the pool. Be­ne­fit design fol­lows that weight­ing. It is why private for­mu­lar­ies and device sched­ules track work­ing-age con­di­tions more closely than they track the age­ing cit­izen pop­u­la­tion.

Two move­ments in the man­date are worth dat­ing pre­cisely. Kuwait doubled its com­puls­ory ex­pat­ri­ate health premium to 100 dinars a year with ef­fect from 23 Decem­ber 2025, which turns a nom­inal scheme into a

fun­ded one (Middle East In­sur­ance Re­view, 2025). In the Emir­ates, Daman reached an in­sured mem­ber­ship of 3.4 mil­lion in the first half of 2026 on gross writ­ten premium of 5.5 bil­lion dirhams (PureHealth, 2026). The man­date is widen­ing. The premium pool is deep­en­ing too. Both ef­fects raise the share of pro­cure­ment that reaches a sup­plier through an in­surer rather than through a min­istry.

MedTechState of Play14 •

The part in brief

  1. 01Health spending across the region moves from roughly $109 billion in 2024 toward $159 billion in 2029, an advance of nearly 8% each year, funded by the state.
  2. 02The device market itself is only a band, roughly $11 to $17 billion in 2024 on definitions that differ, while one disease, diabetes, cost $13.2 billion in 2019.
  3. 03Capacity trails the money: beds run at 1.2 to 2.2 per 1,000 people and physicians at 1.0 to 3.1, both under developed-market norms.
  4. 04Dependence is near-total in value terms: about 96 per cent of devices come from abroad region-wide, and under 3 per cent of Saudi device spending buys local product.
  5. 05Every state funds care for nationals and mandates private cover, Qatar giving health close to 11 per cent of its budget while showing 2.6 per cent of GDP.
MedTechState of Play15 •
The Problem

The Gulf can afford any treatment on earth. It simply cannot make the instruments of its own care, yet.

02

The Mechanics

The build-out, the regulators, the procurement, and the levers of localisation.

The build-out

The Gulf is building hospitals and beds at a pace few regions match, and every bed is a device order.

The de­mand chain is being met with one of the most am­bi­tious health­care build-outs on earth, and the scale of it is the device op­por­tun­ity. Re­gional health spend­ing climb­ing from $109 bil­lion to $159 bil­lion by 2029 funds a phys­ical ex­pan­sion. The Gulf needs an es­tim­ated 12,317 new hos­pital beds between 2024 and 2029, reach­ing roughly 140,600, with Saudi Ar­a­bia ac­count­ing for around 69% of the ad­di­tions. Every new bed, ward and hos­pital is a stream of device or­ders. Those or­ders are for ima­ging and mon­it­or­ing, and for sur­gical and labor­at­ory equip­ment.

The build-out is un­even, and the un­even­ness is telling. Saudi Ar­a­bia, with the re­gion’s fast­est health-spend­ing growth at around 8.8% a year, is the centre of grav­ity; the UAE fol­lows; Qatar is re­peatedly cited as the fast­est-grow­ing na­tional mar­ket. The ex­pan­sion is also tilt­ing from purely pub­lic pro­vi­sion to­ward pub­lic-private part­ner­ships and privat­ised de­liv­ery, which changes who buys the devices and how. For a maker, the build-out is the near-term de­mand sig­nal, a defined, fun­ded, multi-year pipeline of new ca­pa­city that has to be equipped. It is why Gulf medtech grows al­most re­gard­less of con­di­tions: the beds are going up, and they will be filled with im­por­ted ma­chines un­less loc­al­isa­tion in­ter­venes.

Key takeaways
  • The Gulf needs ~12,300 new beds by 2029 (~140,600 total), Saudi ~69% of ad­di­tions.
  • Health spend grows 7.8% a year; Saudi fast­est at ~8.8%.
  • Every new bed is a device order: a fun­ded, multi-year de­mand pipeline.

The build-out is best un­der­stood as the cor­rec­tion of a ca­pa­city de­fi­cit rather than as ex­pan­sion from ad­equacy. Hos­pital beds stand at only 1.2 to 2.2 per 1,000 pop­u­la­tion across the six states, Saudi Ar­a­bia highest at about 2.2 and Qatar low­est at about 1.2 (World Bank, 2017 to 2021). That is well below de­veloped-mar­ket levels and in­con­sist­ent with the re­gion's spend­ing power. The pro­gramme be­hind the cor­rec­tion is quan­ti­fied in Saudi Ar­a­bia at about $65 bil­lion of health­care trans­form­a­tion.

Hospital beds per 1,000 population
beds per 1,000
Saudi Arabia2.2Kuwait2Bahrain1.7Oman1.5UAE1.4Qatar1.2
Source: World Bank, 2021
MedTechState of Play16 •
Regional health spending rises toward $159 billion by 2029, against a $65 billion Saudi programme
US$ billion
050100150200109Health spend, 2024159Health spend, 202965Saudi programme
Source: World Bank, 2017 to 2021

The in­stalled base on which that pro­gramme builds is already sub­stan­tial in the UAE, which op­er­ates more than 150 hos­pit­als and over 5,000 health fa­cil­it­ies. Each new fa­cil­ity con­verts into or­ders in the cat­egor­ies where im­port de­pend­ence is highest, ima­ging above all, which is cap­ital-in­tens­ive and near-totally im­por­ted. The device con­sequence of the build-out is there­fore an in­crease in the im­port bill in the short term, whatever the loc­al­isa­tion policy achieves later.

The build-out is also in­sti­tu­tional, and that part is less vis­ible than the con­struc­tion. Saudi Ar­a­bia has trans­ferred min­istry as­sets to a Health Hold­ing Com­pany and re­or­gan­ised de­liv­ery into 21 in­teg­rated health clusters, which changes the iden­tity and the num­ber of coun­ter­parties a sup­plier

must serve. A maker that has sold to a min­istry is not thereby qual­i­fied to sell to a cluster.

The build-out is best understood as the correction of a capacity deficit rather than as expansion from adequacy.

Medical cities, privatised

The build-out’s flagships are medical cities, and a deliberate shift from state to private delivery.

The build-out’s most vis­ible form is the med­ical city, and its most con­sequen­tial trend is privat­isa­tion. Saudi Ar­a­bia leads. Under Vis­ion 2030, the king­dom plans to privat­ise or cor­por­at­ise some 290 hos­pit­als and around 2,300 health in­sti­tu­tions, lift­ing the private sec­tor’s share of de­liv­ery from roughly a quarter to­ward a third. The Pub­lic In­vest­ment Fund’s Health Hold­ing Com­pany runs the cor­por­at­isa­tion. The flag­ship King Faisal Spe­cial­ist Hos­pital be­came an in­de­pend­ent not-for-profit by royal de­cree, and new pub­lic-private med­ical cit­ies are rising at Abha, Sakaka and Mecca.

MedTechState of Play17 •

The UAE’s model runs fur­ther down the private path: Clev­e­land Clinic Abu Dhabi, Sheikh Khal­ifa Med­ical City and a dense web of private hos­pit­als, many under the Abu Dhabi sov­er­eign health groups, set a tem­plate of in­ter­na­tion­ally-branded, privately-op­er­ated ter­tiary care. For medtech this mat­ters twice over. Privat­ised, in­ter­na­tion­ally-ac­cred­ited pro­viders buy at the very top of the tech­no­logy curve, the new­est ima­ging, ro­bot­ics and di­gital sys­tems, deep­en­ing high-value im­port de­mand. And the shift cre­ates new com­mer­cial buy­ers along­side the state, turn­ing the pro­cure­ment land­scape from purely pub­lic tenders into a mix of sov­er­eign pro­cure­ment and cor­por­ate pur­chas­ing. The med­ical city is where the Gulf’s wealth, its dis­ease bur­den and its ap­pet­ite for the new­est tech­no­logy con­verge into the densest device de­mand in the re­gion.

The flag­ships can be named and di­men­sioned. King Sal­man Med­ical City in Riy­adh is planned at more than 1,200 beds, and the NEOM Hos­pital is de­signed as a tech­no­logy-led fa­cil­ity of about 70,000 square metres. The vehicle mat­ters as much as the build­ings. De­liv­ery has been re­or­gan­ised into 21 in­teg­rated health clusters, and min­istry as­sets trans­ferred to a Health Hold­ing Com­pany. That is cor­por­at­isa­tion under state own­er­ship rather than sale, so the even­tual buyer of equip­ment re­mains sov­er­eign in sub­stance.

The private tier in the UAE is quan­ti­fied through its re­fer­ral traffic. Clev­e­land Clinic Abu Dhabi, part of M42, re­cor­ded a 35 per cent rise in in­ter­na­tional pa­tient volume dur­ing 2024, to more than 10,000 en­coun­ters, with pa­tients

ar­riv­ing chiefly from Kuwait, Saudi Ar­a­bia, Pakistan, Bahrain and the United States. Med­iclinic op­er­ates six hos­pit­als and 29 clin­ics on in­ter­na­tional ac­cred­it­a­tion, and NMC adds fur­ther ca­pa­city.

The pro­cure­ment con­sequence fol­lows dir­ectly. Ac­cred­it­a­tion-grade and med­ical-tour­ism de­mand con­cen­trates in the new­est ima­ging, sur­gical and di­gital sys­tems, which is to say in the cat­egor­ies car­ry­ing near-total im­port de­pend­ence. Privat­isa­tion there­fore raises the tech­no­logy level of Gulf de­mand faster than it raises the re­gion's abil­ity to sup­ply it, and the med­ical city is where that di­ver­gence is widest. Around 290 hos­pit­als and some 2,300 primary-care centres have been opened to private-sec­tor par­ti­cip­a­tion in Saudi Ar­a­bia alone, so the num­ber of dis­tinct com­mer­cial coun­ter­parties is rising faster than the num­ber of beds.

The privatisation programme reaches far beyond hospitals into primary care
institutions
06251,2501,8752,5002,300Primary-care centres290Hospitals21Health clusters
Source: Vision 2030
MedTechState of Play18 •

The regulators

Gulf device regulation has matured fast, and, in tightening, has become a gate that shapes who gets to sell.

Gulf device reg­u­la­tion has pro­fes­sion­al­ised at speed, and the dir­ec­tion is to­ward stricter, more in­de­pend­ent re­gimes. In Saudi Ar­a­bia, the Food and Drug Au­thor­ity (SFDA) now runs the MDMA2 “Saudi Route” tech­nical-file as­sess­ment as the single valid path­way, as of 2026. The old short­cuts that ac­cep­ted a US or EU ap­proval no longer suf­fice. The sys­tem mir­rors the EU’s: four risk classes and rules mod­elled closely on European med­ical-device reg­u­la­tion, with timelines run­ning from a few months for low-risk devices to over a year for the highest class. For­eign makers need a Saudi au­thor­ised rep­res­ent­at­ive.

MarketRegulatorPathwayClasses · timeline
Saudi ArabiaSFDAMDMA2 “Saudi Route” technical fileA–D · ~2–14 months
UAEEmirates Drug EstablishmentNational registration (from MOHAP)4 classes · 5-yr validity

The UAE has moved the same way, and fur­ther. A 2024 fed­eral de­cree cre­ated the Emir­ates Drug Es­tab­lish­ment, which took over the fed­eral health min­istry’s reg­u­lat­ory func­tions through early 2026. It con­sol­id­ates

over­sight under a single na­tional body with a four-class sys­tem, local-rep­res­ent­at­ive re­quire­ments and five-year re­gis­tra­tion valid­ity. The Gulf-wide tra­ject­ory is un­mis­tak­able, from light, ref­er­ence-based over­sight to­ward rig­or­ous, in­de­pend­ent, EU-style re­gimes. For a maker, mar­ket ac­cess now de­mands real reg­u­lat­ory in­vest­ment: a local rep­res­ent­at­ive, a tech­nical file, and the pa­tience to clear a matur­ing but in­creas­ingly ex­act­ing sys­tem. Reg­u­la­tion has be­come a real gate, and an in­stru­ment the sov­er­eign can use to fa­vour those who loc­al­ise.

The UAE trans­ition should be dated, not de­scribed as a pro­cess. The dates are on the re­cord. Med­ical-device mar­ket­ing au­thor­isa­tions trans­ferred to the Emir­ates Drug Es­tab­lish­ment with ef­fect from 29 Decem­ber 2025. The es­tab­lish­ment as­sumed 44 core ser­vices from the Min­istry of Health and Pre­ven­tion by early 2026 under Fed­eral De­cree-Law 38 of 2024. The De­part­ment of Health Abu Dhabi and the Dubai Health Au­thor­ity no longer main­tain sep­ar­ate device re­gis­tries, so a single fed­eral re­gis­tra­tion now car­ries a product across all seven emir­ates. On 24 Feb­ru­ary 2026 a mul­tiple-au­thor­ised-agent mech­an­ism took ef­fect, re­quir­ing more than one au­thor­ised agent per product.

The other four re­gimes dif­fer in kind, not merely in rigour. The dif­fer­ences gov­ern entry se­quen­cing. Qatar re­quires formal re­gis­tra­tion only of im­plant­able devices, with non-im­plant­ables and con­sum­ables pro­ceed­ing on im­port per­mits and mar­ket­ing au­thor­isa­tion, and only a loc­ally re­gistered Qatari rep­res­ent­at­ive may file. Kuwait re­gisters all devices and

MedTechState of Play19 •

in-vitro dia­gnostics under min­is­terial de­crees of Septem­ber 2022. Bahrain's Na­tional Health Reg­u­lat­ory Au­thor­ity re­views in about six to eight weeks and ties the cer­ti­fic­ate term, of one to five years, to the qual­ity cer­ti­fic­ate. Oman op­er­ates a no­ti­fic­a­tion and list­ing sys­tem re­cog­nising FDA, CE and SFDA clas­si­fic­a­tions.

A com­mon spine non­ethe­less runs through all six: prior clear­ance in a ref­er­ence mar­ket, a local au­thor­ised rep­res­ent­at­ive bear­ing real reg­u­lat­ory li­ab­il­ity, a risk clas­si­fic­a­tion, and ISO 13485 qual­ity-sys­tem com­pli­ance.

Procurement: NUPCO and the joint buy

In a market where the state is the buyer, procurement is policy, and the Gulf’s procurement machinery is formidable.

Be­cause the state buys most of the Gulf’s med­ical devices, the pro­cure­ment bod­ies are where mar­ket power and policy con­cen­trate. In Saudi Ar­a­bia, NUPCO, the PIF-owned na­tional uni­fied pro­cure­ment com­pany, runs cent­ral buy­ing north of SAR 25 bil­lion a year (around $6.7 bil­lion). That makes it one of the largest single device buy­ers in the re­gion, and a power­ful lever. It has pi­loted value-based pur­chas­ing and grants local makers a price pref­er­ence. To sell devices into Saudi Ar­a­bia at scale is, in large part, to sell to NUPCO.

At the re­gional level, the Gulf Health Coun­cil runs a joint pro­cure­ment pro­gramme across all six states, with total awards of about $813 mil­lion in 2023 across more than nine thou­sand tender items. That pools the buy­ing power of the smal­ler mar­kets along­side the lar­ger. (The Coun­cil pub­lishes award val­ues, not sav­ings, so the $813 mil­lion is pro­cure­ment volume, not a claimed sav­ing.) The point is that Gulf pro­cure­ment is cent­ral­ised, large, and in­creas­ingly wiel­ded as in­dus­trial policy. The same bod­ies that buy the devices set the local-con­tent pref­er­ences de­signed to make more of them at home. For a maker, NUPCO and the joint buy are not a pro­cure­ment foot­note. They are the core of mar­ket ac­cess.

Quick facts: procurement
NUPCO annual procurement>SAR 25B
NUPCO local-maker price preference10%
GHC joint awards (2023)~$813M
GHC tender items (2023)9,365

One cor­rec­tion mat­ters com­mer­cially. The Saudi in­stru­ment is a tender weight­ing, not a price dis­count. NUPCO em­beds a 15 per cent “Made in Saudi” weight­ing dir­ectly into tender scor­ing, where it is cap­able of de­cid­ing an award, and cer­tain cat­egor­ies carry ex­pli­cit local-man­u­fac­tur­ing or tech­no­logy-trans­fer con­di­tions. A weight­ing of that size op­er­ates on the eval­u­ated score rather than on the quoted price, so it can­not be off­set by dis­count­ing alone, which is the point of design­ing it that way.

MedTechState of Play20 •

The 2026 rules should like­wise be stated at the level the re­cord sup­ports. NUPCO's 2026 pro­cure­ment rules give pri­or­ity to products that are both re­gistered with the Saudi Food and Drug Au­thor­ity and man­u­fac­tured in­side the King­dom. The com­pany also signed frame­work agree­ments dur­ing 2026 for the sup­ply and loc­al­ised pro­duc­tion of es­sen­tial con­sum­ables. These cover in­tra­ven­ous sets and syr­inges, along with gloves and wound care. The de­fens­ible for­mu­la­tion is that im­por­ted fin­ished product now faces markedly nar­rower ac­cess to awards, rather than that for­eign bids are re­jec­ted wherever a local al­tern­at­ive ex­ists.

At the re­gional level the asym­metry with phar­ma­ceut­ic­als is the sa­li­ent fact. The Gulf Health Coun­cil co­ordin­ates policy and op­er­ates a cent­ral­ised re­gis­tra­tion track for medi­cines, but devices re­main na­tional, so the joint buy pools de­mand without pool­ing mar­ket ac­cess. For the four smal­ler states, whose in­di­vidual mar­kets sit below roughly $1.1 bil­lion, pooled pur­chas­ing is the only mech­an­ism by which they ex­er­cise any lever­age over price or spe­cific­a­tion at all.

For a maker, NUPCO and the joint buy are not a procurement footnote.

The con­sequences com­pound the loc­al­isa­tion prob­lem. A do­mestic man­u­fac­turer can­not eas­ily build to Gulf scale, be­cause its home mar­ket is one of six, and four of those six are small; the nat­ural scale eco­nom­ies

that would jus­tify a device plant are split across bor­ders and reg­u­lat­ors. The frag­ment­a­tion also raises the cost of entry for for­eign makers, fa­vour­ing the large mul­tina­tion­als that can ab­sorb six re­gis­tra­tion pro­cesses over smal­ler or local entrants. It is, in short, a drag on the very in­dustry-build­ing the sov­er­eign funds are chas­ing: the Gulf wants a do­mestic medtech base, but its own in­ternal bor­ders keep scale out of reach. Har­mon­ising device re­gis­tra­tion, as phar­ma­ceut­ic­als already are, would do as much for loc­al­isa­tion as any sub­sidy. That it has not happened is it­self a find­ing.

The fragmentation problem

Six states, six regulators, six registrations: the structural drag on building anything at Gulf scale.

For all its shared wealth and am­bi­tion, the Gulf is not one mar­ket but six, and for med­ical devices that frag­ment­a­tion is a real, under-ap­pre­ci­ated con­straint. Where phar­ma­ceut­ic­als enjoy a cent­ral­ised GCC re­gis­tra­tion pro­ced­ure, devices do not. Each of the six states de­mands its own na­tional re­gis­tra­tion. A maker want­ing re­gional reach must there­fore file sep­ar­ately in Saudi Ar­a­bia, the UAE, Qatar, Kuwait, Oman and Bahrain, each with its own reg­u­lator, timeline and re­quire­ments.

MedTechState of Play21 •

The asym­metry is in­sti­tu­tional and doc­u­mented. The Gulf Health Coun­cil runs a cent­ral­ised re­gis­tra­tion track for phar­ma­ceut­ic­als and none for devices, so a single device may re­quire re­gis­tra­tion up to six times, against six sets of re­quire­ments and timelines. Those timelines are not sym­met­rical either. The four smal­ler states typ­ic­ally com­plete re­gis­tra­tion in six to nine months, while Bahrain's au­thor­ity re­views in about six to eight weeks. That makes the se­quence in which a maker files a com­mer­cial de­cision rather than an ad­min­is­trat­ive one.

The hold­ing costs com­pound after ap­proval. Re­gis­tra­tion valid­ity dif­fers by state, run­ning to five years in Saudi Ar­a­bia and the UAE, one to five years in Bahrain tied to the qual­ity cer­ti­fic­ate, and per cer­ti­fic­ate in Qatar, Kuwait and Oman. Re­newal cycles there­fore fall out of align­ment and must be man­aged sep­ar­ately. An au­thor­ised rep­res­ent­at­ive is man­dat­ory in every state and bears real reg­u­lat­ory li­ab­il­ity, which means six re­la­tion­ships, not one.

The scale con­sequence is arith­met­ical. Four of the six na­tional mar­kets sit below roughly $1.1 bil­lion, and the largest device-basis mar­ket is about $2.34 bil­lion. No single home mar­ket in the Gulf is there­fore large enough to jus­tify a high-value device plant on do­mestic de­mand alone. Har­mon­isa­tion would cre­ate the scale that no sub­sidy can.

The hard­est device-spe­cific loc­al­isa­tion tar­gets are weakly sourced, and the caveat mat­ters. Much-re­peated fig­ures of “15% med­ical devices” or “90%-to-25% im­port re­duc­tion” trace to com­mer­cial blogs rather than

of­fi­cial policy, and should be treated with cau­tion. What is firmly es­tab­lished is the mech­an­ism. The Gulf uses its pro­cure­ment power and mar­ket ac­cess to com­pel loc­al­isa­tion, re­ward­ing those who build, headquarter and man­u­fac­ture loc­ally and pen­al­ising those who only im­port. The strategy is co­er­cion through pur­chas­ing, and it is re­shap­ing how every ser­i­ous player now ap­proaches the re­gion.

The localisation levers

The Gulf is not asking the market to localise. It is compelling it: through a specific stack of mandates.

The Gulf’s loc­al­isa­tion strategy is dis­tinct­ive be­cause it does not lean on in­cent­ives alone; it com­pels, using the state’s po­s­i­tion as buyer. Saudi Ar­a­bia’s toolkit is the most de­veloped, and its levers stack:

  • The re­gional-headquar­ters rule. From Janu­ary 2024, for­eign firms must es­tab­lish a Riy­adh re­gional HQ to win gov­ern­ment con­tracts: a power­ful in­duce­ment that has drawn hun­dreds of com­pan­ies to base their Gulf op­er­a­tions in the king­dom.
  • Pro­cure­ment pref­er­ence. NUPCO grants local makers a 10% price pref­er­ence, and from 2026 for­eign bids are to be re­jec­ted where a loc­ally-made, SFDA-re­gistered al­tern­at­ive ex­ists.
MedTechState of Play22 •
  • Local con­tent. The “Made in Saudi” pro­gramme re­quires 40% local added value; of­fi­cial tar­gets in­clude 40% local phar­ma­ceut­ical man­u­fac­tur­ing by 2030 under the na­tional in­dus­trial strategy.

The quan­ti­fied Saudi tar­get should be cor­rec­ted and at­trib­uted. Vis­ion 2030 sets loc­al­isa­tion of 80 per cent of phar­ma­ceut­ical pro­duc­tion by 2030, not 40 per cent, with device am­bi­tion stated along­side it rather than given a num­ber. That dis­tinc­tion is worth pre­serving: the firm tar­get be­longs to medi­cines, while the device-spe­cific fig­ures in cir­cu­la­tion re­main weakly sourced and should con­tinue to be flagged as such wherever they are re­peated.

Only the pharmaceutical localisation target is firmly sourced, at 80 per cent
per cent localisation target
02040608080Pharma, by 203040Often misquoted15Devices, unsourced
Source: Vision 2030

The UAE pur­sues the same end through dif­fer­ent in­stru­ments, and the dif­fer­ence is struc­tural rather than cos­metic. Ac­cess is or­gan­ised through

free zones, prin­cip­ally Dubai Health­care City and Dubai Sci­ence Park, which host light man­u­fac­tur­ing and dis­tri­bu­tion, while the sov­er­eign-backed M42 and PureHealth plat­forms con­cen­trate buy­ing and part­ner­ship. There is no com­par­able pro­cure­ment man­date. The Emir­ati lever is the an­chor­ing of de­mand; the Saudi lever is the con­di­tion­ing of sup­ply.

Sov­er­eign man­u­fac­tur­ing is the third lever, and its cur­rent form is phar­ma­ceut­ical. The Pub­lic In­vest­ment Fund es­tab­lished Lifera in 2023 as a com­mer­cial-scale con­tract de­vel­op­ment and man­u­fac­tur­ing or­gan­isa­tion, an­chor­ing a do­mestic pro­duc­tion base from which ex­ten­sion to­ward devices is ex­pec­ted rather than achieved. Across the re­gion the con­sequence is con­sist­ent. Mar­ket ac­cess in­creas­ingly re­quires a local man­u­fac­tur­ing or part­ner­ship foot­print, not merely a dis­trib­utor. Entry plan­ning should there­fore as­sume that the foot­print, not the price, is the vari­able on which an award turns in the King­dom, and that no equi­val­ent re­quire­ment ap­plies in the Emir­ates.

The registration reality

Behind the ambition sits a practical bottleneck: getting a device approved, in a regime that tightens as it matures.

The loc­al­isa­tion levers and the de­mand are real, but so is the fric­tion of get­ting a device to mar­ket, and it is rising as the re­gimes ma­ture.

MedTechState of Play23 •

Saudi Ar­a­bia’s shift to the MDMA2 tech­nical-file route ends the ac­cept­ance of ref­er­ence-mar­ket short­cuts. A maker can no longer wave a US or EU ap­proval and ex­pect a quick clear­ance. It has to com­pile a full tech­nical file and clear the SFDA’s own as­sess­ment, with timelines stretch­ing past a year for high-risk devices. The UAE’s con­sol­id­a­tion under the Emir­ates Drug Es­tab­lish­ment im­poses a par­al­lel dis­cip­line. The SFDA has even is­sued spe­cific guid­ance for ar­ti­fi­cial-in­tel­li­gence and ma­chine-learn­ing devices, a sig­nal that the fron­tier cat­egor­ies will be reg­u­lated, not waved through.

For makers, the re­gis­tra­tion real­ity re­shapes strategy two ways. It raises the cost and lead time of entry, fa­vour­ing well-re­sourced in­cum­bents and any­one will­ing to in­vest in local reg­u­lat­ory cap­ab­il­ity, which dove­tails neatly with the loc­al­isa­tion agenda. And it turns the local au­thor­ised rep­res­ent­at­ive, the tech­nical file and the reg­u­lat­ory re­la­tion­ship into stra­tegic as­sets rather than ad­min­is­trat­ive chores. The Gulf is no longer a mar­ket a for­eign maker can serve at arm’s length through a dis­trib­utor and a for­eign ap­proval. It in­creas­ingly de­mands a genu­ine local pres­ence, pre­cisely the out­come the loc­al­isa­tion policy in­tends. Reg­u­la­tion and in­dus­trial policy are pulling the same way.

A re­newal cliff is now in pro­spect and should be planned for. Saudi mar­ket­ing au­thor­isa­tions are re­por­ted to run for up to three years, so the first wave of Class A au­thor­isa­tions, filed ahead of the SAUDI-DI unique-device-iden­ti­fic­a­tion man­date of 1 Septem­ber 2024, falls due for re­newal

from about Septem­ber 2027. The fig­ure comes from trade-press ana­lysis pub­lished in 2026 and should be veri­fied against the SFDA Im­ple­ment­ing Reg­u­la­tion be­fore it is re­lied upon com­mer­cially.

The Saudi ob­lig­a­tion is also wider than re­gis­tra­tion it­self. Mar­ket ac­cess re­quires a Med­ical Device Mar­ket­ing Au­thor­isa­tion to­gether with an es­tab­lish­ment li­cence, valid five years, filed through the GHAD portal. It car­ries con­tinu­ing post-mar­ket du­ties too: safety re­port­ing, unique device iden­ti­fic­a­tion and li­fe­cycle man­age­ment, with NUPCO pre­qual­i­fic­a­tion ad­di­tion­ally re­quired for pub­lic sales. Entry is there­fore a stand­ing com­pli­ance func­tion rather than a pro­ject with an end date.

The UAE re­gime im­poses a par­al­lel dis­cip­line on a single portal. Product re­gis­tra­tion and re­newal run through the Emir­ates Drug Es­tab­lish­ment, as do vari­ations, im­port per­mits, phar­ma­covi­gil­ance and post-mar­ket com­pli­ance. Valid­ity is five years, with a re­quire­ment for more than one au­thor­ised agent per product. Fa­cil­ity li­cens­ing re­mains with the De­part­ment of Health in Abu Dhabi and the Dubai Health Au­thor­ity. Both re­gimes now place the au­thor­ised rep­res­ent­at­ive, the tech­nical file and the reg­u­lat­ory re­la­tion­ship among a maker's stra­tegic as­sets, since none of the three can be as­sembled at short no­tice once a tender is in the mar­ket.

MedTechState of Play24 •

The part in brief

  1. 01The region needs 12,317 more hospital beds by 2029, taking the stock to about 140,600, with Saudi Arabia behind roughly 69% of the additions.
  2. 02Saudi procurement is concentrated: NUPCO buys above SAR 25 billion a year, around $6.7 billion, and scores tenders with a 15 per cent made-in-Kingdom weighting.
  3. 03Pooled Gulf buying awarded roughly $813 million in 2023 over more than nine thousand items, the only lever on price the four smaller states hold.
  4. 04Levers stack in the Kingdom: a 10% procurement preference, 40% local added value under Made in Saudi, and an 80 per cent target by 2030 for pharmaceutical production.
  5. 05Devices need separate registration in all six states, as many as six filings, and no national market beyond about $2.34 billion justifies a high-value plant.
MedTechState of Play25 •
The Mechanics

The build-out is best understood as the correction of a capacity deficit rather than as expansion from adequacy.

03

The Localisation

The sovereign capital, the champions, and the multinationals being pulled onshore.

Sovereign capital: the defining feature

What makes Gulf medtech unlike any other market is who is funding its transformation: the state’s own wealth funds.

The one fea­ture that sep­ar­ates Gulf medtech from every other emer­ging mar­ket is sov­er­eign cap­ital. The trans­form­a­tion of the sec­tor is being driven not by ven­ture cap­ital or private en­ter­prise but by the re­gion’s sov­er­eign wealth funds. Those are Saudi Ar­a­bia’s Pub­lic In­vest­ment Fund, Abu Dhabi’s Mubadala and ADQ, and Qatar’s QIA, de­ploy­ing state wealth at a scale and with a pa­tience no private in­vestor can match. These funds do more than fin­ance health­care. They build na­tional cham­pi­ons, found man­u­fac­tur­ers, and use their port­fo­lio com­pan­ies as in­stru­ments of in­dus­trial policy.

That re­writes the stra­tegic logic. In a nor­mal mar­ket, loc­al­isa­tion de­pends on whether private firms find it prof­it­able to man­u­fac­ture loc­ally. In the Gulf, the sov­er­eign can simply de­cide to build the cap­ab­il­ity and fund it through the cycle, swal­low­ing years of loss for a stra­tegic goal. The funds can also pair cap­ital with the state’s own pur­chas­ing power, a PIF-owned man­u­fac­turer selling to PIF-owned NUPCO, clos­ing the loop between in­vest­ment and de­mand. The res­ult is a loc­al­isa­tion ef­fort with re­sources and co­ordin­a­tion un­avail­able any­where else. Whether sov­er­eign cap­ital

can man­u­fac­ture cap­ab­il­ity as read­ily as it man­u­fac­tures fa­cil­it­ies is the open ques­tion. That it is the de­fin­ing force is not in doubt.

Elsewhere, localisation waits on private profit. In the Gulf, the sovereign decides to build it, and funds it through the cycle.

The roster is wider than the four funds usu­ally named, and the breadth mat­ters be­cause it mul­ti­plies the points of entry. Along­side the Pub­lic In­vest­ment Fund, Mubadala, ADQ and the Qatar In­vest­ment Au­thor­ity sit the Abu Dhabi In­vest­ment Au­thor­ity, with global health­care and life-sci­ences al­loc­a­tions, and the In­vest­ment Cor­por­a­tion of Dubai. So do the Kuwait In­vest­ment Au­thor­ity, which is the world's old­est sov­er­eign fund, Bahrain's Mumtalakat at about $17.6 bil­lion of as­sets under man­age­ment, and the Oman In­vest­ment Au­thor­ity. Com­bined Gulf sov­er­eign as­sets of roughly $5 tril­lion are ex­pec­ted to ap­proach $18 tril­lion by 2050.

The dis­tin­guish­ing be­ha­viour is con­struc­tion rather than al­loc­a­tion. The Pub­lic In­vest­ment Fund cre­ated Lifera as a con­tract man­u­fac­turer in order to loc­al­ise pro­duc­tion. Mubadala and G42 cre­ated M42 to fuse care de­liv­ery with ap­plied ar­ti­fi­cial in­tel­li­gence. Mubadala and the Qatar In­vest­ment Au­thor­ity have to­gether backed device makers dir­ectly, in­clud­ing the wear­able com­pany WHOOP. For a medtech busi­ness the funds are

MedTechState of Play26 •

there­fore sim­ul­tan­eously the largest po­ten­tial part­ner, the route to loc­al­isa­tion and the most con­sequen­tial ac­quirer.

A thin­ner layer of con­ven­tional cap­ital sits above the sov­er­eign one, and it is in­creas­ingly in­sti­tu­tion­al­ised. Saudi Ar­a­bia has com­mit­ted some $3.24 bil­lion to health ven­ture and stra­tegic funds. San­abil has partnered Re­design Health to build a ven­ture stu­dio tar­get­ing at least 20 health­care com­pan­ies in the King­dom. The 2025 Global Health Ex­hib­i­tion in Riy­adh alone sur­faced more than $33 bil­lion in an­nounced stra­tegic health in­vest­ment.

Health investment announced at one 2025 exhibition exceeded Bahrain's whole sovereign fund
US$ billion
01020304033Riyadh 2025 pledges17.6Mumtalakat assets3.2Saudi health funds
Source: Global Health Exhibition

The pro­gress is real but early, and the hon­est fig­ures mat­ter. Saudi Ar­a­bia now hosts around 150 li­censed med­ical-device factor­ies with roughly SAR 3.1 bil­lion of in­vest­ment. That is a genu­ine base. It is con­cen­trated in

lower-value products, though, and holds only about 6% of the do­mestic mar­ket. The loc­al­isa­tion is driven through Vis­ion 2030’s health trans­form­a­tion, the re­gional-headquar­ters rule, NUPCO’s pro­cure­ment pref­er­ences and the local-con­tent pro­gramme, all point­ing the same way. Saudi Ar­a­bia has the clearest man­date, the deep­est cap­ital and the most co­ordin­ated ma­chinery in the Gulf. The open ques­tion is whether that ma­chinery can climb the value curve, from mak­ing syr­inges to mak­ing scan­ners, or whether it loc­al­ises as­sembly and headquar­ters while the deep tech­no­logy stays abroad.

Saudi Arabia: PIF and Vision 2030

The kingdom is the Gulf’s most aggressive localiser, deepest pockets, clearest mandate, hardest problem.

Saudi Ar­a­bia is the Gulf’s most de­term­ined loc­al­iser, and the Pub­lic In­vest­ment Fund is its in­stru­ment. In June 2023 the PIF launched Lifera, a com­mer­cial-scale con­tract de­vel­op­ment and man­u­fac­tur­ing or­gan­isa­tion tar­get­ing in­sulins, vac­cines, plasma products and ad­vanced ther­apies. It also took a ma­jor­ity of SaudiBio, and has since signed man­u­fac­tur­ing agree­ments with global pharma names. Along­side it, the king­dom launched a Na­tional Bi­o­tech­no­logy Strategy in Janu­ary 2024, tar­get­ing tens of bil­lions in non-oil GDP and tens of thou­sands of jobs by 2040. The

MedTechState of Play27 •

am­bi­tion is large. It is to build, from a near-zero base, a do­mestic life-sci­ences and med­ical-man­u­fac­tur­ing in­dustry.

The king­dom's scale and its growth rate point in op­pos­ite dir­ec­tions. A pop­u­la­tion of roughly 37 mil­lion sup­ports the re­gion's largest device mar­ket at about $2.34 bil­lion in 2024. That is fore­cast to reach ap­prox­im­ately $4.45 bil­lion by 2035 at around 6 per cent a year, the slow­est com­pound rate of the six states des­pite the largest base. Growth lead­er­ship sits with the smal­ler mar­kets, so the Saudi case for loc­al­isa­tion rests on ab­so­lute volume rather than on mo­mentum.

The di­gital ad­ja­cency is grow­ing con­sid­er­ably faster than the device mar­ket and is being fun­ded ac­cord­ingly. The Saudi di­gital-health mar­ket is pro­jec­ted to rise from about $4.4 bil­lion in 2024 to­ward $15.3 bil­lion by 2033. The in­sti­tu­tional scaf­fold­ing has been built to match, in­clud­ing the San­abil and Re­design Health ven­ture stu­dio and a na­tional com­mit­ment of some $3.24 bil­lion to health ven­ture and stra­tegic funds. Where the king­dom is build­ing cap­ab­il­ity quickly, it is build­ing it in soft­ware.

Ac­cess to the device mar­ket re­mains me­di­ated. The high-value seg­ment is held by the mul­tina­tion­als and reached through es­tab­lished dis­trib­ut­ors, prin­cip­ally Tamer Group, Banaja, Ci­ga­lah and Al Fais­aliah Med­ical Sys­tems, which hold the re­gis­tra­tions and the tender re­la­tion­ships. The un­am­bigu­ous entry se­quence is SFDA re­gis­tra­tion, NUPCO pre­qual­i­fic­a­tion, and a local man­u­fac­tur­ing or tech­no­logy-trans­fer foot­print suf­fi­cient to reach the loc­al­isa­tion-weighted tenders.

Saudi digital health is forecast to grow far beyond the device market
US$ billion
051015202.3Devices, 20244.5Devices, 20354.4Digital, 202415.3Digital, 2033
Source: Vision 2030

The UAE: the Abu Dhabi triad

Where Saudi Arabia builds a manufacturer, Abu Dhabi has built an integrated health-industrial complex.

The UAE’s ap­proach, centred on Abu Dhabi, is to build an in­teg­rated health-in­dus­trial com­plex rather than a single man­u­fac­turer. Since 2024 the emir­ate has or­gan­ised its strategy around a triad of sov­er­eign-backed groups. There is PureHealth, the re­gion’s largest health­care plat­form, cov­er­ing care de­liv­ery and in­sur­ance under ADQ; Ar­cera, an ADQ phar­ma­ceut­ical ven­ture; and M42, the Mubadala-and-G42 tech-en­abled

MedTechState of Play28 •

pro­vider that fuses health­care with ar­ti­fi­cial in­tel­li­gence. Between them they span pro­vi­sion, pharma, in­sur­ance and health tech­no­logy, backed by some of the largest sov­er­eign in­vestors on earth.

The UAE pairs the triad with life-sci­ences in­fra­struc­ture built to draw in­dustry in. There is Dubai Sci­ence Park, home to hun­dreds of com­pan­ies, and Mas­dar City’s life-sci­ences cluster, which opened the Gulf’s first com­mer­cially-scaled shared labor­at­ory in 2025 with M42. The em­phasis is on be­com­ing a re­gional hub, for re­search, for tech-en­abled care, for the headquar­ters and op­er­a­tions of global firms, rather than a low-cost fact­ory. The bet is that con­nectiv­ity, cap­ital and reg­u­lat­ory soph­ist­ic­a­tion can cap­ture the high-value, know­ledge-in­tens­ive end of medtech (AI, dia­gnostics, ad­vanced ther­apies, data) even if the UAE never makes a com­mod­ity device. It is a dif­fer­ent loc­al­isa­tion thesis from Saudi Ar­a­bia’s, hub over fact­ory.

Key takeaways
  • Abu Dhabi’s health triad: PureHealth (care/in­sur­ance), Ar­cera (pharma), M42 (AI-en­abled care).
  • The UAE bets on be­com­ing a hub, re­search, AI, HQs, not a com­mod­ity fact­ory.
  • Backed by the world’s largest sov­er­eign in­vestors (ADQ, Mubadala, G42).

The com­mer­cial case for the hub model is vis­ible in the growth rate. The UAE device mar­ket is put at about $3.8 bil­lion in 2024, rising to ap­prox­im­ately $6.3 bil­lion by 2030 at around 8.9 per cent a year, against roughly 6

per cent in Saudi Ar­a­bia. Dubai's health­care sec­tor alone earns more than $4.6 bil­lion an­nu­ally. That is achieved on a pop­u­la­tion of about 11 mil­lion, which is to say on per-head de­mand that no Gulf state other than Qatar matches.

The ac­cess in­fra­struc­ture is de­lib­er­ately light. Free zones, prin­cip­ally Dubai Health­care City and Dubai Sci­ence Park, host light man­u­fac­tur­ing and dis­tri­bu­tion rather than heavy plant, and the mar­ket is sup­plied through dis­trib­ut­ors such as Gulf Drug and Al Zahrawi Med­ical. Noth­ing in the Emir­ati re­gime cor­res­ponds to a pro­cure­ment weight­ing: de­mand is anchored through the sov­er­eign plat­forms in­stead, and sup­ply is left to ar­range it­self.

The chosen cat­egory is the only one in the eight-cat­egory frame­work that is not im­port-gated. Soft­ware as a med­ical device and ar­ti­fi­cial in­tel­li­gence is gated by tal­ent and data rather than by man­u­fac­tur­ing, and the UAE is the only state of the six rated high on it. The hub thesis is there­fore not a softer ver­sion of the Saudi thesis but a bet on the single cat­egory where the Gulf's man­u­fac­tur­ing de­fi­cit does not apply.

Kuwait, Oman and Bahrain have thin­ner medtech stor­ies, their mar­kets too small to an­chor do­mestic man­u­fac­tur­ing and their data sparse. Their real­istic role is as buy­ers and, through the Gulf Health Coun­cil’s joint pro­cure­ment, as par­ti­cipants in pooled re­gional pur­chas­ing rather than pro­du­cers. The les­son of the smal­ler states is the frag­ment­a­tion prob­lem in human form. Each is too small alone to jus­tify a device in­dustry, and the ab­sence

MedTechState of Play29 •

of a uni­fied mar­ket keeps them from com­bin­ing into one. For them the loc­al­isa­tion ques­tion is largely moot. They will im­port, and their lever­age lies in col­lect­ive pro­cure­ment and in spe­cial­ised, high-value niches like Qatar’s, where sov­er­eign wealth can buy a place at the fron­tier of medi­cine without ever man­u­fac­tur­ing at scale.

Qatar and the smaller states

Beyond the two giants, four smaller states chase focused, high-value niches rather than scale.

Bey­ond Saudi Ar­a­bia and the UAE, the Gulf’s smal­ler states can­not chase scale, so the am­bi­tious ones chase focus. Qatar, backed by the Qatar In­vest­ment Au­thor­ity’s vast re­sources, has con­cen­trated on high-value, spe­cial­ised medi­cine. Sidra Medi­cine set up the coun­try’s first gene-ther­apy centre, among the first hand­ful in the world to ad­min­is­ter a lead­ing gene ther­apy, and the QIA has steered bil­lions into health and bi­otech pro­jects. Qatar is re­peatedly cited as the Gulf’s fast­est-grow­ing na­tional device mar­ket, a func­tion of in­tense per-cap­ita spend­ing on a small, wealthy pop­u­la­tion.

One widely re­peated char­ac­ter­isa­tion does not sur­vive the re­con­ciled basis. Qatar is sized at about $0.69 bil­lion in 2024 rising to roughly $0.98 bil­lion by 2029, a com­pound rate near 7.2 per cent, which places it fourth

of the six on growth. Bahrain leads at about 9.2 per cent from the smal­lest base of around $0.4 bil­lion, fol­lowed by the UAE at about 8.9 per cent. Saudi Ar­a­bia is slow­est at about 6 per cent. Qatar is the Gulf's most ad­vanced small mar­ket. It is not its fast­est-grow­ing one.

Device-market growth by country, forecast CAGR
% a year
Bahrain9.2UAE8.9Oman7.3Qatar7.2Kuwait6.2Saudi Arabia6
Source: 6Wresearch, MarknTel, Statista and Market Research Future, 2025

Qatar's dis­tinc­tion is in the soph­ist­ic­a­tion of its pro­vi­sion rather than in its rate of ex­pan­sion. Hamad Med­ical Cor­por­a­tion op­er­ates twelve hos­pit­als as the dom­in­ant pub­lic net­work. Sidra Medi­cine, opened in 2018 as a fully di­gital, pa­per­less women's and chil­dren's hos­pital on an Epic re­cord sys­tem, serves as a re­gional re­fer­ral hub. The Primary Health Care Cor­por­a­tion handles com­munity care, and the Qatar Gen­ome Pro­gramme has se­quenced more than 6,000 whole gen­omes. The Na­tional Health Strategy 2024 to 2030 pri­or­it­ises di­gital trans­form­a­tion and in­fra­struc­ture.

MedTechState of Play30 •

The other three are dis­tinct pro­pos­i­tions rather than a re­sid­ual. Kuwait, at about $0.74 bil­lion in 2025 rising to­ward $1.31 bil­lion by 2033, car­ries the heav­iest dis­ease bur­den and an­chors it on the Das­man Dia­betes In­sti­tute, a centre of ex­cel­lence re­cog­nised by the In­ter­na­tional Dia­betes Fed­er­a­tion. Bahrain of­fers the fast­est first re­gis­tra­tion in the Gulf. Oman, at roughly $0.8 to $1.1 bil­lion, is build­ing through the Royal Hos­pital, Sul­tan Qa­boos Uni­ver­sity Hos­pital and the Sul­tan Qa­boos Com­pre­hens­ive Can­cer Centre.

Each of the four smaller Gulf device markets is under a billion dollars
US$ billion
00.20.40.60.80.8Oman0.7Kuwait0.7Qatar0.4Bahrain
Source: Gulf Health Council

PureHealth mat­ters to this read as both a demon­stra­tion and a caveat. The demon­stra­tion is that sov­er­eign cap­ital can as­semble, fast, a prof­it­able, in­ter­na­tion­ally-ex­pand­ing health­care cham­pion, in­teg­rat­ing the de­mand side at a scale and speed private cap­ital could not match. That means the hos­pit­als and the in­sur­ance, and the pa­tient re­la­tion­ship with them. The caveat

is that PureHealth is a pro­vider and plat­form, not a device man­u­fac­turer. It em­bod­ies the Gulf’s strength in buy­ing, in­teg­rat­ing and op­er­at­ing health­care, not in mak­ing the devices that health­care runs on. It is the im­port side of the thesis, su­perbly ex­ecuted. The ques­tion it poses is whether the same sov­er­eign model that built a buyer of the first rank can build a maker of one, which is the harder prob­lem by far.

The regional champion: PureHealth

No company embodies the sovereign-built health platform more completely than Abu Dhabi’s PureHealth.

PureHealth is the clearest ex­ample of what sov­er­eign cap­ital can build in Gulf health­care. Backed by ADQ, it has be­come the Middle East’s largest health­care plat­form in a hand­ful of years. It spans hos­pit­als and dia­gnostics, along with in­sur­ance and health tech­no­logy. Its Decem­ber 2023 IPO raised about $986 mil­lion. The FY2024 res­ults were strik­ing, with rev­enue of around AED 25.8 bil­lion, up 58%, and net profit of roughly AED 1.7 bil­lion, up 78%. It has ex­pan­ded in­ter­na­tion­ally, buy­ing the UK’s Circle Health for about $1.2 bil­lion and tak­ing a US foot­print through Ar­dent Health.

MedTechState of Play31 •

The plat­form's func­tion within the loc­al­isa­tion ar­chi­tec­ture is spe­cific, and it is not man­u­fac­tur­ing. In the Emir­ati model the sov­er­eign-backed plat­forms, PureHealth along­side M42, serve as de­mand an­chors: they con­cen­trate buy­ing and part­ner­ship in place of the pro­cure­ment man­dates Saudi Ar­a­bia uses. The in­stru­ment is there­fore the ag­greg­a­tion of pur­chas­ing rather than the con­di­tion­ing of sup­ply, which is con­sist­ent with a jur­is­dic­tion that has chosen not to le­gis­late local con­tent for devices.

The buyer land­scape it sits within is dense and in­sti­tu­tional. De­mand in the UAE con­cen­trates in SEHA and the De­part­ment of Health in Abu Dhabi, the Dubai Health Au­thor­ity at fa­cil­ity level, and private groups in­clud­ing Med­iclinic and NMC, with pro­cure­ment in Abu Dhabi run­ning through SEHA's vendor-qual­i­fic­a­tion pro­cesses. Ac­cess to all of them is me­di­ated by dis­trib­ut­ors hold­ing the re­gis­tra­tions and tender re­la­tion­ships, so an in­teg­rated plat­form does not re­move the in­ter­me­di­ary layer.

The caveat the chapter draws can be put in the frame­work's own terms. The cat­egor­ies such a plat­form buys in greatest volume, ima­ging and im­plants, carry near-total and very high im­port de­pend­ence re­spect­ively. A sov­er­eign buyer of the first rank there­fore en­larges the im­port bill as it grows, and does so in pre­cisely the cat­egor­ies loc­al­isa­tion policy finds hard­est to reach. The demon­stra­tion and the caveat are both real. They are the same fact seen from two sides. Sov­er­eign cap­ital has proved it can build a buyer of in­ter­na­tional scale con­sid­er­ably faster than it can build a sup­plier of any scale.

M42 and the AI hospital

The Gulf’s most distinctive bet fuses sovereign capital, healthcare and frontier artificial intelligence.

If PureHealth shows the Gulf buy­ing and op­er­at­ing health­care at scale, M42 shows it reach­ing for the tech­no­logy fron­tier. Formed in 2023 from the mer­ger of G42 Health­care and Mubadala Health, M42 runs more than 480 fa­cil­it­ies across 26 coun­tries and pairs care de­liv­ery with ser­i­ous AI muscle. Its Med42 clin­ical large lan­guage model was trained on G42’s Condor Galaxy su­per­com­puters, among the most power­ful AI sys­tems in the world. It has grown by ac­quis­i­tion, tak­ing Sweden’s Diaverum to build a global dia­lysis net­work, a dir­ect play on the Gulf’s renal-dis­ease bur­den.

M42 em­bod­ies the UAE’s dis­tinct­ive loc­al­isa­tion thesis, that the Gulf can leapfrog com­mod­ity man­u­fac­tur­ing and cap­ture the high-value, know­ledge-in­tens­ive layer of medtech. That layer is AI dia­gnostics and clin­ical soft­ware, to­gether with data-driven care. This is the one part of the stack where the Gulf’s strengths (cap­ital and com­pute, data and am­bi­tion) line up with the op­por­tun­ity, and where it might genu­inely lead rather than im­port. The strategy sidesteps the man­u­fac­tur­ing prob­lem en­tirely. Soft­ware and AI scale without factor­ies, and the Gulf’s sov­er­eign com­pute and cap­ital rank with any. The catch is that the AI rides on im­por­ted hard­ware. The scan­ner is still for­eign even when the al­gorithm read­ing it is Emir­ati. M42 is

MedTechState of Play32 •

the Gulf’s most cred­ible claim to build­ing, not just buy­ing, ad­vanced med­ical tech­no­logy, at the soft­ware layer, if not yet the hard­ware.

One fig­ure should be re­con­ciled to the in­ternal basis. M42 is re­cor­ded at more than 450 fa­cil­it­ies across 26 coun­tries, formed in 2023 from the mer­ger of G42 Health­care and Mubadala Health; where a higher fa­cil­ity count ap­pears it should be re­stated to that fig­ure or sourced sep­ar­ately. The scale is not in ques­tion, but the num­ber in cir­cu­la­tion has drif­ted and the lower, doc­u­mented count is the one to pub­lish.

The data layer around M42 is what makes the soft­ware thesis cred­ible, and it is largely pub­lic in­fra­struc­ture. Abu Dhabi's health-in­form­a­tion ex­change, Malaffi, is op­er­ated by Abu Dhabi Health Data Ser­vices with M42. NABIDH in Dubai held 10.4 mil­lion re­cords across 1,888 fa­cil­it­ies by mid-2025, and Riay­ati cov­ers the north­ern emir­ates and the na­tional uni­fied re­cord across roughly 5,000 fa­cil­it­ies. Taken to­gether the three ex­changes make on the order of 1.9 bil­lion re­cords ac­cess­ible. The Emir­ati Gen­ome Pro­gramme, backed by G42 Health­care, sits along­side them.

The con­straint on that thesis is the same frag­ment­a­tion that gates man­u­fac­tur­ing. Each state op­er­ates its own data-sov­er­eignty and pri­vacy frame­work, so cross-bor­der ge­n­omic and clin­ical col­lab­or­a­tion within the Gulf re­mains lim­ited. A model trained on one na­tional pop­u­la­tion can­not straight­for­wardly be im­proved on the other five, which caps the re­gional ad­vant­age that scale in data was sup­posed to con­fer.

The data exchanges reach further than the provider network
facilities
01,2502,5003,7505,000450M42 facilities1,888NABIDH, Dubai5,000Riayati, national record
Source: M42

The multinationals, pulled onshore

The real test of the localisation strategy is the one group that matters most: the global firms that actually make the devices.

The ul­ti­mate test of the strategy is whether it changes the be­ha­viour of the mul­tina­tion­als that make the devices, and it does. The global lead­ers that dom­in­ate Gulf medtech (Medtronic, GE HealthCare, Siemens Health­in­eers, Philips, Ab­bott, BD, John­son & John­son MedTech) are re­spond­ing to the re­gional-headquar­ters rule and the pro­cure­ment

MedTechState of Play33 •

pref­er­ences by deep­en­ing their Gulf foot­print. GE HealthCare moved its re­gional headquar­ters to Riy­adh and built Saudi ser­vice centres. Siemens Health­in­eers opened a Riy­adh re­gional HQ and a joint in­nov­a­tion centre with the Saudi health min­istry, and Ab­bott set up a Riy­adh HQ. John­son & John­son MedTech launched dir­ect Saudi op­er­a­tions. BD is pur­su­ing local man­u­fac­tur­ing and an AI part­ner­ship with the min­istry.

MultinationalGulf localisation move
GE HealthCareRegional HQ relocated to Riyadh; 3 service centres
Siemens HealthineersRiyadh RHQ + innovation centre with MoH
AbbottRiyadh RHQ (2023); decade of local manufacturing
J&J MedTechDirect Saudi operations launched (2024)

The pat­tern is real but par­tial, and the dis­tinc­tion is the whole point. The mul­tina­tion­als are loc­al­ising headquar­ters and ser­vice, and dis­tri­bu­tion too, drawn by ac­cess to the re­gion’s pro­cure­ment. Here and there they loc­al­ise as­sembly. But they are not, for the most part, re­lo­cat­ing the deep man­u­fac­tur­ing and R&D that cre­ate high-value devices. The levers are strong enough to pull the global firms on­shore in their com­mer­cial and ser­vice op­er­a­tions, se­cur­ing jobs and pres­ence. They have not yet been strong enough to move the core of the in­dustry, the factor­ies and labor­at­or­ies where scan­ners and im­plants are de­signed and built. Whether they can is the crux of the loc­al­isa­tion gap.

The sup­plier field is wider than the firms named above, and each oc­cu­pies a defined po­s­i­tion. Along­side Medtronic, GE HealthCare, Siemens Health­in­eers, Philips, Ab­bott, Bec­ton Dickin­son and John­son & John­son MedTech, the re­gional ma­jors in­clude Stryker in or­tho­paed­ics, sur­gical and neur­o­tech­no­logy. They also in­clude Bo­ston Sci­entific in in­ter­ven­tional car­di­ology and en­do­scopy, and Roche Dia­gnostics in in-vitro dia­gnostics and labor­at­ory, where de­mand is driven dir­ectly by the dia­betes bur­den. Between them they hold the high-value seg­ment across all six states.

Ac­cess, how­ever, is me­di­ated rather than dir­ect, and that is the part loc­al­isa­tion policy has not changed. Re­gis­tra­tions and tender re­la­tion­ships are held by es­tab­lished dis­trib­ut­ors: Gulf Drug, the Zahrawi Group, Met­romed, Ad­vanced Med­ical Equip­ment and Gulf Med­ical Com­pany across the Emir­ates and the wider re­gion. For a man­u­fac­turer without a local en­tity, the dis­trib­utor re­mains the gate­keeper to both re­gis­tra­tion and pro­cure­ment, so a re­gional headquar­ters does not by it­self dis­place the in­ter­me­di­ary.

The loc­al­isa­tion pres­sure also lands un­evenly by cat­egory. It bites where im­port de­pend­ence is mod­er­ate and the tech­no­logy bar­rier low, in con­sum­ables, dis­pos­ables and point-of-care dia­gnostics, and it has least pur­chase where de­pend­ence is near-total, in ima­ging and im­plants. The ob­served pat­tern of on­shor­ing is there­fore not a mat­ter of cor­por­ate will­ing­ness so much as of where on­shor­ing is tech­nic­ally feas­ible at all.

MedTechState of Play34 •

The manufacturing reality

Strip away the ambition and the announcements: what does the Gulf actually make? Less than the rhetoric implies.

Be­neath the rhet­oric the out­put is thin, and the gap between an­nounce­ment and pro­duc­tion is wide. Saudi Ar­a­bia’s roughly 150 li­censed device factor­ies and SAR 3.1 bil­lion of in­vest­ment are real, but they hold only about 6% of the do­mestic mar­ket and cluster in low-value products, the band­ages, gloves and syr­inges the of­fi­cial lit­er­at­ure can­didly names. Across the Gulf, local phar­ma­ceut­ical and device pro­duc­tion com­bined does not ex­ceed around 10% of con­sump­tion. The UAE’s do­mestic pro­duc­tion runs to dis­pos­ables and spare parts, and one not­able joint ven­ture makes auto-dis­able syr­inges at volume. The ven­ture is genu­ine. It sits firmly at the com­mod­ity end.

The re­search for this read turned up no dis­crete, named, net-new high-value device-man­u­fac­tur­ing plant an­nounced for 2024 to 2026 in the primary re­cord. There are only ag­greg­ate mar­ket fig­ures and headquar­ters re­lo­ca­tions. That ab­sence is it­self a find­ing. The Gulf is loc­al­ising pro­cure­ment, headquar­ters, as­sembly and the com­mod­ity end, but the an­nounce­ment of a plant mak­ing, say, MRI ma­chines or car­diac im­plants at scale has not yet come. The man­u­fac­tur­ing real­ity is plain. The Gulf today makes the cheap, high-volume, low-mar­gin devices and im­ports

everything that needs deep tech­no­logy, pre­ci­sion en­gin­eer­ing or ac­cu­mu­lated IP. Loc­al­isa­tion has begun at the bot­tom of the value curve. Whether it climbs is the open ques­tion.

The re­gion's sov­er­eign man­u­fac­tur­ing vehicle is phar­ma­ceut­ical, and the dis­tinc­tion should be made plainly. Lifera, es­tab­lished by the Pub­lic In­vest­ment Fund in 2023, is a com­mer­cial-scale con­tract de­vel­op­ment and man­u­fac­tur­ing or­gan­isa­tion for bio­phar­ma­ceut­ic­als, with ex­ten­sion to­ward devices ex­pec­ted rather than de­livered. In the in­ternal re­cord of the re­gion's play­ers, the en­tire local-man­u­fac­tur­ing layer is lis­ted as Lifera to­gether with emer­ging con­sum­ables makers, which is an ac­cur­ate de­scrip­tion of its present depth.

The ex­pec­ted tra­ject­ory is ex­pli­cit and it is slow. Con­sum­ables and dis­pos­ables loc­al­ise first, since the tech­no­logy bar­rier is low. Ima­ging, im­plants and ad­vanced dia­gnostics are ex­pec­ted to re­main im­port-re­li­ant well bey­ond 2030, be­cause the cap­ab­il­ity gap is wide. Soft­ware and ar­ti­fi­cial in­tel­li­gence may leapfrog hard­ware al­to­gether, since they play to cap­ital and am­bi­tion rather than to a man­u­fac­tur­ing base. The bind­ing con­straints are cap­ab­il­ity and scale, not cap­ital or will.

The scale con­straint points to a single res­ol­u­tion. Since four of the six mar­kets sit below roughly $1.1 bil­lion and the largest device-basis mar­ket is about $2.34 bil­lion, a high-value plant in the Gulf can only be jus­ti­fied against de­mand bey­ond the Gulf. An ex­port base serving the wider Middle East and North Africa is there­fore not an ad­di­tional am­bi­tion but the pre­con­di­tion for the man­u­fac­tur­ing am­bi­tion it­self.

MedTechState of Play35 •
Across the Gulf, local pharmaceutical and device production combined does not exceed around 10% of consumption.

Digital and AI adjacency

The Gulf’s best chance to lead, not import, sits one layer up from the device: in software and AI.

The Gulf can­not yet make the hard­ware. It is mak­ing ser­i­ous moves in the soft­ware and in­tel­li­gence that ride on top of it, and this is its most cred­ible path to lead­er­ship rather than de­pend­ence. Saudi Ar­a­bia’s Seha Vir­tual Hos­pital, re­cog­nised as the world’s largest, links hun­dreds of fa­cil­it­ies and serves close to half a mil­lion pa­tients a year, de­ploy­ing AI for ima­ging and for breast-can­cer and dia­betic-ret­ino­pathy screen­ing. The king­dom’s data-and-AI au­thor­ity has ear­marked large sums for health IT and partnered with global tech­no­logy firms. The Saudi AI-in-health­care mar­ket is pro­jec­ted to grow sev­eral-fold by 2030. The UAE’s M42, with its Med42 model and sov­er­eign com­pute, is build­ing at the same fron­tier.

The di­gital and AI layer plays to the Gulf’s genu­ine strengths rather than to its weak­ness in pre­ci­sion man­u­fac­tur­ing. Those strengths are cap­ital and

com­pute, data and the cent­ral­ised au­thor­ity to de­ploy sys­tems na­tion­wide. A vir­tual hos­pital or a clin­ical AI model scales without a fact­ory and runs on im­por­ted hard­ware. It at­tacks the re­gion’s real con­straint, which is not a short­age of ma­chines but a short­age of clini­cians to use them, a short­age AI mul­ti­plies. The Gulf may never make the world’s scan­ners, but it can plaus­ibly lead the world in de­ploy­ing AI across them at pop­u­la­tion scale. The ad­ja­cency is where im­port de­pend­ence mat­ters least and the Gulf’s ad­vant­ages mat­ter most.

The flag­ship fig­ure re­quires cor­rec­tion, and the cor­rec­ted ver­sion is more im­press­ive than the loose one. Seha Vir­tual Hos­pital con­nects 241 hos­pit­als and more than 1,400 health centres, per the Saudi Min­istry of Health on 9 Au­gust 2026, su­per­sed­ing both the earlier counts of 224 and 242 fa­cil­it­ies and the looser de­scrip­tion of hun­dreds of sites. It holds a Guin­ness World Re­cord as the world's largest vir­tual hos­pital, and its re­por­ted ar­ti­fi­cial-in­tel­li­gence triage ac­cur­acy runs up to 95 per cent, along­side aug­men­ted-real­ity sur­gical guid­ance and di­gital twins.

The na­tional di­gital layer be­hind it is broader than the vir­tual hos­pital alone. Saudi Ar­a­bia op­er­ates the Se­h­haty, Mawid and Seha ap­plic­a­tions and the 937 ser­vice as cit­izen front-ends. Oman runs its home-grown Al Shifa min­istry re­cord, and Bahrain runs I-SEHA as its na­tional health in­form­a­tion sys­tem. The hos­pital tier is held largely by Or­acle Health, formerly Cerner, with Epic at Clev­e­land Clinic Abu Dhabi and Sidra Medi­cine. The ex­changes above them are state-built, which is why na­tional de­ploy­ment is achiev­able at a pace no private mar­ket matches.

MedTechState of Play36 •
The corrected Seha network is far larger than the facility count it supersedes
facilities
03757501,1251,5001,400Health centres241Hospitals224Earlier count
Source: Saudi Ministry of Health

At the fron­tier the pat­tern re­peats. Dur­ing 2026 Ara­mco and Pasqal in­aug­ur­ated Saudi Ar­a­bia's first quantum com­puter and the Middle East's first com­mer­cial quantum-com­put­ing-as-a-ser­vice plat­form, with a sep­ar­ate Ara­mco and IBM quantum in­nov­a­tion hub along­side. The health­care rel­ev­ance is pro­spect­ive, ex­pec­ted first in drug dis­cov­ery, mo­lecu­lar sim­u­la­tion and op­tim­isa­tion, with quantum sens­ing a longer-term route to less in­vas­ive dia­gnostics.

What the deal flow con­spicu­ously lacks is large, named in­vest­ment in high-value do­mestic device man­u­fac­tur­ing. The money builds hos­pit­als and buys pro­vider net­works abroad. It founds pharma and bi­otech ven­tures and ac­quires dia­lysis and dia­gnostics busi­nesses, but it has not yet pro­duced the flag­ship Gulf device man­u­fac­turer mak­ing ad­vanced

equip­ment at scale. That is the thesis con­firmed in cap­ital al­loc­a­tion. Sov­er­eign wealth is su­perb at build­ing the de­mand side and the ser­vice side of health­care, and at buy­ing cap­ab­il­ity abroad, but it has not yet cracked do­mestic high-value device-mak­ing. For an in­vestor, the move is to fol­low the sov­er­eign. The deals will be in plat­forms, AI, pharma and in­ter­na­tional as­sets. Any genu­ine high-value device-man­u­fac­tur­ing an­nounce­ment should be read as the sig­nal that loc­al­isa­tion has fi­nally reached the part that mat­ters most.

The capital and the deals

The deal flow confirms the thesis: sovereign money building and buying healthcare platforms, not device factories.

The trans­ac­tions of re­cent years tell the loc­al­isa­tion story in deals, and the pat­tern is con­sist­ent. The head­line activ­ity is sov­er­eign-backed plat­form build­ing and in­ter­na­tional ac­quis­i­tion. There is PureHealth’s near-bil­lion-dol­lar IPO and its $1.2 bil­lion pur­chase of Circle Health, M42’s form­a­tion and its ac­quis­i­tion of Diaverum, the PIF’s launch of Lifera and pur­chase of SaudiBio, and the QIA’s multi-bil­lion health com­mit­ments. The cap­ital de­ployed is vast, pa­tient and stra­tegic, ex­actly the pro­file sov­er­eign wealth provides, and it pools in pro­vi­sion, plat­forms, pharma man­u­fac­tur­ing and in­ter­na­tional ex­pan­sion.

MedTechState of Play37 •

The deal re­cord can be stated pre­cisely, and its com­pos­i­tion is the find­ing. Of roughly 400 Gulf health­care trans­ac­tions re­cor­ded between 2021 and April 2025, the UAE ac­coun­ted for 198 and Saudi Ar­a­bia for 170, leav­ing about 32 across Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain and Oman to­gether. Much of that activ­ity is stra­tegic or sov­er­eign-linked rather than clas­sic early-stage ven­ture, so the count meas­ures cor­por­ate and state con­sol­id­a­tion more than it meas­ures a fund­ing pipeline.

GCC healthcare transactions, 2021 to April 2025
deals
050100150200198UAE170Saudi Arabia32Other four states
Source: Regional deal reporting, 2025

Where in­de­pend­ent ven­ture cap­ital does ap­pear, it is al­most en­tirely di­gital rather than device. The vis­ible names are Okadoc in tele­con­sulta­tion and book­ing, with about $22.3 mil­lion raised and ex­pan­sion into Saudi Ar­a­bia, and Klaim, an in­sur­ance-claims plat­form for pro­viders, at $26 mil­lion in a 2025 Series A round. Alma Health sits in vir­tual chronic care at $10 mil­lion.

Se­hteq has grown past 700,000 in­sur­ance cus­tom­ers, Cura has more than 350,000 users and 4,500 doc­tors, and Nux­era AI took $2.5 mil­lion pre-seed in 2025. The in­sti­tu­tional scaf­fold­ing has fol­lowed, in­clud­ing Abu Dhabi's Hub71+ Life Sci­ences ac­cel­er­ator.

Independent venture capital funds software, not devices
US$ million raised
Klaim26Okadoc22.3Alma Health10Nuxera AI2.5
Source: Okadoc

The ab­sence is there­fore con­sist­ent across both lay­ers of cap­ital. Neither the sov­er­eign funds nor the ven­ture mar­ket has fin­anced a high-value do­mestic device man­u­fac­turer, and the money that is mov­ing is mov­ing into pro­vi­sion, plat­forms, in­sur­ance ad­ja­cen­cies and soft­ware. For an in­vestor the prac­tical con­sequence is that the an­nounce­ment to watch for is a named high-value device plant, since noth­ing in the re­cor­ded deal flow to April 2025 con­sti­tutes one.

MedTechState of Play38 •

The part in brief

  1. 01Sovereign funds hold roughly $5 trillion, heading toward $18 trillion by 2050, and they build companies rather than merely allocate, Lifera and M42 among them.
  2. 02Saudi Arabia hosts about 150 licensed device factories carrying some SAR 3.1 billion of investment, yet they supply only about 6% of the home market.
  3. 03Deal flow sits in two markets: of about 400 transactions to April 2025 the UAE recorded 198 and Saudi Arabia 170, leaving some 32 elsewhere.
  4. 04Independent venture money goes to software: Klaim raised $26 million, Okadoc $22.3 million, Alma Health $10 million, and no device maker appears.
  5. 05The UAE market is put at about $3.8 billion in 2024 rising near $6.3 billion by 2030, growth of 8.9 per cent against 6 per cent in Saudi Arabia.
MedTechState of Play39 •
The Localisation

Elsewhere, localisation waits on private profit. In the Gulf, the sovereign decides to build it, and funds it through the cycle.

04

The Read

Two models, the localisation gap, the constraints, and where the market goes.

Saudi Arabia versus the UAE: two models

The Gulf is running two different localisation experiments at once, and the contrast is the strategic lesson.

The Gulf’s two largest mar­kets are pur­su­ing genu­inely dif­fer­ent loc­al­isa­tion mod­els, and the con­trast cla­ri­fies the whole ques­tion. Saudi Ar­a­bia’s model is the fact­ory. Build a do­mestic man­u­fac­tur­ing base from the ground up, com­pel it through pro­cure­ment pref­er­ences and the re­gional-headquar­ters rule, and aim even­tu­ally to climb from com­mod­ity devices to­ward high-value ones. It is the more am­bi­tious bet, with the deeper cap­ital and the lar­ger home mar­ket. It is also the harder prob­lem, be­cause it means build­ing man­u­fac­tur­ing cap­ab­il­ity the king­dom has never had.

ModelSaudi Arabia: the factoryUAE: the hub
BetBuild domestic manufacturingCapture the high-value / AI layer
LeversRHQ rule, NUPCO preference, local contentConnectivity, capital, regulation
RiskCapability it never hadNo traditional device industry

The UAE’s model is the hub. Do not chase com­mod­ity devices, but cap­ture the high-value, know­ledge-in­tens­ive layer, and with it the re­gional

headquar­ters and op­er­a­tions of global firms, on the strength of con­nectiv­ity, cap­ital and reg­u­lat­ory soph­ist­ic­a­tion. That layer means AI and dia­gnostics, along with ad­vanced ther­apies and re­search. It is the more real­istic bet about where a small, open eco­nomy can add value, and the less likely to yield a tra­di­tional device in­dustry. Neither is ob­vi­ously right. They are wagers on dif­fer­ent the­or­ies of how a wealthy, im­port-de­pend­ent re­gion builds ad­vant­age. The likely out­come is that both suc­ceed par­tially and dif­fer­ently. Saudi Ar­a­bia loc­al­ises the lower and middle of the value curve and the com­mer­cial pres­ence of the mul­tina­tion­als, while the UAE cap­tures the di­gital, AI and hub layer, and the deep­est device tech­no­logy stays, for years yet, im­por­ted by both.

The two mod­els can be sep­ar­ated by in­stru­ment, which is the clean­est way to com­pare them. Saudi Ar­a­bia op­er­ates pro­cure­ment scor­ing, tech­no­logy-trans­fer con­di­tions on cer­tain cat­egor­ies, sov­er­eign man­u­fac­tur­ing through Lifera and a quan­ti­fied loc­al­isa­tion tar­get for phar­ma­ceut­ic­als of 80 per cent by 2030. The UAE op­er­ates free zones for light man­u­fac­tur­ing and dis­tri­bu­tion and sov­er­eign de­mand an­chors in M42 and PureHealth, and sets no com­par­able man­date. One jur­is­dic­tion con­di­tions sup­ply; the other ag­greg­ates de­mand.

The un­der­ly­ing arith­metic dif­fers as sharply as the in­stru­ments. Saudi Ar­a­bia holds a pop­u­la­tion of roughly 37 mil­lion, the largest spend and the slow­est growth rate of the six at about 6 per cent a year. The UAE holds about 11 mil­lion people and grows at about 8.9 per cent on a broader

MedTechState of Play40 •

re­por­ted basis. The king­dom's case rests on volume suf­fi­cient to jus­tify a plant; the Emir­ati case rests on in­tens­ity suf­fi­cient to jus­tify a hub.

On the in­ternal de­mand mat­rix, which is a qual­it­at­ive judge­ment rather than a meas­ure­ment, the di­vi­sion is already vis­ible. The UAE is the only state of the six rated high on soft­ware as a med­ical device and ar­ti­fi­cial in­tel­li­gence, and the only one rated high in the oph­thal­mic, dental and re­lated group, re­flect­ing med­ical tour­ism. Saudi Ar­a­bia is rated high across six of the eight cat­egor­ies, which is a state­ment about breadth of de­mand rather than about cap­ab­il­ity to sup­ply it.

The localisation gap

The defining tension of Gulf medtech is the distance between sovereign ambition and industrial reality.

The ten­sion this read keeps re­turn­ing to is the gap between the Gulf’s loc­al­isa­tion am­bi­tion and its in­dus­trial base. The am­bi­tion is genu­ine, fun­ded and co­ordin­ated as nowhere else, rest­ing on sov­er­eign cap­ital, pro­cure­ment man­dates, re­gional-HQ rules and na­tional strategies all aimed at a do­mestic medtech in­dustry. The real­ity is that the base it must be built from is tiny. There is around 6% local share in Saudi Ar­a­bia, con­cen­trated in com­mod­it­ies, and near-total im­port de­pend­ence else­where. There is no flag­ship high-value device man­u­fac­turer, and, in the primary

re­cord, an ab­sence of the plant an­nounce­ments that would sig­nal a real climb up the value curve.

What the evid­ence sug­gests is that sov­er­eign cap­ital can com­pel some things and not oth­ers. It can com­pel headquar­ters, com­mer­cial pres­ence, as­sembly and com­mod­ity man­u­fac­tur­ing, the mul­tina­tion­als are vis­ibly re­spond­ing. It can build first-rate buy­ers, plat­forms and AI cap­ab­il­ity, PureHealth and M42 prove it. What it has not yet shown it can do is con­jure, against a thin in­dus­trial base and six frag­men­ted mar­kets, the deep man­u­fac­tur­ing and en­gin­eer­ing cap­ab­il­ity that high-value devices re­quire: the ac­cu­mu­lated know-how that took the US and Ger­many dec­ades. Sov­er­eign will is ne­ces­sary; it may not be suf­fi­cient. The loc­al­isa­tion gap is the dif­fer­ence between de­cid­ing to have an in­dustry and ac­tu­ally build­ing one, and it is the ques­tion on which the next phase of Gulf medtech turns.

Sovereign capital can compel a headquarters and an assembly line. Whether it can conjure a high-value device industry is the open question.

The gap has a shape that policy can­not eas­ily re­verse, and the shape is an in­ver­sion. The loc­al­isa­tion op­por­tun­ity runs op­pos­ite to the value chain. The easi­est wins sit in the low-tech­no­logy, high-volume cat­egor­ies, con­sum­ables and point-of-care dia­gnostics. The cat­egor­ies the re­gion most

MedTechState of Play41 •

wants to make at home, ima­ging and im­plants, carry near-total and very high im­port de­pend­ence and are the hard­est to loc­al­ise. Policy there­fore ac­quires the least valu­able cap­ab­il­ity first, and does so by design rather than by fail­ure.

The obstacles are named in the king­dom's own as­sess­ment, which is un­usu­ally can­did. They are a skilled high-tech­no­logy man­u­fac­tur­ing tal­ent gap, loc­al­isa­tion man­dates that raise the cost of entry, ex­e­cu­tion risk across the giga-pro­jects, con­tinu­ing de­pend­ence on im­por­ted com­pon­ents and in­tel­lec­tual prop­erty, and in­tense com­pet­i­tion for NUPCO tenders. Not one of those is a cap­ital con­straint, which is con­sist­ent with the con­clu­sion that the bind­ing con­straints are cap­ab­il­ity and scale.

The Emir­ati route does not close the same gap, and should not be read as though it did. Its ob­ject is the loc­al­isa­tion of headquar­ters, re­search, data and tech-en­abled care, not of man­u­fac­ture. On the re­gion's own eight-cat­egory frame­work, there­fore, the gap closes at present only in the one cat­egory that was never im­port-gated to begin with.

This mat­ters be­cause man­u­fac­tur­ing cap­ab­il­ity is, in the end, em­bod­ied in people, not just fa­cil­it­ies. A sov­er­eign fund can build a fact­ory. Staff­ing it with the en­gin­eers, qual­ity spe­cial­ists and sci­ent­ists who can make high-value devices, and keep­ing them, is slower and harder than de­ploy­ing cap­ital. The Gulf’s heavy re­li­ance on im­por­ted la­bour also leaves its health sys­tem and any nas­cent in­dustry ex­posed to the mo­bil­ity of that work­force. Loc­al­ising devices there­fore de­pends on loc­al­ising tal­ent, on

build­ing the do­mestic sci­entific and en­gin­eer­ing base that no pro­cure­ment pref­er­ence can short­cut. It is the deep­est of the con­straints, and the slow­est to re­solve.

The workforce constraint

Beneath the capital lies a harder limit: a healthcare system, and an industry, run largely by people from elsewhere.

The con­straint sov­er­eign cap­ital can­not quickly buy past is people. Gulf health­care runs over­whelm­ingly on an ex­pat­ri­ate work­force. In the UAE, ex­pat­ri­ates make up an es­tim­ated 82% of phys­i­cians and 96% of nurses, and in Saudi Ar­a­bia around 90% of the private-sec­tor health work­force. Phys­i­cian and nurse dens­ity across the Gulf sits below OECD levels, and Saudi Ar­a­bia alone is reckoned to need tens of thou­sands more doc­tors by 2030. A med­ical-tech­no­logy in­dustry must design, man­u­fac­ture, reg­u­late and ser­vice devices. It needs a depth of spe­cial­ised en­gin­eer­ing, sci­entific and clin­ical tal­ent the re­gion does not yet have and cur­rently im­ports along with the devices.

Key takeaways
  • Gulf health­care runs on ex­pat­ri­ates: UAE ~82% of doc­tors, ~96% of nurses; Saudi ~90% of private health staff.
MedTechState of Play42 •
Gulf health systems are staffed overwhelmingly by expatriates
per cent expatriate
025507510096UAE nurses90Saudi private staff82UAE physicians
Source: World Bank, 2017 to 2021
  • Phys­i­cian/nurse dens­ity sits below OECD; Saudi needs tens of thou­sands more doc­tors by 2030.
  • Device-mak­ing is em­bod­ied in people: the tal­ent base is the slow­est con­straint to fix.

The short­age is meas­ur­able be­fore any ques­tion of na­tion­al­ity arises. Phys­i­cian dens­ity across the six states runs from about 1.0 per 1,000 pop­u­la­tion in Bahrain to roughly 3.1 in Saudi Ar­a­bia, and hos­pital beds from about 1.2 to 2.2 per 1,000 (World Bank, 2017 to 2021). Both sit below de­veloped-mar­ket norms in states whose spend­ing power is at or above them, so the clin­ical work­force is a con­straint on the use of devices even where the devices them­selves are af­ford­able.

Physicians per 1,000 population
physicians per 1,000
Saudi Arabia3.1UAE2.6Qatar2.5Kuwait2.3Oman2Bahrain1
Source: World Bank, 2020

The con­straint ex­tends into the reg­u­lat­ory and qual­ity pro­fes­sions, which is less often no­ticed. An au­thor­ised rep­res­ent­at­ive is man­dat­ory in all six states and bears real reg­u­lat­ory li­ab­il­ity, and in Qatar and Bahrain only a loc­ally re­gistered rep­res­ent­at­ive may file at all, while ISO 13485 qual­ity-sys­tem com­pet­ence is ex­pec­ted through­out. Loc­al­ising man­u­fac­ture there­fore re­quires not only en­gin­eers but a do­mestic cadre of reg­u­lat­ory af­fairs and qual­ity spe­cial­ists, a pro­fes­sion that scarcely ex­ists in a mar­ket built on dis­tri­bu­tion.

The re­gion's chosen fron­tier is the one most ex­posed to this con­straint. Soft­ware as a med­ical device and ar­ti­fi­cial in­tel­li­gence is gated by tal­ent and data rather than by man­u­fac­tur­ing. The in­sti­tu­tions built around it are there­fore prop­erly read as tal­ent in­stru­ments as much as tech­no­logy

MedTechState of Play43 •

ones. Those are the Qatar Gen­ome Pro­gramme, the Emir­ati Gen­ome Pro­gramme, Sidra Medi­cine and Hub71+ Life Sci­ences.

Market access, and what could go wrong

For a maker or investor, the Gulf is among the most attractive markets in the world, on the sovereign’s terms.

For a device maker, the Gulf of­fers the richest de­mand in the world on the most nav­ig­able terms: a state payer, a fun­ded build-out, and a clear, if de­mand­ing, path to ac­cess. The vi­able strategies are well-defined by the loc­al­isa­tion re­gime. Es­tab­lish a re­gional headquar­ters to win gov­ern­ment con­tracts. Se­cure SFDA or Emir­ates Drug Es­tab­lish­ment re­gis­tra­tion through a local rep­res­ent­at­ive. Loc­al­ise as­sembly or man­u­fac­tur­ing to cap­ture pro­cure­ment pref­er­ence, or part­ner a sov­er­eign-backed cham­pion. The Gulf re­wards those who com­mit to a real local pres­ence and pen­al­ises those who only ship from abroad.

Three risks could bend the path. Fiscal de­pend­ence is the deep­est. The whole build-out rests on oil rev­enue, and with Saudi Ar­a­bia’s fiscal break-even creep­ing up against heavy megapro­ject spend­ing, a sus­tained oil-price fall could slow the health ex­pan­sion. Ex­e­cu­tion risk is real. The

loc­al­isa­tion am­bi­tion may out­run the in­dus­trial and human base, leav­ing ex­pens­ive fa­cil­it­ies under-used and tar­gets quietly missed, as some already have been. And the frag­ment­a­tion could per­sist, keep­ing the six mar­kets sub-scale and de­ter­ring the do­mestic man­u­fac­tur­ing the re­gion wants. None of this re­verses the un­der­ly­ing de­mand, since the dis­ease bur­den and the state payer guar­an­tee a large, grow­ing mar­ket. But each shapes how fast loc­al­isa­tion moves and how much of the value the Gulf cap­tures rather than im­ports.

The ac­cess se­quence can be set out as five steps. It is the same five every­where. First comes clear­ance in a re­cog­nised ref­er­ence mar­ket, typ­ic­ally a United States FDA 510(k) or pre­market ap­proval, an EU CE mark, or in­creas­ingly an SFDA ap­proval. Second is risk clas­si­fic­a­tion from A to D by the na­tional reg­u­lator. Third is the ap­point­ment of an au­thor­ised rep­res­ent­at­ive or li­censed dis­trib­utor in-coun­try. Fourth is na­tional re­gis­tra­tion with the SFDA, the Emir­ates Drug Es­tab­lish­ment, Qatar's Min­istry of Pub­lic Health, Kuwait's Drug and Food Con­trol, Bahrain's NHRA or Oman's Min­istry of Health. Fifth is pro­cure­ment list­ing, with NUPCO in Saudi Ar­a­bia and the SEHA and Dubai Health Au­thor­ity pro­cesses in the UAE.

Bahrain re­pays being treated as a de­lib­er­ate first fil­ing rather than as a small mar­ket. Its reg­u­lator re­views in about six to eight weeks against six to nine months in the other smal­ler states, it is among the re­gion's most trans­par­ent, and the king­dom sits a short cause­way from the largest mar­ket in the Gulf. A low-cost prov­ing ground with a fast cer­ti­fic­ate is worth

MedTechState of Play44 •

more at the start of a re­gional pro­gramme than its $0.4 bil­lion mar­ket would sug­gest.

To the three risks named above a fourth should be added, and it is ana­lyt­ical rather than com­mer­cial. Coun­try mar­ket val­ues are drawn from dif­fer­ent re­search houses on in­com­pat­ible scopes and must not be summed, so the most com­mon error in siz­ing this re­gion is made be­fore any stra­tegic judge­ment is reached.

The next two to three years

What a maker or investor should expect Gulf medtech to look like by 2028.

Over the next two to three years, Gulf medtech will keep grow­ing hard on its un­shake­able de­mand and loc­al­ise at the mar­gins where sov­er­eign power can com­pel it. Four de­vel­op­ments look most likely:

  • The de­mand com­pounds. The dis­ease bur­den, the build-out and the state payer guar­an­tee a mar­ket grow­ing to­ward the high single di­gits an­nu­ally: the surest de­mand in global medtech.
  • Loc­al­isa­tion deep­ens at the bot­tom and middle. More com­mod­ity and mid-value as­sembly, more mul­tina­tional headquar­ters and ser­vice op­er­a­tions on­shore, but the high-value plant re­mains scarce.
  • AI and di­gital lead the genu­ine build­ing. Seha Vir­tual Hos­pital, M42 and sov­er­eign com­pute make the soft­ware-and-in­tel­li­gence layer the area where the Gulf ac­tu­ally leads, not im­ports.
  • Con­sol­id­a­tion around sov­er­eign cham­pi­ons. PureHealth, M42 and the PIF ven­tures grow and ac­quire, at home and abroad, con­cen­trat­ing the sec­tor around state-backed plat­forms.

The bind­ing ques­tion re­mains the loc­al­isa­tion gap. The mar­ket’s growth is not in doubt; what is in doubt is whether the Gulf con­verts its sov­er­eign will into genu­ine high-value man­u­fac­tur­ing cap­ab­il­ity, or stays the world’s great buyer, loc­al­ising headquar­ters, as­sembly and AI while im­port­ing the deep tech­no­logy. The smart po­s­i­tion, for maker and in­vestor alike, is to serve the cer­tain de­mand while help­ing the sov­er­eign close the gap, on its terms, at whatever rung of the value curve it is ready to climb.

The fast edges can be named with fig­ures, and both sit out­side hard­ware man­u­fac­tur­ing. Wear­able health devices are pro­jec­ted to grow from about $1.05 bil­lion to­ward $3.12 bil­lion by 2032, roughly 17 per cent a year and the fast­est seg­ment in the mar­ket. The Saudi di­gital-health mar­ket is pro­jec­ted to rise from about $4.4 bil­lion in 2024 to­ward $15.3 bil­lion by 2033. Neither tra­ject­ory de­pends on a fact­ory. That is why both are more cer­tain than the loc­al­isa­tion pro­gramme it­self.

Two fin­an­cing re­forms fall in­side the win­dow and will show up as de­mand. Bahrain's SEHATI pro­gramme and Oman's Dham­ani plat­form, launched by the Fin­an­cial Ser­vices Au­thor­ity on 1 Janu­ary 2025, are both still

MedTechState of Play45 •
The fastest-growing adjacencies, current and forecast
US$ bn
051015201.1GCC wearables, 20243.1GCC wearables, 20324.4Saudi digital health,202415.3Saudi digital health,2033
Source: Market Research Future and IMARC, 2025

phas­ing in. Private-sec­tor de­mand in the two most pub­licly fun­ded sys­tems there­fore ar­rives dur­ing the fore­cast period rather than after it. The Emir­ates Drug Es­tab­lish­ment's mul­tiple-agent re­gime, in force since Feb­ru­ary 2026, will mean­while con­tinue to re­shape how products are rep­res­en­ted in the re­gion's second-largest mar­ket.

On the soft­ware layer the gov­ernance ques­tion is also being settled in-re­gion. Qatar, Saudi Ar­a­bia and the UAE have been among the global front-run­ners in fram­ing rules for ar­ti­fi­cial in­tel­li­gence in health, rather than wait­ing for them. The cat­egory in which the Gulf genu­inely leads will there­fore be reg­u­lated by Gulf au­thor­it­ies on a Gulf timetable.

The Gulf is try­ing to close it with the one tool it has in abund­ance: sov­er­eign cap­ital. The PIF, Mubadala, ADQ and QIA are build­ing cham­pi­ons,

found­ing man­u­fac­tur­ers and wield­ing pro­cure­ment and headquar­ters man­dates to com­pel loc­al­isa­tion. The ef­fort is genu­ine and partly work­ing. Mul­tina­tion­als are mov­ing on­shore, lead­ing buy­ers and AI plat­forms (PureHealth, M42) have been built, and com­mod­ity man­u­fac­tur­ing has begun. But the deep, high-value device-mak­ing stays im­por­ted, the scan­ners and the im­plants alike, gated by a tiny in­dus­trial base, six frag­men­ted mar­kets, and an ex­pat­ri­ate-de­pend­ent work­force.

The read, on a page

The whole argument, in one place, with the evidence behind it.

The Gulf is the world’s great pa­tient. It car­ries one of the heav­iest chronic-dis­ease bur­dens on earth, dia­betes among the world’s highest and car­di­ovas­cu­lar dis­ease the lead­ing killer, and it funds the treat­ment lav­ishly, the state driv­ing health spend­ing to­ward $159 bil­lion by 2029. Yet it makes al­most none of the devices that treat­ment needs, im­port­ing roughly 94% of them in Saudi Ar­a­bia and 98% in the UAE. The de­fin­ing fea­ture of Gulf medtech is this gap between abund­ant, state-fun­ded de­mand and near-total im­port de­pend­ence.

For the maker and the in­vestor, the read is to serve the cer­tain de­mand and help close the gap. The Gulf will buy whatever it can­not yet make. It

MedTechState of Play46 •
The Gulf has built the world’s richest demand on the thinnest supply. Whether it makes that supply, or keeps buying it, is the question.

will re­ward who­ever helps it make more, on the sov­er­eign’s terms, one rung of the value curve at a time.

The loc­al­isa­tion im­pulse is re­gional rather than Saudi alone, and that is eas­ily missed. Every state car­ries an equi­val­ent pro­gramme. There is Vis­ion 2030 in Saudi Ar­a­bia, Qatar Na­tional Vis­ion 2030, Kuwait Vis­ion 2035, Bahrain's Eco­nomic Vis­ion 2030 and Oman Vis­ion 2040. Each treats health­care as a di­ver­si­fic­a­tion pil­lar, and each com­mits to move up the value chain from buy­ing devices to mak­ing them. Only Saudi Ar­a­bia has so far con­ver­ted the com­mit­ment into pro­cure­ment rules, which is the dif­fer­ence between an in­ten­tion and a lever.

Four cor­rec­tions car­ried in this edi­tion sharpen the ar­gu­ment rather than soften it. The dia­betes series now rests on the In­ter­na­tional Dia­betes Fed­er­a­tion's 11th edi­tion, pub­lished in 2025 on 2024 es­tim­ates, against a global com­par­ator of 11.1 per cent, with Qatar second ahead of Saudi Ar­a­bia. Seha Vir­tual Hos­pital con­nects 241 hos­pit­als and more than 1,400 health centres (Saudi Min­istry of Health, 9 Au­gust 2026). Device mar­ket­ing au­thor­isa­tions in the UAE have sat with the Emir­ates Drug Es­tab­lish­ment with

ef­fect from 29 Decem­ber 2025. The fourth cor­rec­tion con­cerns pro­cure­ment. NUPCO's 2026 pro­cure­ment rules pri­or­it­ise product that is both SFDA-re­gistered and made in-King­dom.

Each cor­rec­tion points the same way. The de­mand is bet­ter doc­u­mented than be­fore, and the di­gital land­scape is lar­ger than re­por­ted. The gate is tighter. The sov­er­eign has strengthened its hold on ac­cess, while the man­u­fac­tur­ing base it is try­ing to cre­ate has not yet ma­ter­i­ally changed.

Key takeaways

Nine conclusions for the people who must act on this market.

  1. The Gulf can buy any device and make al­most none. ~94% im­por­ted in Saudi Ar­a­bia, ~98% in the UAE: the de­fin­ing gap.
  2. The de­mand is the heav­iest on earth. Dia­betes among the world’s highest; CVD the lead­ing killer, struc­tural, not cyc­lical.
  3. The state is the payer. Uni­ver­sal pub­lic care plus man­dat­ory in­sur­ance means de­mand con­verts dir­ectly into pro­cure­ment.
  4. Sov­er­eign cap­ital is the de­fin­ing force. PIF, Mubadala, ADQ and QIA build cham­pi­ons and com­pel loc­al­isa­tion as private cap­ital can­not.
  5. Two mod­els run at once. Saudi Ar­a­bia builds the fact­ory; the UAE builds the hub. Both will suc­ceed par­tially and dif­fer­ently.
MedTechState of Play47 •
  1. Loc­al­isa­tion works at the bot­tom, not the top. Com­mod­ity as­sembly and mul­tina­tional HQs on­shore; high-value plant re­mains scarce.
  2. AI is where the Gulf leads. Seha Vir­tual Hos­pital and M42 cap­ture the soft­ware layer, built, not im­por­ted.
  3. Frag­ment­a­tion and tal­ent gate the climb. Six sep­ar­ate re­gis­tra­tions and an ex­pat­ri­ate work­force limit do­mestic scale.
  4. The gap is the prize. Value ac­crues to those who help con­vert the im­port bill into local cap­ab­il­ity, on the sov­er­eign’s terms.

Volge's expertise in MedTech

The engineering work the sector asks for, and the form it takes on an engagement.

Med­ical devices are now net­worked products under reg­u­lat­ory su­per­vi­sion, so the en­gin­eer­ing they need sits across se­cur­ity, data and com­pli­ance at once. The work below is what device makers, hos­pital groups and in­vestors in this mar­ket com­mis­sion. Each is de­livered by senior en­gin­eers work­ing in­side the cli­ent's own team, with the Global De­liv­ery Centres run­ning what has been built once it is in pro­duc­tion.

A device maker or hos­pital group in this mar­ket needs an asset po­s­i­tion be­fore it needs a se­cur­ity pro­gramme. The re­gister of what is de­ployed,

by model and by soft­ware ver­sion, is the doc­u­ment every other de­cision rests on, and few cli­ents have one that sur­vives in­spec­tion. It is a product in its own right, not a spread­sheet ex­er­cise. Build­ing it is un­glam­or­ous work. Volge usu­ally starts there, be­cause both seg­ment­a­tion and sub­mis­sion evid­ence are de­rived from the re­gister rather than as­sembled sep­ar­ately.

Reg­u­lat­ory evid­ence is pro­duced con­tinu­ously or it is re­con­struc­ted ex­pens­ively. Qual­ity man­age­ment to the in­ter­na­tional stand­ard for med­ical devices re­quires design his­tory and change con­trol to be cur­rent, not gathered up for an audit, and the same holds for post-mar­ket sur­veil­lance (In­ter­na­tional Or­gan­isa­tion for Stand­ard­isa­tion, 2016). Volge staffs this with en­gin­eers who have filed rather than only ad­vised, and keeps one of them ac­count­able for the re­cord after the pro­gramme closes. Con­tinu­ity mat­ters more than head­count.

The first ninety days should end with a de­fens­ible asset re­gister and one seg­men­ted clin­ical net­work, and noth­ing more than that, with meas­ure­ment fol­low­ing from there. Device up­time against main­ten­ance spend is the num­ber a hos­pital board un­der­stands, and time from vul­ner­ab­il­ity dis­clos­ure to fielded patch is the one a reg­u­lator asks about. Two fail­ures are com­mon. The re­gister is built once and never main­tained, and se­cur­ity is scoped against the cor­por­ate net­work rather than the clin­ical one be­hind it.

Regulatory and quality engineering
  • Sub­mis­sion data pack­ages for re­gis­tra­tion and con­form­ity as­sess­ment.
MedTechState of Play48 •
Device security and resilience
  • Med­ical device se­cur­ity re­view, against IEC 62443 and the pre­market cy­ber­se­cur­ity ex­pect­a­tions of the reg­u­lator.
  • Clin­ical net­work seg­ment­a­tion, sep­ar­at­ing dia­gnostic and thera­peutic devices from the hos­pital cor­por­ate net­work.
  • Device threat mod­el­ling and pen­et­ra­tion test­ing, on the device, its gate­way and its cloud ser­vice.
  • Co­ordin­ated vul­ner­ab­il­ity dis­clos­ure and patch pro­grammes for a fielded device pop­u­la­tion.
Device data and operations
  • Med­ical device in­vent­ory man­age­ment, build­ing and main­tain­ing a single asset re­gister across sites.
  • Device util­isa­tion and ser­vice ana­lyt­ics, link­ing up­time and main­ten­ance to clin­ical through­put.
  • In­ter­op­er­ab­il­ity en­gin­eer­ing, bring­ing device out­put into the re­cord through HL7 FHIR and na­tional ex­changes.
  • Unique device iden­ti­fic­a­tion and seri­al­isa­tion across man­u­fac­tur­ing and dis­tri­bu­tion.
  • Qual­ity man­age­ment sys­tem di­git­isa­tion to ISO 13485, in­clud­ing design his­tory and change con­trol.
  • Post-mar­ket sur­veil­lance and vi­gil­ance re­port­ing, with the data pipeline that feeds it.
  • Val­id­a­tion and model gov­ernance for soft­ware as a med­ical device.
How an engagement runs
  • A dia­gnosis of two to eight weeks, led on site by senior ar­chi­tects, es­tab­lish­ing the device pop­u­la­tion and its ex­pos­ure.
  • A se­quenced pro­gramme, be­cause an asset re­gister has to exist be­fore seg­ment­a­tion or vul­ner­ab­il­ity work can be scoped.
  • Build teams em­bed­ded along­side the cli­ent's own en­gin­eers rather than work­ing to a spe­cific­a­tion at arm's length.
  • Run and op­er­ate from the Global De­liv­ery Centres, with the design his­tory and sur­veil­lance re­cord kept cur­rent.
MedTechState of Play49 •
The Read

Sovereign capital can compel a headquarters and an assembly line. Whether it can conjure a high-value device industry is the open question.

Sources

The bodies cited in this read for market size, disease burden, procurement and regulation, with the year the text attributes to each.

MedTechState of Play50 •
Version · VSP-GMT-001 · 2026
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About Volge

Volge is an engineering firm providing enterprise technology transformation services to clients across the Middle East, India, APAC, Europe, and North America.

Delivery stands on two pillars: Forward Deployed Engineering, with senior specialists embedded in the client’s own team, and Intelligent Command Centre Operations, run from our Global Delivery Centres, which keeps what they build running. Senior engineers stay with an engagement from the first diagnosis through to production.

Our services span Strategy, Data, Platforms, AI and Automation, Cyber Trust, Technology Operations, and Applied Functional Engineering. Engagements begin with a diagnosis. The firm is built on working autonomy: engineers decide, innovate, co-create, and own their work. Motivated engineers build the systems that sustain our clients’ growth.

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