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volge

Rails Without a Payer : State of Play of Indian Digital Health

INDIAN DIGITAL HEALTH · STATE OF PLAY 2026
A market built on public rails as good as any, gated by the arithmetic of acquisition, and missing the one thing that would fix it: a payer.
90cr
ABHA health IDs
₹1.12
spent to earn ₹1
0
OPD cover under PM-JAY
India 2026

State of Play is a read on a sector: its size, its structure, where the money moves and what moves it. Each edition takes one market and sets out what is known, what is claimed, and what the difference between the two is worth to anyone deciding where to commit.

A market built on public rails as good as any, gated by the arithmetic of acquisition, and missing the one thing that would fix it: a payer. A premium briefing on India’s digital-health market, the public rails it runs on, the unit economics that gate it, and the payer it is still missing.

Figures carry their basis and their date. Where published estimates disagree, the range is given and the basis named rather than averaged away, and where a widely quoted number does not survive checking it is corrected here rather than repeated. Every chart plots a figure stated in the text, and nothing is projected beyond what a named source projects.

Contents

01Introduction
  1. 02The rails are public; the payer is missing
  2. 05Rails without a payer
  3. 06A market sized by definition
  4. 07The unit-economics ceiling
  5. 09The missing payer
  6. 10The funding reset
02Deep dive
  1. 14The public rails: ABDM
  2. 15eSanjeevani, and the price of free
  3. 17The health stack, and the consent layer
  4. 18Why pure-play loses money
  5. 19The stack-to-survive playbook
  6. 20The e-pharmacy regulatory vacuum
  7. 21DPDP and the health-data regime
  8. 22The trust problem
03Real-world application
  1. 25The seven segments
  2. 26E-pharmacy: the share war
  3. 27The cautionary tale: PharmEasy
  4. 29The survivor: Tata 1mg
  5. 30The asset-light route: Practo
  6. 31Teleconsultation: the loss-leader layer
  7. 32Diagnostics: the margin lever
  8. 34Insurtech: the wedge toward a payer
  9. 35Fitness, wellness and full-stack care
  10. 36The capital and the deals
  11. 38Clinical and frugal AI
04The read
  1. 41The doctor shortage the rails serve
  2. 42The escape route: building the payer
  3. 43The constraints, and what could go wrong
  4. 45The next two to three years
  5. 46The read, on a page
  6. 47Key takeaways
  7. 48Volge's expertise in digital health
  8. •Sources
Digital HealthState of Play01 •

The rails are public; the payer is missing

India built some of the best digital-health plumbing on earth. Then it discovered that almost nobody could make money running water through it.

The para­dox of In­dian di­gital health is that the rails are pub­lic and the eco­nom­ics are not. India has built, at the scale of a bil­lion people, some of the finest pub­lic di­gital-health in­fra­struc­ture any­where: 90 crore di­gital health IDs, 100 crore linked re­cords, and a free state tele­con­sulta­tion ser­vice that has handled 43 crore con­sulta­tions. The rails are ex­traordin­ary. They are also pub­lic. And they sit on top of an ab­sence. The mar­ket that runs on them has no payer.

The res­ult is a sec­tor with a bril­liant sup­ply side and a broken de­mand side. Every private di­gital-health plat­form still spends more to win a cus­tomer than that cus­tomer is worth: on the clean­est avail­able proxy, India’s lead­ers burn ₹1.12 to ₹1.21 to earn a single rupee of rev­enue. The cause is struc­tural, not ma­na­gerial. India’s pub­lic in­sur­ance scheme, PM-JAY, pays for the hos­pital but ex­pli­citly ex­cludes out­pa­tient care, which is pre­cisely what telemedi­cine and e-phar­macy sell. Three things fol­low.

Both sides of the ar­gu­ment have moved since this page was writ­ten. The ar­gu­ment holds. On the rails, the Ay­ush­man Bharat Di­gital Mis­sion had

is­sued about 93.95 crore ABHA health ac­counts and linked some 105 crore health re­cords by July 2026 (Na­tional Health Au­thor­ity, 2026). eSanjeevani re­cor­ded 50,00,92,730 cu­mu­lat­ive tele­con­sulta­tions on 15 Septem­ber 2026 (MoHFW, 2026). The free pub­lic al­tern­at­ive is there­fore roughly a sixth lar­ger than the fig­ure car­ried above, and the sup­ply side of the para­dox has strengthened rather than sta­bil­ised.

  • Unit eco­nom­ics, not tech­no­logy, is the bind­ing con­straint. The product works; the rails work; what does not work is the maths of ac­quir­ing and re­tain­ing a pay­ing user for a low-value, in­fre­quent trans­ac­tion.
  • Sur­vival means stack­ing. No pure-play telemedi­cine or e-phar­macy busi­ness is sus­tain­able alone. The sur­viv­ors bundle dia­gnostics, phar­macy, sub­scrip­tions and private label until the life­time value clears the ac­quis­i­tion cost.
  • The es­cape is a payer. The one struc­tural fix is a payer that funds out­pa­tient di­gital health. Private health in­sur­ance, en­abled by the Ac­count Ag­greg­ator con­sent rails, is the most vis­ible can­did­ate for the job.

The op­por­tun­ity is real and the rails are as good as any, but the value goes to who­ever cracks the unit eco­nom­ics, by stack­ing or by reach­ing the payer, and not to any­one who simply rides the rails.

On the payer side, the first genu­ine move­ment in years is now vis­ible. Health in­sur­ance ac­coun­ted for 40.8 per cent of India’s non-life gross premium in FY26, against 38.6 per cent in FY25, over­tak­ing motor to be­come the largest line. Seg­ment premium rose 15.4 per cent to about ₹1.4 lakh crore, against in­dustry growth of 9.3 per cent (IRDAI and CareEdge

Digital HealthState of Play02 •

Rat­ings, 2026). The prox­im­ate cause is fiscal. The 56th GST Coun­cil re­moved the 18 per cent levy on in­di­vidual life and health premi­ums with ef­fect from 22 Septem­ber 2025, al­though group health re­mains taxed at that rate (Min­istry of Fin­ance, 2025).

The ex­clu­sion at the centre of the ar­gu­ment is un­changed. Ay­ush­man Bharat PM-JAY had is­sued 48.5 crore cards by 21 Septem­ber 2026 across more than 38,000 em­pan­elled hos­pit­als (Na­tional Health Au­thor­ity, 2026), and it still pays for hos­pit­al­isa­tion rather than for the clinic. Out-of-pocket spend­ing re­mains above 60 per cent of health ex­pendit­ure on the re­con­ciled basis used in the Volge play­book (2026). The payer is closer than it was. It has not ar­rived.

The rails reach roughly twice as many people as the public payer
crore
037.575112.515094ABHA health accounts105Linked health records48.5PM-JAY cards issued
Source: National Health Authority
Digital HealthState of Play03 •

The part in brief

  1. 01India’s health rails carry 90 crore digital identities and 100 crore linked records, and the free state teleconsultation service has handled 43 crore consultations.
  2. 02Leaders of the market still spend ₹1.12 to ₹1.21 for every rupee of revenue earned, which makes unit economics the binding constraint rather than technology.
  3. 03The public payer had issued 48.5 crore PM-JAY cards across more than 38,000 empanelled hospitals by September 2026, and it funds hospitalisation rather than clinic visits.
  4. 04Health insurance reached 40.8 per cent of non-life gross premium in FY26, from 38.6 per cent a year earlier, and overtook motor as the largest line.
  5. 05Out-of-pocket payment still exceeds 60 per cent of health spending on the reconciled basis, which leaves the patient funding outpatient care in cash.
Digital HealthState of Play04 •
01

The Problem

A market with first-rate rails, no profits, and no payer.

Rails without a payer

India fixed the infrastructure problem of digital health long before it fixed the business problem.

India’s pub­lic in­fra­struc­ture runs years ahead of its private eco­nom­ics. The state has laid rails the rich world would envy: a na­tional health iden­tity car­ried by 90 crore people, a bil­lion linked re­cords, a free tele­con­sulta­tion ser­vice reach­ing every state and union ter­rit­ory. And yet the com­pan­ies built to run on those rails are, al­most to a one, loss-mak­ing, freshly out of a bru­tal fund­ing cor­rec­tion.

The dis­tance between the rails and the re­turns is not a tech­no­logy gap. The apps work. The rails work, and the de­mand is enorm­ous. It is an eco­nom­ics gap. The cost of ac­quir­ing and serving a pay­ing cus­tomer out­runs the value that cus­tomer gen­er­ates, be­cause the core product, an out­pa­tient con­sulta­tion or a medi­cine order, is low-value and in­fre­quent. The de­cis­ive point is that it is paid for by no one but the pa­tient. India built the rail­way be­fore it found the freight that pays.

Key takeaways
  • India’s pub­lic di­gital-health rails rank with any: 90cr IDs, 100cr re­cords, 43cr free con­sults.
  • The private com­pan­ies on those rails are al­most all loss-mak­ing.
  • The gap is eco­nom­ics, not tech­no­logy: the core product has no payer.

The dis­tance has widened on the meas­ur­able side. The pub­lic iden­tity layer has passed 93.95 crore health ac­counts and about 105 crore linked re­cords (Na­tional Health Au­thor­ity, July 2026). The free na­tional tele­con­sulta­tion ser­vice crossed 50 crore cu­mu­lat­ive con­sulta­tions on 15 Septem­ber 2026 (MoHFW, 2026). The phys­ical net­work be­hind that ser­vice is lar­ger than the con­sulta­tion count alone con­veys. More than 142,000 Ay­ush­man Arogya Mandirs now op­er­ate as spokes, against 19,473 hubs and 901 on­line out-pa­tient de­part­ments, and they are served by roughly 242,000 re­gistered doc­tors, spe­cial­ists and health work­ers (MoHFW, Oc­to­ber 2026).

Cor­rect the no­men­clature wherever it ap­pears. The fa­cil­it­ies de­scribed in earlier edi­tions as Health and Well­ness Centres be­came Ay­ush­man Arogya Mandirs in 2023, and it is the Mandirs that carry the pub­lic tele­con­sulta­tion chan­nel into rural India. The name mat­ters be­cause the spoke, not the app, is the point of ac­cess for the cit­izen who owns no device, and the state owns the spoke.

Against that pub­lic land­scape stands a private base that is broad and shal­low. Track­ers count roughly 11,000 health-tech­no­logy firms in India, of which an es­tim­ated 90 per cent re­main pre-rev­enue or below ₹1 crore of an­nual rev­enue. The top five firms hold about 60 per cent of rev­enue in tele­con­sulta­tion and e-phar­macy. Between 20 and 30 per cent of the base

Digital HealthState of Play05 •
The public teleconsultation service rests on spokes rather than hubs
facilities
037,50075,000112,500150,000142,000Ayushman Arogya Mandir spokes19,473Hubs901Online out-patient departments
Source: MoHFW

is ex­pec­ted to fail or be ab­sorbed within two years (Tracxn and in­dustry track­ers, 2026). The in­fra­struc­ture is na­tional. The in­dustry on it is a hand­ful of plat­forms and a long tail.

A market sized by definition

Ask how big Indian digital health is and you get an answer somewhere between $6 billion and $16 billion. Both are defensible. That is the problem.

The single most slip­pery num­ber in this sec­tor is its own size. Es­tim­ates for the 2024–25 mar­ket run from about $6.3 bil­lion to $16.1

bil­lion, a two-and-a-half-fold spread. The cause is al­most en­tirely defin­i­tional. Statista’s nar­row, con­sumer-app count lands near $6 bil­lion. Grand View and IMARC, fold­ing in en­ter­prise soft­ware and elec­tronic re­cords, reach $14–16 bil­lion. The growth rates di­verge just as wildly, from about 12% to nearly 40% a year, and should never be av­er­aged to­gether.

The num­bers you can trust are the seg­ments. Telemedi­cine is put at roughly $5.5 bil­lion by 2025 and is the largest slice at about 45% of rev­enue; e-phar­macy at roughly $3.7 bil­lion. The move, for an op­er­ator or in­vestor, is to dis­trust the head­line and read the parts. The mar­ket is real and grow­ing fast. Its “size”, how­ever, is a defin­i­tional arte­fact. The ques­tion that mat­ters is not how big it is but which pieces of it can be made to pay.

The spread meas­ures scope rather than dis­agree­ment about India. The rem­edy is to com­mit to one basis and state it. On the re­con­ciled basis used in­tern­ally, the mar­ket is put at roughly $15 bil­lion to $18 bil­lion for 2025, with $17.81 bil­lion on the broad­est con­struc­tion (Cus­tom Mar­ket In­sights, 2025). Nar­rower tele­health defin­i­tions land near $3.9 bil­lion for the same year, pro­jec­ted to about $9.8 bil­lion by 2030 at some 20 per cent a year (Mordor In­tel­li­gence, 2025). The long pro­jec­tion, above $100 bil­lion by 2033 at a com­pound rate of 20 to 25 per cent, is dir­ec­tion of travel rather than fore­cast.

Two fea­tures of the mar­ket mat­ter more than its head­line. The base is broad and shal­low: of ap­prox­im­ately 11,000 health-tech­no­logy firms, an es­tim­ated 90 per cent are pre-rev­enue or below ₹1 crore of rev­enue

Digital HealthState of Play06 •
The size of the market is decided by the definition used, from narrow telehealth to the broadest construction
US$ billion
051015203.9Narrow telehealth6.3Consumer apps only16.1With enterprise IT17.8Broadest basis
Source: Statista, Grand View, IMARC and Custom Market Insights, 2025
Indian digital-health revenue by segment grouping
% of revenue
012.52537.55045Teleconsultation30Diagnostics ande-pharmacy15Clinical AI and medtechoverlap10Wellness and preventive
Source: Volge HealthTech India Playbook, 2026

(Tracxn, 2026). And growth is no longer evenly dis­trib­uted, since cap­ital and rev­enue are con­cen­trat­ing in a small num­ber of plat­forms that own sev­eral seg­ments at once.

The prac­tical con­sequence for an op­er­ator or an in­vestor is that seg­ment bound­ar­ies are be­com­ing com­mer­cial rather than strict. A share fig­ure quoted for tele­con­sulta­tion or for e-phar­macy de­scribes a rev­enue line in­side a plat­form more often than it de­scribes a com­pany. The use­ful ques­tion is not how large the mar­ket is but which of its parts can be made to pay.

The unit-economics ceiling

The number that decides this market is not its size. It is the cost of a single customer.

The wall every In­dian di­gital-health com­pany runs into is unit eco­nom­ics. What it costs to win and serve a cus­tomer is set against what that cus­tomer is worth. No plat­form dis­closes raw ac­quis­i­tion cost and life­time value. The clean­est proxy is there­fore also the bluntest: how many ru­pees a com­pany spends to earn one. In FY25, Tata 1mg spent about ₹1.12 to earn ₹1; MediBuddy, about ₹1.21. Spend­ing more than you make is the sec­tor’s baseline con­di­tion. It is not the ex­cep­tion.

Digital HealthState of Play07 •

The cause is built into the product. A tele­con­sulta­tion can carry a healthy gross mar­gin of around 70%. But it is low-value and in­fre­quent, and it barely up­sells, so the cost of ac­quir­ing the user rarely re­pays in a single trans­ac­tion. E-phar­macy runs on thin mar­gins against cap­ital-heavy lo­gist­ics, knife-fight pri­cing and near-zero switch­ing costs. The de­mand is vast and the product works, but the eco­nom­ics of a one-off, low-ticket health pur­chase simply do not clear the cost of win­ning the per­son who makes it. Everything else here re­sponds to this one ceil­ing. The stack­ing, the con­sol­id­a­tion and the hunt for a payer fol­low from it.

Quick facts: the ceiling
Tata 1mg: spent to earn ₹1 (FY25)₹1.12
MediBuddy: spent to earn ₹1 (FY25)₹1.21
Teleconsult gross margin~70%
E-pharmacy gross margin~25–30%
Diagnostics gross margin~45–50%

Spend-to-earn ra­tios from audited FY25 fil­ings (En­trackr). Mar­gins: Red­seer. No plat­form dis­closes raw CAC/LTV; ra­tios are the best proxy.

The ceil­ing can be stated more dir­ectly than through a spend-to-earn ratio, and the dir­ect state­ment is harsher. Ac­quir­ing a tele­con­sulta­tion user costs ₹800 to ₹2,000 or more, against a single con­sulta­tion worth ₹300 to ₹800. No first trans­ac­tion re­pays the cost of the cus­tomer who makes it

(Volge play­book, 2026). Worked through, a ven­ture ac­quir­ing at ₹1,200 and selling a ₹500 con­sulta­tion at a 50 per cent gross mar­gin earns a con­tri­bu­tion of ₹250. That re­cov­ers a fifth of its ac­quis­i­tion cost. Roughly four­teen to twenty-four fur­ther con­sulta­tions are re­quired to reach a life­time value of three to five times that cost.

The seg­ment mar­gins on which that arith­metic rests are lower than is often quoted. On the in­ternal basis, tele­con­sulta­tion gross mar­gins run 40 to 60 per cent and e-phar­macy 15 to 25 per cent, below the fig­ures car­ried in the panel above. The ceil­ing is there­fore if any­thing higher than the ra­tios imply. The ac­cep­ted bench­marks are a life­time value of at least three to five times ac­quis­i­tion cost, a pay­back period under twelve months and a re­peat rate of 40 to 60 per cent. The ma­jor­ity of the sec­tor clears none of them.

The de­nom­in­ator can be changed where the nu­mer­ator can­not. A user ac­quired through a cor­por­ate con­tract at about ₹300, gen­er­at­ing re­cur­ring an­nual rev­enue, re­pays within months, and busi­ness-to-busi­ness ac­quis­i­tion costs of ₹150 to ₹500 per user are routine. The route out of the ceil­ing is there­fore a change of chan­nel and bundle rather than a change of price.

Digital HealthState of Play08 •
Teleconsultation margins run well above e-pharmacy margins, and both sit below the figures usually quoted
per cent
01530456040Teleconsult, low60Teleconsult, high15E-pharmacy, low25E-pharmacy, high
Source: Volge playbook, 2026

The missing payer

The deepest reason digital health cannot pay for itself in India is brutally simple: no one pays for what it sells.

In most health sys­tems a third party pays for the care a pa­tient re­ceives, a gov­ern­ment scheme or an in­surer, and that is what makes the pro­vider’s eco­nom­ics work. In India, for the out­pa­tient care di­gital health over­whelm­ingly de­liv­ers, that third party is miss­ing. Out-of-pocket spend­ing still runs near 39% of health ex­pendit­ure by the na­tional ac­counts, and

around half by in­ter­na­tional meas­ures. That is among the highest on earth. The pa­tient pays, in cash, for the con­sulta­tion and the medi­cine.

The state scheme does not close the gap, be­cause of one de­cis­ive ex­clu­sion. Ay­ush­man Bharat (PM-JAY) of­fers a ₹5 lakh fam­ily cover, has is­sued more than 36 crore cards, and now runs in every state, but it cov­ers only in­pa­tient, sec­ond­ary and ter­tiary hos­pit­al­isa­tion. Out­pa­tient care is ex­pli­citly carved out. So India’s largest health payer does not pay for the thing di­gital health sells. Private health in­sur­ance is grow­ing, health is now the biggest non-life line, but in­di­vidual cover is barely a tenth of it. The ac­quis­i­tion cost the ceil­ing de­scribes is, in the end, un­covered. There is no one to ab­sorb it.

India’s biggest health payer covers the hospital but not the clinic, and the clinic is what digital health sells.

Two of the fig­ures on this page need re-basing, and the cor­rec­tion sharpens the ar­gu­ment. PM-JAY had is­sued 48.5 crore cards by 21 Septem­ber 2026 across more than 38,000 em­pan­elled hos­pit­als (Na­tional Health Au­thor­ity, 2026), a scheme far lar­ger than the count given above and still con­fined to in­pa­tient, sec­ond­ary and ter­tiary care. Out-of-pocket spend­ing is bet­ter stated at above 60 per cent of health ex­pendit­ure on the re­con­ciled in­ternal basis (2026) than at the lower na­tional-ac­counts

Digital HealthState of Play09 •

fig­ure, which places India among the most cash-fun­ded health sys­tems of its in­come group.

Non-life insurance premium growth, FY26
% year on year
0510152019.9Retail health15.4Health segment9.3Non-life industry
Source: CareEdge Ratings, 2026

The payer pool that could close the gap is non­ethe­less grow­ing faster than the in­dustry around it. Health in­sur­ance reached 40.8 per cent of non-life gross premium in FY26, from 38.6 per cent in FY25, over­tak­ing motor. Seg­ment premium grew 15.4 per cent to about ₹1.4 lakh crore and re­tail health 19.9 per cent, against in­dustry growth of 9.3 per cent (IRDAI and CareEdge Rat­ings, 2026). The prox­im­ate cause is fiscal. It is the re­moval of the 18 per cent GST on in­di­vidual life and health premi­ums from 22 Septem­ber 2025, group health re­main­ing taxed (56th GST Coun­cil, 2025). The mar­ket is es­tim­ated near $16 bil­lion in 2025 and about $48.5 bil­lion by 2035 (Mordor In­tel­li­gence and IMARC, 2025).

Early move­ment is vis­ible on the pub­lic side as well. PM-JAY has begun re­im­burs­ing tele­con­sulta­tion in se­lec­ted states, and the scheme has been ex­ten­ded to cit­izens aged 70 and above. The white spaces that would re­lieve the ceil­ing are spe­cific: out-pa­tient cover, men­tal-health cover, senior in­clu­sion and rural pen­et­ra­tion.

The funding reset

The cheap capital that once hid the unit economics has gone home. Its absence put the problem under a spotlight.

For a few giddy years, abund­ant ven­ture cap­ital let In­dian di­gital-health firms spend straight through the unit-eco­nom­ics ceil­ing, buy­ing growth at a loss on the faith that scale would even­tu­ally fix the maths. That era is over. Fund­ing into In­dian healthtech fell from a 2021 peak near $1 bil­lion to a 2023 trough of about $419 mil­lion. It re­boun­ded to roughly $1.13 bil­lion in 2024, then settled to around $700 mil­lion in 2025, a reset year in which deal counts fell and the sec­tor slid down the ven­ture rank­ings. The first half of 2026 brought about $310 mil­lion, and it went to AI, on­co­logy and ge­n­om­ics rather than the old con­sumer plays.

The dis­cip­line that reset im­posed is the most con­sequen­tial thing to hap­pen to the sec­tor. With growth-at-all-costs money gone, com­pan­ies had to face the ceil­ing head-on, cut­ting mar­ket­ing, nar­row­ing focus, chas­ing

Digital HealthState of Play10 •

the path to prof­it­ab­il­ity the next part lays out. A much-quoted “$9.9 bil­lion” is cu­mu­lat­ive all-time fund­ing, not a single year, and should not be read as a flood; the real pic­ture is a sec­tor re­cov­er­ing on tighter terms. The cap­ital winter did not kill In­dian di­gital health. It made it grow up.

Key takeaways
  • Fund­ing fell from ~$1B (2021) to ~$419M (2023), re­covered to ~$1.13B (2024), ~$700M (2025).
  • The “$9.9B” head­line is cu­mu­lat­ive all-time, not an­nual: do not mis­take it for a flood.
  • The reset forced dis­cip­line: the ceil­ing can no longer be spent through.

The com­pos­i­tion of the reset is more in­struct­ive than its level. The 2024 re­bound was spread across 112 deals, and the first quarter of 2025 alone drew about $496 mil­lion across 38 rounds (Tracxn and in­dustry track­ers, 2026). By the first half of 2026 the con­cen­tra­tion had tightened sharply. Only four rounds above $100 mil­lion were re­cor­ded na­tion­ally, against el­even a year earlier. The money went to ar­ti­fi­cial in­tel­li­gence and on­co­logy, and to ge­n­om­ics, re­hab­il­it­a­tion and pre­ci­sion medi­cine. Roughly 30 per cent of health-tech­no­logy ven­ture cap­ital now flows to medtech and dia­gnostics rather than to pure tele­con­sulta­tion.

The re­pri­cing of the 2021 co­hort is the de­fin­ing fea­ture of the cycle. It was ex­ecuted at the level of in­di­vidual com­pan­ies rather than through a

Indian health-technology funding, by period
US$ m
03757501,1251,5001,1302024, full year496Q1 2025310H1 2026
Source: Tracxn and industry funding trackers, 2026

gen­eral mark­down. PharmEasy’s par­ent took ₹1,804 crore in 2024 at a steep dis­count to its peak, led by a do­mestic fam­ily of­fice. Pristyn Care was val­ued at about $1.17 bil­lion in Novem­ber 2025, down some 17 per cent from its $1.4 bil­lion peak (En­trackr and Inc42, 2026). Un­dif­fer­en­ti­ated dir­ect-to-con­sumer brands have seen early-stage fund­ing con­tract hard­est.

Ap­pet­ite for the sec­tor it­self has not gone. More than 39 new health-tech­no­logy ven­tures were foun­ded in the first half of 2025. The cap­ital re­quire­ment at each stage is mod­est by medtech stand­ards, at ₹1 crore to ₹5 crore at seed and ₹50 crore to ₹150 crore at Series B. What has changed is the test ap­plied. A cal­cu­lated ac­quis­i­tion cost, life­time value and pay­back period are now screened be­fore growth is fun­ded.

Digital HealthState of Play11 •
The capital a health-technology venture needs at each stage is modest by medtech standards
₹ crore
037.575112.51501Seed, low5Seed, high50Series B, low150Series B, high
Source: Tracxn and industry trackers, 2026
Roughly 30 per cent of health-technology venture capital now flows to medtech and diagnostics rather than to pure teleconsultation.
Digital HealthState of Play12 •

The part in brief

  1. 01The market is put anywhere between about $6.3 billion and $16.1 billion for 2024 and 2025, and the spread measures definitional scope rather than disagreement.
  2. 02Tata 1mg spent about ₹1.12 and MediBuddy about ₹1.21 in FY25 to earn a single rupee, so spending beyond revenue is the sector’s normal condition.
  3. 03Winning a teleconsultation user costs ₹800 to ₹2,000 or more while one consultation is worth ₹300 to ₹800, so no first transaction repays itself.
  4. 04PM-JAY covers hospitalisation on 48.5 crore cards and excludes outpatient care, so nobody but the patient funds the consultation digital health actually sells.
  5. 05Healthtech funding fell from about $1 billion in 2021 to $419 million in 2023, recovered to $1.13 billion in 2024 and settled near $700 million in 2025.
Digital HealthState of Play13 •
The Problem

Roughly 30 per cent of health-technology venture capital now flows to medtech and diagnostics rather than to pure teleconsultation.

02

The Mechanics

The rails the market runs on, the economics that gate it, and the rules still unwritten.

The public rails: ABDM

India’s digital-health rails are a genuine world first, population-scale public infrastructure, built in five years.

The Ay­ush­man Bharat Di­gital Mis­sion (ABDM) ap­plies India’s “India Stack” play­book, the one that pro­duced Aadhaar and UPI, to health. The scale is re­cent and stag­ger­ing. The ABHA di­gital health ID, car­ried by 14.7 crore people in 2021, passed 90 crore by 2026; the re­cords linked to those IDs crossed 100 crore in May 2026, doub­ling in roughly fif­teen months. A re­gistry of more than 363,000 fa­cil­it­ies and over 564,000 prac­ti­tion­ers com­pletes the dir­ect­ory.

The whole thing is con­sent-first by design. ABDM’s Health Data Man­age­ment policy moves data only on ex­pli­cit, pur­pose-bound, time-lim­ited, with­draw­able con­sent, brokered through a Con­sent Man­ager. That body is the health twin of the Ac­count Ag­greg­ator. Dis­cov­ery and book­ing run on the Uni­fied Health In­ter­face, built on the Beckn pro­tocol, the same open stand­ard be­hind ONDC in com­merce. Open, in­ter­op­er­able, con­sent-based and built for a bil­lion people, the rails are as good as any in the world. The ques­tion is not whether they exist, but whether any­one can build a pay­ing busi­ness on top of them.

The counts given here have been over­taken and should be re-based. The ABHA health ac­count passed 90 crore on 30 May 2026 and stood at

Quick facts: the rails
ABHA health IDs (2026)90cr+
Linked health records (May 2026)100cr+
Facilities registered~363,520
Professionals registered~564,851
Health-tech solutions integrated450+

about 93.95 crore by July 2026, against 84.79 crore in Janu­ary 2026. Linked health re­cords crossed the 100-crore mark over the same period to reach some 105 crore, from 82.69 crore in Janu­ary (Na­tional Health Au­thor­ity, 2026). On that basis roughly 67 per cent of the pop­u­la­tion now holds a health ac­count. The re­cord-to-ac­count ratio has moved above one for the first time. Uttar Pra­desh alone ac­counts for more than 15.3 crore ac­counts.

The re­gistry layer has also grown bey­ond the fig­ures above, with about 4.1 lakh fa­cil­it­ies re­gistered as at Janu­ary 2026 (Na­tional Health Au­thor­ity, 2026). The num­ber that mat­ters to a builder is the par­ti­cipant count rather than the cit­izen count: more than 1,000 private firms are now ABDM-cer­ti­fied, which lets e-phar­ma­cies, hos­pit­als and soft­ware vendors ex­change re­cords through stand­ard­ised in­ter­faces. That is a net­work ef­fect which com­pounds with every par­ti­cipant and which no single plat­form can own.

The net­work is early ex­actly where it mat­ters most. Ad­op­tion of the Uni­fied Health In­ter­face and its net­work ef­fects re­main nas­cent, and build­ing on

Digital HealthState of Play14 •
Linked records have overtaken health accounts for the first time
crore
037.575112.515084.8Accounts, Jan 202682.7Records, Jan 202694Accounts, Jul 2026105Records, Jul 2026
Source: National Health Authority
ABHA health accounts issued
crore
025507510067Sep 202480Aug 202584.8Jan 202690May 202694Jul 2026
Source: National Health Authority / ABDM, 2026
The directory behind the rails is large, while the count of certified private participants is still small
count
Practitioners564,000Facilities363,000Certified firms1,000
Source: National Health Authority, 2026

gov­ern­ment rails car­ries a de­pend­ency on their pace and on un­even state-level ma­tur­ity. The rails lower the cost of reach; they do not yet guar­an­tee the de­mand, and the gap between an is­sued ac­count and a used one is the quant­ity nobody pub­lishes.

eSanjeevani, and the price of free

India’s biggest telemedicine provider is the government, and it charges nothing. That single fact reshapes the market for everyone else.

The most im­port­ant fact about In­dian telemedi­cine is that its largest pro­vider is the state, and it is free. eSanjeevani, the na­tional tele­con­sulta­tion plat­form, passed 43 crore cu­mu­lat­ive con­sulta­tions by Novem­ber 2025, across every state and union ter­rit­ory: a scale no private

Digital HealthState of Play15 •

plat­form comes near. For an or­din­ary cit­izen, see­ing a doc­tor on­line is, in­creas­ingly, a free pub­lic ser­vice.

This is struc­tural, not a foot­note, and it cuts two ways. It proves vast lat­ent de­mand for re­mote care, and it proves the rails work. It also pins the con­sumer’s will­ing­ness to pay near zero for the exact product private telemedi­cine is try­ing to sell. How do you charge for a con­sulta­tion the state hands out free? The qual­ity pic­ture sharpens the point. Stud­ies put the av­er­age eSanjeevani con­sulta­tion at little more than a minute, and real use of the rails stays shal­low be­neath the bil­lion-scale ac­count num­bers. The rails are built and the de­mand is proven. What is un­proven is that a private op­er­ator can carve out a mar­gin in a mar­ket where the dom­in­ant player gives the product away.

How do you charge for a consultation the state gives away? The free incumbent caps private willingness-to-pay at the source.

The scale of the free in­cum­bent has since been re-based. The dir­ec­tion is up­ward. eSanjeevani re­cor­ded 50,00,92,730 cu­mu­lat­ive tele­con­sulta­tions on 15 Septem­ber 2026, hav­ing crossed 50 crore, against the 43 crore car­ried above for Novem­ber 2025 (MoHFW, 2026). The ser­vice cov­ers all 36 states and union ter­rit­or­ies and is in­teg­rated with ABDM. It is sup­por­ted by roughly 242,000 re­gistered doc­tors, spe­cial­ists and health work­ers. A

pub­lic ser­vice that has added some seven crore con­sulta­tions in ten months is not a leg­acy pro­gramme against which private pri­cing might even­tu­ally re­cover.

The eSanjeevani network, October 2026
count
Registered providers242,000Ayushman Arogya Mandir spokes142,000Hubs19,473Online OPDs901
Source: MoHFW, 2026

The volume ar­rives through a chan­nel worth nam­ing cor­rectly. Pa­tients without their own devices reach the ser­vice through the Ay­ush­man Arogya Mandirs, the fa­cil­it­ies re­named from Health and Well­ness Centres in 2023. More than 142,000 of them now func­tion as spokes, along­side 19,473 hubs and 901 on­line out-pa­tient de­part­ments (MoHFW, Oc­to­ber 2026). The state there­fore owns both the con­sulta­tion and the point of ac­cess. That is the part of the pub­lic net­work a private plat­form can­not rep­lic­ate at any price.

The stra­tegic read­ing is un­changed and bet­ter evid­enced. Basic con­sulta­tion is oc­cu­pied, free, and ex­tend­ing into ex­actly the rural mar­kets where will­ing­ness to pay is low­est, so private tele­con­sulta­tion must com­pete on spe­cialty depth, clin­ical qual­ity, con­veni­ence and out­comes rather than on

Digital HealthState of Play16 •

price. The ser­vice is sim­ul­tan­eously the strongest evid­ence that re­mote de­mand is real and the clearest con­straint on mon­et­ising it.

The health stack, and the consent layer

Beneath the apps runs an open, consent-based protocol stack, and it may be where the missing payer comes from.

India’s rails are not one plat­form but a stack of open pro­to­cols, and read­ing the stack shows where the op­por­tun­ity lies. The iden­tity layer is ABHA; the re­cords layer is the linked health re­cords; the in­ter­op­er­ab­il­ity layer is the Uni­fied Health In­ter­face, on the Beckn pro­tocol, so any com­pli­ant app can find and book con­sults, dia­gnostics and phar­macy across pro­viders. And above it all sits the con­sent layer, the Health Data Man­age­ment policy and the Con­sent Man­ager, gov­ern­ing how data moves.

The con­sent layer mat­ters be­cause it reaches into the fin­an­cial sys­tem. The Ac­count Ag­greg­ator frame­work, with bil­lions of con­sen­ted data-shar­ing ac­counts, is the money-side twin of the health Con­sent Man­ager. To­gether they make it pos­sible, for the first time, for an in­surer to un­der­write and pay for out­pa­tient care using veri­fied, con­sen­ted health and fin­an­cial data. The stack is more than the rails on which care is de­livered. It is the

in­fra­struc­ture on which a payer could fi­nally be built. The es­cape route runs straight through this layer.

The stack is bet­ter read as five com­pos­able blocks than as four lay­ers, and nam­ing them shows where a ven­ture may stop build­ing for it­self. ABHA provides the port­able iden­tity and health ad­dress. The Health Fa­cil­ity Re­gistry provides a na­tional dir­ect­ory of hos­pit­als and clin­ics, and of labs and phar­ma­cies. The Health­care Pro­fes­sion­als Re­gistry provides a veri­fied dir­ect­ory of prac­ti­tion­ers. The Health In­form­a­tion Ex­change and Con­sent Man­ager moves re­cords on pa­tient au­thor­isa­tion. The Uni­fied Health In­ter­face provides an open pro­tocol for dis­cov­ery, book­ing, de­liv­ery and pay­ment across any com­pli­ant ap­plic­a­tion (Na­tional Health Au­thor­ity, 2026).

The builder thesis fol­lows dir­ectly from that list. A ven­ture can au­then­tic­ate through ABHA, find pro­viders through the two re­gis­tries and ex­change re­cords through the con­sent man­ager. A pa­tient on any ap­plic­a­tion can then dis­cover and book any par­ti­cip­at­ing pro­vider, which lowers the cost of build­ing both dis­tri­bu­tion and trust. More than 1,000 private firms are already ABDM-cer­ti­fied, and the in­ter­face car­ries the po­ten­tial to un­bundle the closed plat­forms, since dis­cov­ery and book­ing be­come an open net­work rather than a walled garden.

Two cau­tions be­long with the op­por­tun­ity. Ad­op­tion of the Uni­fied Health In­ter­face and its net­work ef­fects are nas­cent, so a model that de­pends on them is tak­ing a tim­ing risk on a gov­ern­ment pro­gramme rather than on its

Digital HealthState of Play17 •

own ex­e­cu­tion. And the con­sent layer now car­ries stat­utory ob­lig­a­tions as well as policy ones, since the Di­gital Per­sonal Data Pro­tec­tion Rules were no­ti­fied on 13 Novem­ber 2025, with con­sent-man­ager du­ties fall­ing due from about Novem­ber 2026. The route to the payer runs through this layer, and so does the com­pli­ance cost.

Why pure-play loses money

The ceiling is not a vague malaise. It is a specific failure of single-product models: which is why the survivors stopped building them.

The unit-eco­nom­ics ceil­ing is pre­cise, and nam­ing its mech­an­ics shows ex­actly why stack­ing is the only way out:

  • Stan­dalone tele­con­sulta­tion. High gross mar­gin (~70%) but low ticket size, low fre­quency and al­most no re­cur­ring rev­enue. The con­sulta­tion is a one-off; the cus­tomer, once ac­quired, rarely re­turns often enough to repay the ac­quis­i­tion cost.
  • Stan­dalone e-phar­macy. Thin gross mar­gins (~25–30%) against cap­ital-in­tens­ive last-mile lo­gist­ics, fierce price com­pet­i­tion, and near-zero switch­ing costs: cus­tom­ers chase the dis­count.
  • The ac­quis­i­tion trap. Be­cause the free pub­lic ser­vice caps will­ing­ness-to-pay and the products are low-value, the mar­ket­ing spend needed to win a pay­ing user routinely ex­ceeds what that user gen­er­ates: the ₹1.12-to-earn-₹1 real­ity.

The con­clu­sion every sur­vivor reaches is the same. No single product is a busi­ness. Profit in In­dian di­gital health does not live in any one ver­tical but in the bundle. A low-mar­gin ac­quis­i­tion product (the con­sulta­tion) is paired with higher-mar­gin at­tach products such as dia­gnostics and phar­macy, and with sub­scrip­tions and in­sur­ance, until the life­time value of the whole re­la­tion­ship fi­nally clears the cost of win­ning it. The next page is about how the sur­viv­ors ac­tu­ally do it.

The fail­ures are as in­struct­ive as the mech­an­ics, and they failed in the ways the mech­an­ics pre­dict. HealthcareMagic could not mon­et­ise. Scarce high-qual­ity doc­tors and low-cost con­sulta­tions could not sup­port the arith­metic. Med­well Ven­tures was cap­ital-in­tens­ive in labs and centres without sus­tain­able col­lec­tions, and re­ceiv­ables broke the model. A broad co­hort of dir­ect-to-con­sumer health brands failed at a rate near 80 per cent, hav­ing com­peted on price until mar­gin dis­ap­peared (Volge play­book, 2026). In each case ac­quis­i­tion cost ex­ceeded life­time value at scale rather than at launch, which is why the prob­lem sur­faces late.

The sur­viv­ors share four moves. Only the first is the bundle. The plat­form model mon­et­ises one ac­quired cus­tomer across con­sulta­tion, phar­macy and dia­gnostics, so the ac­quis­i­tion cost is amort­ised across streams, with a path to profit of eight­een to twenty-four months. The busi­ness-to-busi­ness chan­nel sells cor­por­ate group health at ac­quis­i­tion costs of ₹150 to ₹500 per user and higher re­ten­tion. Niche high-ticket seg­ments such as chronic care, fer­til­ity and sur­gery carry lar­ger fees and more re­peat vis­its.

Digital HealthState of Play18 •

And the in­fra­struc­ture play sells to hos­pit­als and clin­ics rather than to pa­tients, on re­cur­ring rev­enue.

The arith­metic fa­vours two of the seven seg­ments. Pro­vider and clin­ical soft­ware car­ries the best eco­nom­ics in the sec­tor, on re­cur­ring rev­enue, lower ac­quis­i­tion cost and high switch­ing costs, and it is un­der­built re­l­at­ive to the op­por­tun­ity. Chronic care and re­mote mon­it­or­ing come next, on re­ten­tion rather than ticket size. India’s com­pet­it­ive po­s­i­tion is in­versely re­lated to ac­quis­i­tion cost, which is to say it is weak­est ex­actly where the con­sumer story is loudest.

HealthcareMagic could not monetise, because scarce high-quality doctors and low-cost consultations could not support the arithmetic.

The stack-to-survive playbook

The route to profit is not a better app. It is a wider bundle, and diagnostics is the keystone.

The com­pan­ies that reached, or neared, prof­it­ab­il­ity did it by abandon­ing the pure-play model and stack­ing com­ple­ment­ary rev­enue until the eco­nom­ics cleared. The pat­tern is con­sist­ent, and the key­stone is

dia­gnostics. A tele­con­sulta­tion ac­quires the cus­tomer cheaply and earns their trust. A dia­gnostics order, at 45–50% gross mar­gins and far higher fre­quency, mon­et­ises that trust, and a phar­macy order closes the loop. Sub­scrip­tions, pharma ad­vert­ising and private-label products then stack mar­gin on top.

Tata 1mg is the clean­est proof. It reached EBITDA prof­it­ab­il­ity in its core seg­ments by lean­ing on a dia­gnostics busi­ness run­ning past ₹600 crore, not on phar­macy or con­sulta­tion alone. Practo turned prof­it­able the other way, going asset-light, con­sulta­tion-and-soft­ware, dodging in­vent­ory and lo­gist­ics en­tirely. The les­son holds either way. In a mar­ket with no payer and a free pub­lic al­tern­at­ive, the road to a mar­gin is to own the whole pa­tient re­la­tion­ship and mon­et­ise it across products, not to win one trans­ac­tion. The ques­tion for any op­er­ator or in­vestor is not “is the app good?” It is “does the bundle clear the ceil­ing?”

Key takeaways
  • No single product is a busi­ness; the sur­viv­ors stack con­sult + dia­gnostics + phar­macy + sub­scrip­tion.
  • Dia­gnostics is the key­stone: 45–50% mar­gins, higher fre­quency (Tata 1mg’s profit lever).
  • The test is not “is the app good?” but “does the bundle clear the ceil­ing?”

The move from a single product to a bundle changes the de­nom­in­ator of the ratio rather than the nu­mer­ator, and that is the whole of the play­book.

Digital HealthState of Play19 •

One ac­quis­i­tion mon­et­ised across con­sulta­tion, phar­macy and dia­gnostics car­ries a blen­ded mar­gin and reaches profit in a stated eight­een to twenty-four months, against a dir­ect-to-con­sumer con­sulta­tion that never re­pays its ac­quis­i­tion cost from a single trans­ac­tion. The cor­por­ate chan­nel is the cheapest ver­sion of the same man­oeuvre, at ₹150 to ₹500 per user, re­cur­ring and sticky, with a sales cycle of three to six months (Volge play­book, 2026).

The bundle has a cost as well as a be­ne­fit. Plat­form mod­els are cap­ital-heavy, and their net­work ef­fects take years to build. The two lead­ing plat­forms il­lus­trate both halves of that trade. Tata 1mg reached more than ₹1,900 crore of rev­enue in FY24 under Tata Di­gital, while PharmEasy reached ₹5,664 crore in the same year and re­quired a down round to sta­bil­ise. Scale and breadth, rather than a single high-mar­gin product, are the route to vi­ab­il­ity, and the cap­ital needed to as­semble them is the bar­rier.

A third route is now vis­ible be­side stack­ing and asset-light op­er­a­tion. Busi­ness-to-busi­ness and in­fra­struc­ture mod­els sold to hos­pit­als, clin­ics and in­surers carry the low­est ac­quis­i­tion cost and the highest switch­ing cost in the sec­tor, and ABDM com­pli­ance is cre­at­ing fresh de­mand for in­ter­op­er­able pro­vider soft­ware. The test for any model re­mains the same: whether life­time value clears ac­quis­i­tion cost by a factor of three to five, with pay­back in­side twelve months.

For the sec­tor, that va­cuum is the single largest struc­tural risk. A busi­ness hand­ling pre­scrip­tion medi­cines at scale lives under the per­man­ent

pos­sib­il­ity that a court rul­ing or a min­istry no­ti­fic­a­tion could re­shape or re­strict it overnight. The un­cer­tainty scares off cap­ital, com­plic­ates ex­pan­sion and shad­ows every e-phar­macy busi­ness case. Set it against the rails and the con­trast is stark. India built pub­lic in­fra­struc­ture as good as any for di­gital health while leav­ing the largest private seg­ment that runs on it leg­ally un­settled. Resolv­ing the e-phar­macy frame­work, in either dir­ec­tion, would lift one of the deep­est over­hangs on the sec­tor.

The e-pharmacy regulatory vacuum

India’s second-largest digital-health segment has run for seven years with no settled rules whatsoever.

The most strik­ing reg­u­lat­ory fact in In­dian di­gital health is an ab­sence. E-phar­macy, a multi-bil­lion-dol­lar busi­ness serving tens of mil­lions, has op­er­ated for nearly seven years with no ded­ic­ated, no­ti­fied reg­u­la­tion. Draft rules sur­faced in 2018 and were never fi­nal­ised, and the Delhi High Court slapped on an in­terim re­stric­tion the same year. The drug reg­u­lator fired show-cause no­tices at some twenty e-phar­ma­cies in 2023. When the court ordered the health min­istry in 2024 to frame a policy within four months, the dead­line came and went. The pro­posed devices-and-drugs

Digital HealthState of Play20 •

bill then stripped out the li­cens­ing pro­vi­sions al­to­gether, hand­ing the gov­ern­ment open-ended power to “reg­u­late, re­strict or pro­hibit.”

The dates in the ju­di­cial re­cord are routinely con­flated, so state them pre­cisely. Draft rules to amend the Drugs and Cos­met­ics Rules were is­sued in Au­gust 2018 and have never been no­ti­fied. In Novem­ber 2023 the Delhi High Court dir­ec­ted the cent­ral gov­ern­ment to frame a policy within eight weeks, ob­serving that the rules had then been pending for over five years (Delhi High Court, 2023). In the in­terim, on­line phar­ma­cies op­er­ate under the ex­ist­ing off­line drug law and the In­form­a­tion Tech­no­logy Act, and a phar­macy li­cence re­mains ne­ces­sary to dis­pense. Mar­ket­places part­ner li­censed phar­ma­cies and verify pre­scrip­tions.

The seg­ment car­ry­ing that risk is the largest in the sec­tor by ab­so­lute rev­enue and the most con­sol­id­ated, dom­in­ated by con­glom­er­ate-backed plat­forms. Mar­gins run 15 to 25 per cent on the in­ternal basis, so prof­it­ab­il­ity de­pends on scale, private label, chronic-re­fill sub­scrip­tions and data, and the busi­ness is lo­gist­ics-heavy and cold-chain de­pend­ent (Volge play­book, 2026). The com­bin­a­tion of thin mar­gins and con­tested legal ground is the reason valu­ations in the seg­ment carry a reg­u­lat­ory dis­count rather than a growth premium.

The va­cuum is un­re­solved as at the most re­cent re­view. No no­ti­fic­a­tion had been con­firmed as of Novem­ber 2026, and the seg­ment re­mains the single largest policy risk in In­dian di­gital health on the cross­walk used in­tern­ally. Res­ol­u­tion in either dir­ec­tion would re­price the seg­ment, and

con­tin­ued si­lence is it­self a de­cision, one that leaves the largest private line in the mar­ket per­man­ently pro­vi­sional.

DPDP and the health-data regime

The new privacy law lands on the most sensitive data of all, and quietly redraws who can do what with it.

Health data is the most sens­it­ive cat­egory of per­sonal data there is, and India is fi­nally reg­u­lat­ing it, through a ho­ri­zontal law. The Di­gital Per­sonal Data Pro­tec­tion Act was passed in 2023, with its rules no­ti­fied in Novem­ber 2025. It treats health data as per­sonal data and phases in over eight­een months. A Con­sent Man­ager frame­work ar­rives from around Novem­ber 2026, and the sub­stant­ive ob­lig­a­tions and pen­al­ties, up to ₹250 crore, from May 2027. For a di­gital-health busi­ness, it lays a bind­ing pri­vacy re­gime on top of the ABDM con­sent ar­chi­tec­ture, which already de­mands ex­pli­cit, pur­pose-bound con­sent.

The ef­fect is double-edged. On com­pli­ance, every plat­form touch­ing health re­cords has to build con­sent, audit and breach-re­sponse ma­chinery to a new stat­utory stand­ard be­fore 2027, a real cost, es­pe­cially for the many sub-scale play­ers. Stra­tegic­ally, though, a strong con­sent

Digital HealthState of Play21 •

re­gime is an en­a­bler: it is ex­actly the veri­fied-con­sent plumb­ing that lets health data be shared safely with an in­surer or a bank, which is what the payer es­cape route de­pends on. As with the rails them­selves, the data re­gime is a bur­den today and the found­a­tion of to­mor­row’s es­cape.

The stat­utory timetable is now spe­cific enough to plan against. The Di­gital Per­sonal Data Pro­tec­tion Rules were no­ti­fied on 13 Novem­ber 2025 as G.S.R. 846(E). Con­sent-man­ager du­ties fall due from about 13 Novem­ber 2026 and full com­pli­ance from about 13 May 2027, with pen­al­ties of up to ₹250 crore for ser­i­ous fail­ures (Min­istry of Elec­tron­ics and In­form­a­tion Tech­no­logy, 2025). A re­por­ted Janu­ary 2026 pro­posal to shorten the eight­een-month win­dow to twelve months had not been no­ti­fied as of Oc­to­ber 2026. The later dates re­main the plan­ning basis.

The ob­lig­a­tions fall un­evenly across the seven seg­ments. Pro­vider soft­ware and chronic-care mon­it­or­ing carry the heav­iest bur­den, since both hold lon­git­ud­inal clin­ical re­cords. E-dia­gnostics and tele­con­sulta­tion sit on ex­pli­cit con­sent and pre­scrip­tion re­cord-keep­ing. Well­ness, reg­u­lated lightly else­where, is brought into scope for the first time by the simple fact of hold­ing health data. Data loc­al­isa­tion in India, de­le­tion rights and con­sent ar­chi­tec­ture are re­quired of all of them, and the cost falls hard­est on the roughly 90 per cent of the base that is sub-scale.

The stra­tegic read­ing here is the one that ap­plies to the rails gen­er­ally. A stat­utory con­sent re­gime layered on the ABDM con­sent man­ager is the veri­fied-con­sent plumb­ing through which an in­surer or a bank can be

given health data law­fully, which is the pre­con­di­tion of the payer es­cape. Com­pli­ance is there­fore a cost in 2026 and 2027 and an asset there­after, and the firms that build it early are the ones an in­surer can trans­act with at all.

The trust problem

Even free, even at billion-scale, digital care runs into a quieter limit: whether patients and doctors trust it enough to use it for real.

Below the eco­nom­ics sits a softer but stub­born con­straint. Trust and qual­ity are at issue. The bil­lion-scale ac­count num­bers on the pub­lic rails hide shal­low real-world use. Stud­ies find point-of-care util­isa­tion low, and the av­er­age free pub­lic tele­con­sulta­tion last­ing barely a minute, too short for mean­ing­ful clin­ical en­gage­ment. A con­sulta­tion that is fast, free and su­per­fi­cial proves de­mand for ac­cess, not depth, and it sets a low qual­ity bar that any private plat­form has to clear to jus­tify char­ging at all.

The trust gap runs both ways. Pa­tients, first-timers es­pe­cially, weigh a re­mote con­sulta­tion against an in-per­son doc­tor they already know; phys­i­cians, for their part, often in­teg­rate poorly with the plat­forms and doubt the clin­ical ad­equacy of a one-minute call. Build­ing real clin­ical trust, con­tinu­ity of care, in­teg­ra­tion with dia­gnostics and phys­ical fol­low-up, demon­strable qual­ity, is it­self a cost and a moat. The plat­forms that win

Digital HealthState of Play22 •

will be the ones that turn shal­low, trans­ac­tional ac­cess into deep, trus­ted re­la­tion­ships, be­cause only a trus­ted re­la­tion­ship gen­er­ates the re­peat, multi-product en­gage­ment that clears the ceil­ing. Trust, here, is not a soft vir­tue. It is the pre­con­di­tion for life­time value.

The trust con­straint has a sup­ply-side coun­ter­part that is easier to quantify than pa­tient sen­ti­ment. India has roughly 1.1 mil­lion re­gistered doc­tors for 1.4 bil­lion people, ap­prox­im­ately 1.1 doc­tors per 1,000 pop­u­la­tion against 2.8 in de­veloped mar­kets, with about 70 per cent of spe­cial­ists serving the urban third (MoHFW and in­dustry re­port­ing, 2026). Qual­ity is there­fore ra­tioned be­fore it is de­livered, and a plat­form com­pet­ing on clin­ical depth is com­pet­ing for the same scarce clini­cians who are already over­sub­scribed in the cit­ies.

Clin­ical trust is also being re­built through tool­ing rather than through as­sur­ance. The share of In­dian clini­cians using ar­ti­fi­cial-in­tel­li­gence tools rose from about 12 per cent in 2024 to 41 per cent in 2025, ahead of the United States and the United King­dom. Much of that use is doc­u­ment­a­tion rather than clin­ical de­cision-mak­ing (EY, 2026). Am­bi­ent scrib­ing, mul­ti­lin­gual triage and de­cision sup­port re­duce the ad­min­is­trat­ive load that makes a one-minute con­sulta­tion eco­nom­ic­ally ra­tional in the first place. That is a more cred­ible route to depth than ex­horta­tion.

Trust is the op­er­at­ive con­straint on the es­cape route as well. An in­surer pay­ing for out­pa­tient care un­der­writes on re­cor­ded out­comes, and the seg­ments with the strongest re­ten­tion, chronic care and re­mote

mon­it­or­ing, are pre­cisely those whose moat is out­comes data and sus­tained en­gage­ment. Re­im­burse­ment there re­mains nas­cent. Depth of re­la­tion­ship is there­fore the asset a payer buys, and the plat­forms without it will have noth­ing to sell when the payer ar­rives.

Digital HealthState of Play23 •

The part in brief

  1. 01The identity layer reached about 93.95 crore health accounts and some 105 crore linked records by July 2026, roughly two thirds of the population.
  2. 02The free state service recorded over 50 crore cumulative teleconsultations by September 2026, adding some seven crore in ten months and capping private willingness to pay.
  3. 03Teleconsultation earns about 70 per cent gross margin but e-pharmacy only 25 to 30 per cent, which is why no single product sustains a business.
  4. 04Diagnostics runs at 45 to 50 per cent gross margin and higher frequency, which is the lever that carried Tata 1mg’s bundle past a ₹600 crore run-rate.
  5. 05Some 1.1 million registered doctors serve 1.4 billion Indians, about 1.1 per thousand against 2.8 in developed markets, so clinical quality is rationed before it is delivered.
Digital HealthState of Play24 •
The Mechanics

HealthcareMagic could not monetise, because scarce high-quality doctors and low-cost consultations could not support the arithmetic.

03

The Market

The segments, the survivors, and the firms turning the corner, or not.

The seven segments

Indian digital health is not one market but seven, each with its own economics, and only some can pay.

The sec­tor splits into seg­ments whose eco­nom­ics di­verge sharply, and the di­ver­gence ex­plains where value pools. Read across them and the pat­tern is con­sist­ent: the seg­ments that can at­tach to a higher-mar­gin, higher-fre­quency product sur­vive; the rest struggle.

SegmentEconomicsPlayers
TeleconsultationHigh margin, low frequency; free public rivalPracto, Apollo 24/7, MediBuddy
E-pharmacyThin margins; regulatory vacuumTata 1mg, PharmEasy, Netmeds
Diagnostics / lab-techMargin keystone: 45–50%, repeat demandRedcliffe, Healthians, Thyrocare
InsurtechProfitable: the payer is built inPolicybazaar, Acko
Fitness & wellnessSubscription-led, capital-hungryCult.fit
Full-stack careHigh-value episodes, capital-intensivePristyn Care, Apollo
Hospital / clinic SaaSQuiet B2B, recurring revenue:

Rank them by eco­nom­ics and the story tells it­self: in­sur­tech and dia­gnostics make money; tele­con­sulta­tion and e-phar­macy can­not stand alone; and the sur­viv­ors are the ones that bridge seg­ments. The struc­ture of the mar­ket is the whole thesis in mini­ature.

The tax­onomy used in­tern­ally cuts the sec­tor into seven seg­ments rather than the six lines above, and the two ad­di­tions are the ones the eco­nom­ics fa­vour. Pro­vider and clin­ical soft­ware, mean­ing elec­tronic re­cords, prac­tice man­age­ment and clinic plat­forms sold to hos­pit­als and doc­tors, car­ries re­cur­ring rev­enue, lower ac­quis­i­tion cost and high switch­ing costs. ABDM com­pli­ance is now cre­at­ing fresh de­mand for in­ter­op­er­able sys­tems. Chronic care and re­mote mon­it­or­ing, led by dia­betes and car­diac pro­grammes, car­ries bet­ter eco­nom­ics than acute tele­con­sulta­tion be­cause the re­la­tion­ship re­curs. Clin­ical ar­ti­fi­cial in­tel­li­gence is treated as a cross-cut­ting cap­ab­il­ity rather than an eighth seg­ment. It ap­pears in­side sev­eral of the oth­ers.

Ranked by eco­nom­ics rather than by rev­enue, the order is there­fore in­sur­tech, pro­vider soft­ware, dia­gnostics and chronic care, with tele­con­sulta­tion and con­sumer well­ness last. In­sur­tech is grow­ing at about 29 per cent a year and is reg­u­lated by IRDAI. Pro­vider soft­ware is un­der­built re­l­at­ive to the op­por­tun­ity. Well­ness, at roughly a tenth of rev­enue, is brand-led, high in ac­quis­i­tion cost and the seg­ment whose clas­si­fic­a­tion as health­care is most de­bated (Volge play­book, 2026).

Digital HealthState of Play25 •
Leading digital-health firms by FY24 operating revenue
₹ crore
PharmEasy (API Holdings)5,664Tata 1mg1,968HealthKart1,021Cult.fit927MediBuddy645Pristyn Care601Healthians243Practo240
Source: Company filings via Entrackr and Inc42, 2026

Read the scale of the named lead­ers against that rank­ing rather than along­side it. The largest firms in the sec­tor by rev­enue are e-phar­macy and plat­form busi­nesses, while the seg­ments with the best unit eco­nom­ics con­tain the smal­lest com­pan­ies. India’s com­pet­it­ive po­s­i­tion is in­versely re­lated to ac­quis­i­tion cost. The seg­ments where the coun­try is strongest are the quiet, re­cur­ring, busi­ness-to-busi­ness ones, and the seg­ments where it is weak­est are the ones that at­trac­ted the most cap­ital.

Read the scale of the named leaders against that ranking rather than alongside it.

E-pharmacy: the share war

India’s largest private digital-health segment has already changed hands at the top, and why it changed is the lesson.

E-phar­macy is the most-con­tested seg­ment, and its lead­er­ship has already flipped. Tata 1mg over­took PharmEasy, climb­ing to roughly 31% share by late 2023 while PharmEasy slid from about a third to around 15%, with Net­meds, Apollo and Flip­kart Health split­ting the rest. The change at the top was not luck. It tracks, al­most ex­actly, the read’s thesis about which mod­els sur­vive.

Tata 1mg won by stack­ing. The group’s cap­ital and brand backed it, and it built a dia­gnostics busi­ness along­side its phar­macy and rode that higher-mar­gin at­tach to prof­it­ab­il­ity. PharmEasy lost by over-reach­ing. It chased growth and ac­quis­i­tions on cheap cap­ital, piled on debt, and got caught when the fund­ing winter hit. The war was not won on app pol­ish or de­liv­ery speed. It was won on bal­ance-sheet dis­cip­line and the abil­ity to bolt on a prof­it­able second product. The flip is the clearest mar­ket proof of the stack-to-sur­vive play­book, and the clearest warn­ing of what hap­pens to those who chase scale without the eco­nom­ics.

The con­sol­id­a­tion that pro­duced the con­test pred­ates the lead­er­ship change and ex­plains its terms. PharmEasy ac­quired Med­life in an all-stock trans­ac­tion in 2021, cre­at­ing the largest on­line phar­macy with an es­tim­ated

Digital HealthState of Play26 •

60 to 70 per cent of the seg­ment at that point. Re­li­ance Re­tail had entered in 2020 by tak­ing 60 per cent of Net­meds for ₹620 crore (Busi­ness Stand­ard and Inc42, 2026). The seg­ment ar­rived at its share war already con­glom­er­ate-owned. That is why the de­cis­ive vari­able be­came the strength of the par­ent rather than the qual­ity of the ap­plic­a­tion.

Leadership changed hands as PharmEasy's share collapsed
% of segment
02040608070PharmEasy, 2021 peak31Tata 1mg, late 202315PharmEasy, late 2023
Source: Business Standard

The eco­nom­ics be­neath the share fig­ures are thin­ner than the rev­enue sug­gests. Gross mar­gins run 15 to 25 per cent on the in­ternal basis, so prof­it­ab­il­ity de­pends on scale, private label, chronic-re­fill sub­scrip­tions and data, against cap­ital-in­tens­ive lo­gist­ics and a cold-chain ob­lig­a­tion (Volge play­book, 2026). Rev­enue lead­er­ship and profit lead­er­ship are there­fore sep­ar­able: PharmEasy re­por­ted ₹5,664 crore of rev­enue in

FY24, nearly three times Tata 1mg’s ₹1,968 crore, while los­ing the stra­tegic con­test.

The seg­ment’s legal basis has not im­proved while its own­er­ship has settled. The gov­ern­ing rules have never been no­ti­fied, the court dir­ec­tion of Novem­ber 2023 re­mains un­ful­filled, and no no­ti­fic­a­tion had been con­firmed as of Novem­ber 2026. A share war con­duc­ted on con­tested legal ground is a war for a po­s­i­tion that a single no­ti­fic­a­tion could re­define, which is the reason the seg­ment trades at a reg­u­lat­ory dis­count ir­re­spect­ive of who leads it.

The war was not won on app polish or delivery speed.

The cautionary tale: PharmEasy

No company shows the unit-economics ceiling more starkly than the one that ignored it the longest.

PharmEasy is the sec­tor’s cau­tion­ary tale. It chased scale and ac­quis­i­tions on cheap money, and was caught when the eco­nom­ics caught up. Val­ued at about $5.6 bil­lion at its 2021 peak, its par­ent ran a rights issue in 2024 at roughly a 90% dis­count, led by the in­vestor Ran­jan Pai, to clear debt taken on mostly to buy the dia­gnostics chain Thyro­care. By late 2024

Digital HealthState of Play27 •

some in­vestors were mark­ing the com­pany below $500 mil­lion. In FY25 it re­por­ted rev­enue of about ₹5,872 crore, barely grow­ing, and a net loss of roughly ₹1,517 crore, nar­rowed about 40% only after deep cuts to mar­ket­ing and staff.

The les­son is pre­cise, and double-edged. PharmEasy’s col­lapse was a unit-eco­nom­ics fail­ure. It spent through the ceil­ing to buy growth, and the debt that fun­ded the strategy turned un­sus­tain­able the mo­ment cap­ital tightened. Yet its stra­tegic in­stinct, that dia­gnostics is the mar­gin key­stone, was right. It simply paid far too much and far too late, with bor­rowed money. The com­pany is re­struc­tur­ing now, cut­ting ac­quis­i­tion costs and lean­ing on Thyro­care’s profits. PharmEasy is both the warn­ing and, in its turn to­ward dia­gnostics-led dis­cip­line, a late con­vert to the play­book the sur­viv­ors ran from the start.

The scale of the cap­ital in­volved is the part that makes the case cau­tion­ary rather than merely un­for­tu­nate. API Hold­ings raised about $1.1 bil­lion in total. It ac­quired Thyro­care for ₹4,546 crore in 2021 for 66.1 per cent of a lis­ted dia­gnostics chain, bought Ak­named in the same year, and took Re­tailio and Marg ERP shortly after. It then filed for an ini­tial pub­lic of­fer­ing of up to ₹6,250 crore be­fore with­draw­ing it in the 2022 and 2023 cor­rec­tion (com­pany fil­ings and En­trackr, 2026). The ₹1,804 crore res­cue of 2024 was there­fore small be­side the sums it was re­pair­ing.

The stra­tegic in­stinct de­serves credit, and the se­quen­cing de­serves the blame. Dia­gnostics is the mar­gin key­stone, and buy­ing a prof­it­able lis­ted

API Holdings: the scale of the strategy, selected transactions
₹ crore
Withdrawn IPO filing (2022)6,250Thyrocare acquisition (2021)4,546Down round (2024)1,804Netmeds, for comparison (2020)620
Source: Company filings, Business Standard and Entrackr, 2026

chain was the fast­est route to it. But the pur­chase was made with bor­rowed money at the top of the cycle, and the group added hos­pital sup­ply-chain and dis­tri­bu­tion soft­ware busi­nesses at the same time. Breadth bought at once, rather than built in se­quence, is what con­ver­ted a sound thesis into a debt prob­lem.

The list­ing ques­tion re­mains the open one. A re­vived of­fer­ing has been ex­pec­ted since 2025, con­di­tional on the busi­ness turn­ing cash-flow pos­it­ive, with sev­eral ob­serv­ers point­ing to late 2026 at the earli­est (in­dustry re­port­ing, 2026). Until a pure-play or plat­form di­gital-health busi­ness lists in India, the base case for an exit in this sec­tor is the con­glom­er­ate ac­quis­i­tion, and the pub­lic mar­ket will con­tinue to apply the same test the private rounds now apply.

Two struc­tural ad­vant­ages com­poun­ded the strategy. The Tata brand and bal­ance sheet lowered both the trust bar­rier and the cost of cap­ital, let­ting the com­pany keep in­vest­ing through the fund­ing winter while rivals pulled

Digital HealthState of Play28 •

back. The group’s pa­tient money also let it build the dia­gnostics busi­ness com­pet­it­ors had to buy at dis­tress prices. Tata 1mg is the work­ing model for In­dian di­gital health. It is a stacked, dia­gnostics-anchored bundle on a strong bal­ance sheet, turn­ing low-mar­gin ac­quis­i­tion into a prof­it­able, multi-product re­la­tion­ship. It is also the an­swer to the ceil­ing, and a re­minder that, here, the eco­nom­ics re­ward pa­tience and breadth over speed and focus.

The survivor: Tata 1mg

If PharmEasy is the warning, Tata 1mg is the template: the company that cleared the ceiling by stacking.

Tata 1mg is the clearest proof the ceil­ing can be cleared. Backed by Tata Di­gital, which owns about 63.5%, it re­por­ted rev­enue of roughly ₹2,392 crore in FY25, up 22%. It nar­rowed its loss to about ₹276 crore and, tellingly, reached EBITDA prof­it­ab­il­ity in its core seg­ments. It got there not on phar­macy or con­sulta­tion alone. It leaned on a dia­gnostics arm run­ning past a ₹600 crore run-rate, ex­actly the higher-mar­gin, higher-fre­quency at­tach the play­book calls for.

Key takeaways
  • Tata 1mg: ~₹2,392cr FY25 (+22%), EBITDA-prof­it­able in core seg­ments.
The diagnostics arm is more than twice the loss still carried
₹ crore
06251,2501,8752,5002,392Revenue, FY25600Diagnostics run-rate276Net loss, FY25
Source: company filings
  • The lever is dia­gnostics (>₹600cr run-rate), not phar­macy or con­sults alone.
  • Brand + pa­tient cap­ital let it build the bundle while rivals re­trenched: the tem­plate.

The tra­ject­ory, not the single year, is what dis­tin­guishes this com­pany. Rev­enue rose from more than ₹1,900 crore in FY24 to the fig­ure above in FY25, on about $240 mil­lion of cap­ital raised in total. That is a frac­tion of the roughly $1.1 bil­lion con­sumed by the seg­ment leader by rev­enue (com­pany fil­ings and Tracxn, 2026). Cap­ital ef­fi­ciency, rather than cap­ital ac­cess, is the achieve­ment, and it is the met­ric on which the two plat­forms sep­ar­ate most cleanly.

The own­er­ship struc­ture is the mech­an­ism rather than the con­text. Tata Di­gital ac­quired its con­trolling stake in 2021, and the group’s entry was

Digital HealthState of Play29 •

ex­pli­citly an entry into in­teg­rated di­gital health rather than into phar­macy alone. That is why the dia­gnostics and con­sulta­tion lines were built along­side the phar­macy rather than bolted on under pres­sure later. A par­ent that can fund an eight­een-to-twenty-four-month path to plat­form prof­it­ab­il­ity without a bridge round is, in this mar­ket, a struc­tural ad­vant­age that no op­er­at­ing de­cision can sub­sti­tute for.

The tem­plate is harder to copy than to de­scribe. The bundle re­quires sim­ul­tan­eous com­pet­ence in lo­gist­ics, labor­at­ory op­er­a­tions and clin­ical sup­ply, each cap­ital-hungry, and the firms hold­ing the best unit eco­nom­ics in the sec­tor, pro­vider soft­ware and chronic care, got there by avoid­ing all three. Tata 1mg is the proof that the ceil­ing can be cleared at con­sumer scale, and the clearest il­lus­tra­tion of what clear­ing it at that scale costs.

The trajectory, not the single year, is what distinguishes this company.

The con­trast with the in­vent­ory-led sur­viv­ors is in­struct­ive. Practo car­ries lower rev­enue but cleaner eco­nom­ics. Soft­ware and con­sulta­tion mar­ket­places scale without ware­houses, last-mile fleets or work­ing-cap­ital drag. There is no single road through the ceil­ing. One path stacks higher-mar­gin products onto a heavy op­er­a­tional base; an­other strips the base away and mon­et­ises the con­nect­ive layer. For an in­vestor the two imply dif­fer­ent risk and re­turn, but they share one dis­cip­line. Both re­fused to chase scale at

a loss, and both found a struc­ture where the re­la­tion­ship is worth more than it costs to win. Prof­it­ab­il­ity here is achiev­able, and by more than one design.

The asset-light route: Practo

A third route to profit skips the inventory trap entirely: proof there is more than one way to clear the ceiling.

Practo of­fers the sec­tor’s other prof­it­ab­il­ity model, which is asset-light. Where Tata 1mg cleared the ceil­ing by stack­ing in­vent­ory-heavy dia­gnostics and phar­macy, Practo cleared it by car­ry­ing no in­vent­ory at all. It is a con­sulta­tion-and-soft­ware busi­ness that con­nects pa­tients to doc­tors and sells soft­ware to clin­ics, without the cap­ital-heavy lo­gist­ics of de­liv­er­ing medi­cine. In FY25 it turned prof­it­able, post­ing op­er­at­ing EBITDA of around ₹15 crore against a loss the year be­fore, and is re­portedly in talks to raise pre-IPO cap­ital.

The scale at which this model turns prof­it­able is the point most often missed. Practo re­por­ted about ₹240 crore of op­er­at­ing rev­enue in FY24 on roughly $251 mil­lion raised over its life, against plat­form peers an order of mag­nitude lar­ger by rev­enue (com­pany fil­ings and Tracxn, 2026). Prof­it­ab­il­ity was reached at a twenty-fourth of the rev­enue of the seg­ment leader. That is a state­ment about the cost base rather than about the

Digital HealthState of Play30 •

mar­ket, and it is the reason the model is rep­lic­able by firms that will never raise plat­form-scale cap­ital.

The soft­ware half of the busi­ness is the half the eco­nom­ics fa­vour. Pro­vider and clin­ical soft­ware car­ries re­cur­ring rev­enue, ac­quis­i­tion costs of ₹150 to ₹500 per user and high switch­ing costs, and it is un­der­built re­l­at­ive to the op­por­tun­ity, with ABDM com­pli­ance now gen­er­at­ing fresh de­mand for in­ter­op­er­able sys­tems (Volge play­book, 2026). A con­sulta­tion mar­ket­place at­tached to a clinic soft­ware busi­ness is there­fore a chronic-care-style an­nu­ity wear­ing a con­sumer brand, and the an­nu­ity is the part that clears the ceil­ing.

The lim­it­a­tion sits along­side the ad­vant­age. An asset-light op­er­ator does not own the dia­gnostics mar­gin, so its rev­enue ceil­ing is lower and its ex­pos­ure to the plat­forms that do own it is per­man­ent; and the same firms are now its largest com­pet­it­ors in clinic soft­ware. The sec­tor’s most de­fens­ible eco­nom­ics and its largest rev­enue pools sit in dif­fer­ent com­pan­ies, and noth­ing in the present struc­ture sug­gests they are about to con­verge.

The reason is the thesis at its purest. A con­sulta­tion car­ries a de­cent mar­gin but a low ticket and low fre­quency, and it com­petes with a free pub­lic ser­vice. As a stan­dalone busi­ness it can­not repay the cost of ac­quir­ing its users; as the top of a fun­nel into dia­gnostics, phar­macy, in­sur­ance or em­ployer con­tracts, it be­comes the cheapest pos­sible start to a prof­it­able re­la­tion­ship. Every ser­i­ous op­er­ator has ab­sorbed the same in­sight:

tele­con­sulta­tion is a loss-leader, not a line of busi­ness: valu­able pre­cisely be­cause it pulls the cus­tomer through the door cheaply, so long as a higher-mar­gin product is wait­ing on the other side.

Teleconsultation: the loss-leader layer

The segment that defines digital health is also the one that, on its own, cannot pay for itself.

Tele­con­sulta­tion is the front door of In­dian di­gital health, the largest seg­ment by rev­enue, around 45%, and the one least able to stand alone. Apollo 24/7, backed by the Apollo hos­pital group, leads on reach and wires con­sulta­tion into its phar­macy and dia­gnostics net­work. MediBuddy is strong in the cor­por­ate, em­ployer-paid niche, a rare pocket where a third party ac­tu­ally pays. Practo an­chors the asset-light, soft­ware-led ap­proach. Each, in its own way, treats the con­sulta­tion not as the product but as the cheapest way in to some­thing more prof­it­able.

The cor­por­ate pocket de­serves more weight than its size sug­gests, be­cause it is the only place in the seg­ment where a third party already pays. Busi­ness-to-busi­ness ac­quis­i­tion costs run ₹150 to ₹500 per user against ₹800 to ₹2,000 or more dir­ect to con­sumer, re­ten­tion is higher, and the

Digital HealthState of Play31 •

rev­enue is re­cur­ring and em­ployer-fun­ded, at the cost of a three-to-six-month sales cycle (Volge play­book, 2026). The em­ployer, not the in­surer, is the first func­tion­ing payer for In­dian di­gital health, and the cor­por­ate chan­nel is con­cen­trated in tech­no­logy and fin­an­cial ser­vices.

Winning a user through an employer costs a fraction of winning one direct from the consumer
₹ per user
05001,0001,5002,000150Corporate, low500Corporate, high800Consumer, low2,000Consumer, high
Source: Volge playbook, 2026

The growth of the spe­cial­ist cor­por­ate op­er­ator il­lus­trates the point in rev­enue. MediBuddy moved from ₹645 crore in FY24 to ₹743 crore in FY25 while cut­ting losses by about 37 per cent, which is the pro­file of a busi­ness whose ac­quis­i­tion cost is paid by some­body else (En­trackr, 2026). Against that, the dir­ect-to-con­sumer side of the seg­ment com­petes with a free pub­lic ser­vice that added some seven crore con­sulta­tions in the ten months to Septem­ber 2026.

The stra­tegic con­clu­sion is there­fore nar­rower than the seg­ment’s rev­enue share im­plies. Tele­con­sulta­tion is de­fens­ible as a cor­por­ate be­ne­fit, as a spe­cialty prac­tice in men­tal health, fer­til­ity or der­ma­to­logy at urban price points of ₹500 to ₹1,500, and as the cheap top of a plat­form fun­nel. It is not de­fens­ible as a gen­eral con­sumer product, and the seg­ment’s 45 per cent rev­enue share should be read as the size of a chan­nel rather than the size of a busi­ness.

Diagnostics: the margin lever

The quiet segment that decides who survives, higher margin, higher frequency, the keystone of every winning bundle.

If tele­con­sulta­tion is the loss-leader, dia­gnostics is the profit. With gross mar­gins of 45–50%, well above phar­macy, and higher pur­chase fre­quency, on­line dia­gnostics is the key­stone that turns a stacked busi­ness prof­it­able. That is ex­actly why it sits at the centre of every sur­vivor’s strategy. The seg­ment is com­pet­it­ive and con­sol­id­at­ing. Red­cliffe Labs re­por­ted about ₹419 crore in FY25, Health­i­ans around ₹263 crore and near­ing break­even, and Or­ange Health smal­ler and loss-mak­ing. The es­tab­lished, prof­it­able in­cum­bent Thyro­care, now PharmEasy-con­trolled, pos­ted about ₹687 crore and a healthy profit.

Digital HealthState of Play32 •
Diagnostics playerFY25 revenueProfitability
Thyrocare (PharmEasy-controlled)~₹687crProfitable
Redcliffe Labs~₹419crNarrowing losses
Healthians~₹263crNear breakeven

What makes dia­gnostics de­cis­ive is that every­one wants to own it. Tata 1mg’s prof­it­ab­il­ity rests on it. PharmEasy’s en­tire debt-fuelled gamble was an at­tempt to buy it, and the asset-light play­ers part­ner for it. The reason is struc­tural. Dia­gnostics pairs a de­fens­ible mar­gin with re­peat de­mand (tests get ordered reg­u­larly, con­sulta­tions do not) and a nat­ural at­tach to the con­sulta­tion that comes be­fore it. In a mar­ket with no payer and a free pub­lic con­sulta­tion, dia­gnostics is where the unit eco­nom­ics fi­nally turn pos­it­ive, which makes it the single most con­tested layer in In­dian di­gital health.

The seg­ment’s moat is op­er­a­tional rather than com­mer­cial, which is why it res­ists the ac­quis­i­tion-cost prob­lem that de­feats con­sulta­tion. Home sample col­lec­tion is lo­gist­ic­ally com­plex and cap­ital-in­tens­ive, and the de­fens­ible as­sets are turn­around time, trained phle­bot­omy at the door, and ac­cred­it­a­tion under NABL or ISO 15189 (Volge play­book, 2026). Those are as­sets that take years to as­semble and can­not be bought with mar­ket­ing spend, which is pre­cisely the op­pos­ite of the po­s­i­tion in tele­con­sulta­tion.

The com­pet­it­ive field is wider than the di­gital-nat­ive names sug­gest. Dia­gnostics and e-phar­macy to­gether ac­count for roughly 30 per cent of

sec­tor rev­enue. The on­line ag­greg­at­ors com­pete not only with one an­other but with the es­tab­lished off­line patho­logy chains, Dr Lal PathLabs and Met­ro­polis among them. Those chains are mov­ing on­line with ex­ist­ing labor­at­ory net­works and brand trust already built. Health­i­ans reached EBITDA break­even on about ₹243 crore of rev­enue in FY24, which in­dic­ates the scale at which the seg­ment’s eco­nom­ics begin to work (En­trackr, 2026).

The profitable incumbent still leads the digital-native challengers
₹ crore, FY25
Thyrocare687Redcliffe Labs419Healthians263
Source: Entrackr

Every struc­tural route out of the unit-eco­nom­ics ceil­ing passes through this seg­ment. The plat­form bundle uses dia­gnostics to mon­et­ise the con­sulta­tion, the asset-light op­er­at­ors part­ner for it, and the one debt-fun­ded at­tempt to buy it out­right re­shaped the e-phar­macy league table. A seg­ment that is sim­ul­tan­eously the profit lever for the con­sumer plat­forms and a going con­cern in its own right will con­tinue to be the most con­tested layer in In­dian di­gital health.

That is why in­sur­tech is more than an­other seg­ment; it is the wedge to­ward the mar­ket’s miss­ing payer. Com­mer­cial health in­sur­ance is now the

Digital HealthState of Play33 •

largest non-life line in India, grow­ing fast, and pushed fur­ther by the 2025 re­moval of GST on in­di­vidual premi­ums. As more In­di­ans gain private out­pa­tient cover, and as the Ac­count Ag­greg­ator con­sent rails let in­surers un­der­write on veri­fied health data, an ac­tual payer for di­gital health starts to take shape. The in­sur­tech play­ers already stand at the exact spot where the mar­ket’s cent­ral prob­lem is solved: where someone other than the pa­tient fi­nally pays. The es­cape route runs through this seg­ment.

Insurtech: the wedge toward a payer

The most profitable corner of digital health is also the one that points straight at the market’s missing piece.

In­sur­tech is the ex­cep­tion that proves the rule. While telemedi­cine and e-phar­macy strain against the ceil­ing, di­gital in­sur­ance is the sec­tor’s standout. PB Fintech, par­ent of Poli­cy­bazaar, re­por­ted FY25 rev­enue of about ₹4,977 crore and net profit of around ₹353 crore, and Acko reached roughly ₹2,837 crore. The dif­fer­ence is the model. In­sur­ance has a payer built in. The in­surer col­lects a premium and pays for care, so the eco­nom­ics rest on un­der­writ­ing and dis­tri­bu­tion, not on squeez­ing a mar­gin out of a one-off con­sulta­tion.

Insurtech makes money because it has a payer built in. Everywhere else in digital health, the payer is missing: which is why insurance is the escape.

The seg­ment is the fast­est-grow­ing of the seven, at roughly 29 per cent a year, and the spe­cific entry point mat­ters more than the growth rate. Group health lowers ac­quis­i­tion cost and brings re­cur­ring, em­ployer-fun­ded rev­enue. Claims tech­no­logy and be­ne­fits ad­min­is­tra­tion are the other two wedges. The seg­ment is also reg­u­lated by IRDAI, which makes it the most leg­ally settled part of the sec­tor as well as the most prof­it­able (Volge play­book, 2026). Con­sol­id­a­tion has begun, the de­fin­ing trans­ac­tion being the mer­ger of RenewBuy into InsuranceDekho at about ₹7,400 crore in May 2025.

The premium data be­hind the seg­ment’s claim to be the es­cape route is now un­am­bigu­ous. Health in­sur­ance be­came the largest line in India’s non-life mar­ket in FY26 at 40.8 per cent of gross premium, from 38.6 per cent in FY25. Seg­ment premium was up 15.4 per cent to about ₹1.4 lakh crore and re­tail health up 19.9 per cent, against in­dustry growth of 9.3 per cent (IRDAI and CareEdge Rat­ings, 2026). The mar­ket is es­tim­ated near $16 bil­lion in 2025, reach­ing about $48.5 bil­lion by 2035.

The com­pos­i­tion of that growth de­cides whether the es­cape ma­ter­i­al­ises. The rel­ev­ant white spaces are out-pa­tient cover, men­tal-health cover,

Digital HealthState of Play34 •
Insurtech is growing faster than the premium pool it sells into
% a year
07.51522.53029Insurtech segment19.9Retail health premium15.4Health premium9.3Non-life industry
Source: IRDAI

senior in­clu­sion, rural pen­et­ra­tion and pre­ven­tion-led di­gital en­gage­ment, and the reg­u­lator capped an­nual premium in­creases for senior cit­izens at 10 per cent in Janu­ary 2025. Premium growth in hos­pit­al­isa­tion cover alone would leave the di­gital-health ceil­ing ex­actly where it is.

Full-stack care, in­teg­rated pro­viders that own the jour­ney from con­sulta­tion to sur­gery, like Pristyn Care, runs the op­pos­ite bet. The wager is that own­ing the whole, high-value epis­ode (an elect­ive sur­gery, not a con­sulta­tion) is where the eco­nom­ics live. It car­ries higher rev­enue per pa­tient but also heavy op­er­a­tional com­plex­ity and cap­ital in­tens­ity. Pristyn cut staff and ex­ited cit­ies in 2024 as it hit the same ceil­ing from a dif­fer­ent angle. To­gether, fit­ness and full-stack make the same point. No clever model es­capes the un­der­ly­ing maths. Re­cur­ring rev­enue and high-value epis­odes

both help, but neither sub­sti­tutes for the dis­cip­line of match­ing what a cus­tomer is worth to what it costs to serve them.

Fitness, wellness and full-stack care

Two neighbouring models test different answers to the ceiling, the subscription, and owning the whole patient journey.

Two more seg­ments map the range of strategies and their costs. Fit­ness and well­ness, led by Cult.fit, runs the sub­scrip­tion bet that should, in the­ory, smooth the eco­nom­ics through re­cur­ring rev­enue. In prac­tice it stays cap­ital-hungry, with FY25 rev­enue of about ₹1,216 crore (up 31%) but a loss of roughly ₹481 crore, as the cost of win­ning and keep­ing mem­bers and build­ing phys­ical centres bites hard. Sub­scrip­tions help the life­time-value side of the equa­tion, but ac­quis­i­tion and ful­fil­ment costs in a price-sens­it­ive mar­ket keep profit out of reach.

The seg­ment con­tains a prof­it­able counter-ex­ample that qual­i­fies the loss-mak­ing case. HealthKart, a dir­ect-to-con­sumer nu­tri­tion and well­ness busi­ness, re­por­ted ₹1,021 crore of rev­enue in FY24 with a profit after tax of ₹38 crore. HealthifyMe, at ₹80 crore to ₹100 crore of rev­enue, is re­por­ted at or near prof­it­ab­il­ity (En­trackr and com­pany fil­ings, 2026). Product-led

Digital HealthState of Play35 •

well­ness, where the trans­ac­tion is a re­peat pur­chase rather than a sub­scrip­tion to a phys­ical net­work, clears the ceil­ing on gross mar­gin and brand. Sub­scrip­tion plus bricks (the model above) does not.

Wellness and full-stack platforms, FY24 operating revenue
₹ crore
HealthKart1,021Cult.fit927Pristyn Care601
Source: Company filings via Entrackr and Inc42, 2026

Con­sumer well­ness is roughly a tenth of sec­tor rev­enue and the seg­ment whose clas­si­fic­a­tion as health­care is most con­tested, which mat­ters for how it should be val­ued. Ac­quis­i­tion cost is high, churn is a con­stant risk, and the moat is brand, com­munity and in some cases hard­ware, with Ul­trahu­man dif­fer­en­ti­ated by its wear­able (Volge play­book, 2026). It is treated in­tern­ally as an ad­ja­cent con­sumer cat­egory rather than as clin­ical care, and the premium placed on it should be a con­sumer-brand premium rather than a health-tech­no­logy one.

On the full-stack side, the valu­ation evid­ence con­firms the op­er­a­tional re­trench­ment de­scribed here. Pristyn Care stood at about $1.17 bil­lion in Novem­ber 2025, down some 17 per cent from its $1.4 bil­lion peak, on ₹601 crore of FY24 rev­enue and about $187 mil­lion raised. High-value epis­odes

do raise rev­enue per pa­tient, and they raise fixed cost and clin­ical li­ab­il­ity in the same move­ment.

The capital and the deals

After the reset, the money flows to consolidation and the proven, and the deals show exactly where value is now seen.

The cap­ital re­order­ing of 2024–2026 tells the read’s story in trans­ac­tions. The de­fin­ing deal was stra­tegic, not ven­ture. In 2024, Ad­vent put about ₹2,475 crore into roughly 12% of Apollo’s health-tech and phar­macy busi­ness (HealthCo), valu­ing it near ₹22,481 crore. Ad­vent then merged it with the Keimed dis­tri­bu­tion busi­ness, as­sem­bling an in­teg­rated, prof­it­able, IPO-bound plat­form that is the stacked model made con­crete. Along­side it, PharmEasy raised emer­gency cap­ital at a 90% dis­count, and the sec­tor logged at least eight mer­gers and ac­quis­i­tions by late 2025 as con­sol­id­a­tion re­placed growth-at-all-costs.

The cap­ital mir­rors the mar­ket ex­actly. Money now flows to the firms that have solved the unit eco­nom­ics: the stacked, the prof­it­able and the stra­tegic­ally backed. It flows away from the single-product loss-makers. Stra­tegic and in­sti­tu­tional cap­ital (Tata, Apollo, Ad­vent) is con­sol­id­at­ing the sec­tor into a hand­ful of in­teg­rated plat­forms. Ven­ture cap­ital, reset to about $700 mil­lion a year, is se­lect­ive and tilt­ing to­ward AI and spe­cial­ist ver­tic­als

Digital HealthState of Play36 •

rather than the old con­sumer plays. For an in­vestor the mes­sage is con­sist­ent. The op­por­tun­ity is in­vestable, but the di­li­gence ques­tion has shif­ted from “how fast is it grow­ing?” to “does the model clear the ceil­ing, and is there a payer in sight?”

The ac­quirer list is short, do­mestic and stra­tegic, and it is the de­fin­ing fea­ture of the deal re­cord. Tata Di­gital took about 65 per cent of 1mg in 2021. Re­li­ance Re­tail took 60 per cent of Net­meds for ₹620 crore, and made a stra­tegic in­vest­ment in the on­co­logy plat­form Karki­nos in 2024. PharmEasy as­sembled Med­life, Thyro­care, Ak­named, Re­tailio and Marg ERP, while InsuranceDekho merged with RenewBuy at about ₹7,400 crore in May 2025. The Manipal fam­ily of­fice sta­bil­ised PharmEasy with ₹1,804 crore in 2024 (Busi­ness Stand­ard, Inc42 and En­trackr, 2026). Con­glom­er­ates and fam­ily of­fices, not ven­ture funds, now set the price.

Landmark Indian digital-health transactions, by disclosed value
₹ crore
InsuranceDekho / RenewBuy merg7,400PharmEasy / Thyrocare (2021)4,546PharmEasy down round (2024)1,804Reliance / Netmeds (2020)620
Source: Business Standard, Inc42 and Entrackr, 2026

The ven­ture side has re­priced rather than with­drawn. Fund­ing reached about $1.13 bil­lion across 112 deals in 2024, and about $496 mil­lion across

38 rounds in the first quarter of 2025. Roughly 30 per cent of health-tech­no­logy ven­ture cap­ital is now dir­ec­ted to medtech and dia­gnostics rather than to tele­con­sulta­tion. Only four rounds above $100 mil­lion were re­cor­ded na­tion­ally in the first half of 2026, against el­even a year earlier (Tracxn, 2026). The in­vestor base has also broadened, with de­vel­op­ment-fin­ance and im­pact cap­ital fund­ing ac­cess-led mod­els that com­mer­cial funds will not.

The exit ques­tion re­mains un­re­solved, and it gov­erns the cap­ital cycle above it. Stra­tegic ac­quis­i­tion or a private-equity sec­ond­ary is the real­istic exit; the pub­lic route awaits the first list­ing, most plaus­ibly a plat­form or an in­sur­tech-ad­ja­cent busi­ness that reaches prof­it­ab­il­ity first. Until then, the sec­tor’s ter­minal value is set by five or six do­mestic buy­ers.

Conglomerates and family offices, not venture funds, now set the price.

The more dis­tinct­ive play is frugal AI aimed straight at the doc­tor gap. ASHABot, built with Mi­crosoft Re­search, hands a mil­lion com­munity health work­ers a mul­ti­lin­gual AI as­sist­ant over WhatsApp. eSanjeevani it­self added AI-driven dif­fer­en­tial dia­gnosis across hun­dreds of symp­toms in 2025. The logic is hard to fault. AI scales clin­ical ex­pert­ise without the doc­tors India lacks, runs on rails already built, and plays to a soft­ware strength rather than a hard­ware or cap­ital weak­ness. It even sidesteps the

Digital HealthState of Play37 •

unit-eco­nom­ics ceil­ing in part, be­cause much of it sells to in­sti­tu­tions and gov­ern­ments, pay­ers, in other words, rather than to in­di­vidual pa­tients. Of every route out of the ceil­ing, clin­ical and frugal AI is the one where India can lead rather than fol­low.

Clinical and frugal AI

The one layer where Indian digital health might build genuinely global products, and relieve its deepest shortage at the same time.

The most prom­ising fron­tier in In­dian di­gital health is ar­ti­fi­cial in­tel­li­gence, be­cause it at­tacks the coun­try’s real clin­ical bot­tle­neck, too few doc­tors, not too little de­mand, with the input India has in abund­ance. Qure.ai, a ra­di­ology-AI firm that raised $65 mil­lion in 2024, runs al­gorithms that read scans and screen for dis­ease across more than a hun­dred coun­tries. Those al­gorithms were used for tuber­cu­losis screen­ing at the 2025 Maha Kumbh, and Niramai builds ra­di­ation-free breast-can­cer screen­ing. These are global products built from an In­dian base, in the mould of the coun­try’s IT in­dustry.

Key takeaways
  • AI scales scarce clin­ical ex­pert­ise, India’s real bot­tle­neck, on the rails already built.
  • Qure.ai (ra­di­ology, $65M, 100+ coun­tries) and frugal AI (ASHABot) are global-grade.
  • Much of it is sold to in­sti­tu­tions and gov­ern­ments: sidestep­ping the miss­ing-payer prob­lem.

Ad­op­tion has moved faster than the ex­porter story sug­gests, and the ad­op­ters are clini­cians rather than in­sti­tu­tions. The share of In­dian doc­tors using ar­ti­fi­cial-in­tel­li­gence tools rose from about 12 per cent in 2024 to 41 per cent in 2025, ahead of the United States and the United King­dom. Much of that use is doc­u­ment­a­tion rather than clin­ical de­cision-mak­ing (EY, 2026). The do­mestic build is fol­low­ing the same path. Eka Care has launched an India-first am­bi­ent scribe on pur­pose-trained lan­guage mod­els, con­vert­ing mul­ti­lin­gual con­sulta­tions into struc­tured notes and pre­scrip­tions. Sar­vam AI de­ploys voice-en­abled mul­ti­lin­gual triage agents over WhatsApp and low-band­width in­ter­faces.

The frugal claim can be quan­ti­fied. Small, do­main-spe­cific mod­els tuned for Indic lan­guages and voice-first use are re­por­ted to cut in­fer­ence costs by 60 to 97 per cent against gen­eral-pur­pose al­tern­at­ives (in­dustry re­port­ing, 2026). That is the dif­fer­ence between a fea­ture that can be given to a rural health worker and one that can­not. Pub­lic-health de­ploy­ment is already meas­ur­able in out­comes rather than in usage. Gov­ern­ment screen­ing pro­grammes in tuber­cu­losis and dia­betic ret­ino­pathy have been as­so­ci­ated with a 27 per cent de­cline in ad­verse tuber­cu­losis out­comes.

Two lim­its bound the claim. These sys­tems are po­si­tioned as de­cision sup­port rather than autonom­ous dia­gnosis. Where the soft­ware per­forms a med­ical func­tion in its own right it is reg­u­lated by CDSCO as a Class C

Digital HealthState of Play38 •

device, car­ry­ing a clin­ical val­id­a­tion and ap­proval bur­den that con­sumer soft­ware does not. Ac­cur­acy, gov­ernance, li­ab­il­ity and the DPDP ob­lig­a­tions all apply. Read cor­rectly, the layer is an ac­cel­er­ant across all seven seg­ments, strongest where it re­lieves the la­bour con­straint rather than where it re­places the clini­cian.

The ex­port claim now rests on a clear­ance re­cord rather than on a fund­ing round. Qure.ai's chest X-ray de­tec­tion product won a six-in­dic­a­tion 510(k) class II clear­ance on 26 Feb­ru­ary 2026. That took the com­pany to 26 cleared in­dic­a­tions across nine products for X-ray and com­puted tomo­graphy, against more than 65 cer­ti­fied in­dic­a­tions in Europe (Ima­ging Tech­no­logy News, 2026). It is a reg­u­lat­ory asset. The same product is the only chest X-ray de­tec­tion device cleared with a pre­de­ter­mined change con­trol plan, which al­lows the model to be re­vised without a fresh sub­mis­sion each time. The asset com­pounds abroad. Every added in­dic­a­tion widens the hos­pital base without adding an In­dian con­sulta­tion to the count.

The do­mestic rule book caught up in the same year, and it raises the bar for every­one build­ing here. The Cent­ral Drugs Stand­ard Con­trol Or­gan­isa­tion is­sued its final guid­ance doc­u­ment on med­ical device soft­ware on 21 July 2026. The doc­u­ment runs to 62 pages and sits under the Med­ical Devices Rules of 2017 (Nishith Desai As­so­ci­ates, 2026). It is not a new stat­ute. Every de­veloper is now asked to state the spe­cific med­ical pur­pose of its soft­ware. That state­ment de­cides whether the product is read as

de­cision sup­port or as a defin­it­ive dia­gnosis, and risk class fol­lows from it rather than from mar­ket­ing lan­guage. The am­bi­ent scribe and the voice triage agent will there­fore be tested against the same in­stru­ment as the ra­di­ology al­gorithm.

The more distinctive play is frugal AI aimed straight at the doctor gap.
Digital HealthState of Play39 •

The part in brief

  1. 01Tata 1mg climbed to roughly 31 per cent of e-pharmacy by late 2023 while PharmEasy slid to around 15, a flip decided by balance-sheet discipline.
  2. 02PharmEasy’s parent raised ₹1,804 crore in 2024 at about a 90 per cent discount to its $5.6 billion peak, having bought Thyrocare for ₹4,546 crore.
  3. 03Tata 1mg reported about ₹2,392 crore of FY25 revenue, up 22 per cent, narrowed its loss to ₹276 crore and reached EBITDA profit in core segments.
  4. 04PB Fintech earned about ₹4,977 crore of FY25 revenue with ₹353 crore of net profit, because insurance has a payer built into the model.
  5. 05Indian clinicians using AI tools went from about 12 per cent in 2024 to 41 per cent a year later, and Qure.ai raised $65 million for radiology.
Digital HealthState of Play40 •
The Market

Insurtech makes money because it has a payer built in. Everywhere else in digital health, the payer is missing: which is why insurance is the escape.

04

The Read

The demand, the escape route, the constraints, and where the market goes.

The doctor shortage the rails serve

Below the economics lies the reason the rails exist at all: a country with too few doctors, in the wrong places.

The de­mand is real and struc­tural. India does not have enough doc­tors, and the ones it has cluster in the wrong places. On the most de­fens­ible meas­ure, India has roughly one al­lo­pathic doc­tor per 2,700 people (the gov­ern­ment cites a far ro­sier ratio by count­ing tra­di­tional-medi­cine prac­ti­tion­ers and as­sum­ing high activ­ity rates). The maldis­tri­bu­tion is severe. About 80% of doc­tors serve cit­ies hold­ing less than a third of the pop­u­la­tion, and rural com­munity health centres run a spe­cial­ist short­fall of roughly 80%. This is the gap di­gital health ex­ists to bridge, and the reason the state built the rails in the first place.

The short­age ex­plains both the op­por­tun­ity and the con­straint. The op­por­tun­ity is enorm­ous: re­mote con­sulta­tion and AI triage can stretch scarce ex­pert­ise to hun­dreds of mil­lions who can­not reach a spe­cial­ist, which is why eSanjeevani’s 43 crore con­sulta­tions mat­ter as proof of need. The con­straint is that the same short­age sup­presses will­ing­ness to pay (a pa­tient with no local doc­tor will take a free re­mote one) and starves private plat­forms of phys­i­cians to staff them. Di­gital health is, at bot­tom, India’s

an­swer to a doc­tor short­age it can­not fix any other way, any time soon. The pur­pose is clear. The prob­lem is pay­ing for it.

The ab­so­lute num­bers be­hind the ratio set the ceil­ing on everything the sec­tor can de­liver. India holds roughly 1.1 mil­lion re­gistered doc­tors for a pop­u­la­tion of 1.4 bil­lion, ap­prox­im­ately 1.1 doc­tors per 1,000 against 2.8 in de­veloped mar­kets, along­side a hos­pital-bed short­age es­tim­ated near 1.5 mil­lion (MoHFW and in­dustry re­port­ing, 2026). No di­gital model cre­ates a clini­cian, so every plat­form in the mar­ket is com­pet­ing for slices of the same con­strained sup­ply, and the free pub­lic ser­vice has first call on a large part of it.

The pub­lic re­sponse to that short­age is now meas­ur­able at the level of in­fra­struc­ture rather than of con­sulta­tions. More than 142,000 Ay­ush­man Arogya Mandirs op­er­ate as telemedi­cine spokes, against 19,473 hubs and 901 on­line out-pa­tient de­part­ments, served by roughly 242,000 re­gistered pro­viders, and the cu­mu­lat­ive con­sulta­tion count passed 50 crore on 15 Septem­ber 2026 (MoHFW, 2026). The hub-and-spoke design is the state’s an­swer to maldis­tri­bu­tion: the spe­cial­ist stays in the city and the con­sulta­tion travels.

The mar­ket splits along the same line, and the split de­term­ines strategy. Urban tier-one mar­kets gen­er­ate over 70 per cent of plat­form rev­enue, at ₹500 to ₹1,500 a con­sulta­tion, and are sat­ur­ated and com­mod­it­ised. Rural and tier-two and tier-three mar­kets hold the lar­ger sup­ply gap, with lim­ited will­ing­ness to pay and the gov­ern­ment scheme as the primary chan­nel.

Digital HealthState of Play41 •

That chan­nel re­im­burses at ₹50 to ₹200 per con­sulta­tion on cycles of 90 days or more. The hy­brid is there­fore the only vi­able shape, with urban mar­gin sub­sid­ising pub­lic-chan­nel reach.

The government channel pays for a consultation at a small fraction of the urban private price
₹ per consultation
03757501,1251,500500Urban, low1,500Urban, high50Public, low200Public, high
Source: MoHFW and industry reporting, 2026

The mech­an­ism is spe­cific. An in­surer that pays for a mem­ber’s di­gital con­sulta­tion, dia­gnostics and phar­macy turns those products from pa­tient-fun­ded, price-sens­it­ive, one-off pur­chases into payer-fun­ded, man­aged, re­cur­ring care: ab­sorb­ing the ac­quis­i­tion cost and re­ward­ing the en­gage­ment that lowers claims. The in­sur­tech play­ers are already stand­ing at that junc­tion. The es­cape route is not spec­u­lat­ive; it is vis­ible in the data and the deals. What is un­cer­tain is tim­ing, how fast out­pa­tient in­sur­ance pen­et­rates, how quickly the con­sent rails get used to fund care, and which

plat­forms po­s­i­tion them­selves to be paid by the payer when it ar­rives. Who­ever wires di­gital-health de­liv­ery to the emer­ging payer cap­tures the mar­ket.

The escape route: building the payer

What this market needs is not a better app or a bigger market. It is the arrival of a payer.

If the miss­ing payer is the dis­ease, the cure is the emer­gence of one, and the like­li­est can­did­ate is private health in­sur­ance, rid­ing the rails the state has already built. The pieces are as­sem­bling. Com­mer­cial health in­sur­ance is now the largest non-life line in India and grow­ing fast, and the 2025 re­moval of GST on in­di­vidual premi­ums lowers the bar­rier to cover. The Ac­count Ag­greg­ator con­sent frame­work, with bil­lions of en­abled ac­counts, gives in­surers the veri­fied data to un­der­write and pay for out­pa­tient care for the first time. As more In­di­ans get private cover that in­cludes out­pa­tient be­ne­fits, someone other than the pa­tient fi­nally pays for the con­sulta­tion and the medi­cine, and the ceil­ing lifts.

The premium data now sup­ports the claim with spe­cificity rather than dir­ec­tion. Health in­sur­ance be­came the largest line in India’s non-life mar­ket

Digital HealthState of Play42 •
The market does not need a better app. It needs a payer, and insurance, riding the consent rails, is the one in sight.

in FY26, at 40.8 per cent of gross premium against 38.6 per cent in FY25. Premium was up 15.4 per cent to about ₹1.4 lakh crore and re­tail health up 19.9 per cent, against in­dustry growth of 9.3 per cent (IRDAI and CareEdge Rat­ings, 2026). The re­moval of the 18 per cent GST on in­di­vidual life and health premi­ums took ef­fect on 22 Septem­ber 2025, group health re­main­ing taxed at that rate. The mar­ket is es­tim­ated near $16 bil­lion in 2025 against about $48.5 bil­lion by 2035.

The pub­lic payer has also begun to move, which the ar­gu­ment above does not yet credit. PM-JAY has star­ted re­im­burs­ing tele­con­sulta­tion in se­lec­ted states, and the scheme has been ex­ten­ded to cit­izens aged 70 and above, on a base of 48.5 crore cards is­sued by 21 Septem­ber 2026 (Na­tional Health Au­thor­ity, 2026). Pub­lic re­im­burse­ment is slow, at cycles of 90 days or more, and low, at ₹50 to ₹200 a con­sulta­tion. It there­fore buys volume rather than mar­gin. But it es­tab­lishes the prin­ciple that the state will pay for a con­sulta­tion de­livered re­motely.

The se­quence that mat­ters is there­fore com­pos­i­tion be­fore scale. Out-pa­tient cover, men­tal-health cover, senior in­clu­sion, rural pen­et­ra­tion and

pre­ven­tion-led di­gital en­gage­ment are the spe­cific white spaces, and the cor­por­ate chan­nel, already em­ployer-fun­ded, is the one op­er­at­ing today. The plat­form po­si­tioned to be paid by the payer is the one already paid by an em­ployer.

The constraints, and what could go wrong

The path is navigable, but the obstacles are specific, and several could keep the market loss-making for years yet.

Five con­straints gate In­dian di­gital health, and each of them binds on its own timetable:

  • The unit-eco­nom­ics ceil­ing. Until a payer ar­rives or a bundle clears it, most pure plays re­main loss-mak­ing, the bind­ing con­straint, and the slow­est to fix.
  • The free pub­lic al­tern­at­ive. eSanjeevani’s free con­sulta­tions cap private will­ing­ness-to-pay at the source.
  • The reg­u­lat­ory va­cuum. E-phar­macy’s seven-year ab­sence of settled rules is a per­man­ent over­hang; a re­strict­ive rul­ing could re­shape the largest private seg­ment overnight.
  • The trust and qual­ity gap. Shal­low, brief con­sulta­tions limit the deep re­la­tion­ships that gen­er­ate life­time value.
Digital HealthState of Play43 •
  • The fund­ing dis­cip­line. Cap­ital is se­lect­ive; firms that can­not show a path to the ceil­ing will not be fun­ded.

Three risks could keep the mar­ket sub­scale. The payer may not ar­rive fast enough, out­pa­tient in­sur­ance could pen­et­rate slowly, leav­ing the eco­nom­ics broken for years. The e-phar­macy frame­work could turn re­strict­ive, hit­ting the largest private seg­ment overnight. And con­sol­id­a­tion could leave a few prof­it­able in­teg­rated plat­forms sit­ting atop a long tail of fail­ures, healthy for the sur­viv­ors, a con­trac­tion for the sec­tor. None of these re­verses the struc­tural de­mand. Each shapes how long the mar­ket stays loss-mak­ing, and who is left stand­ing when it turns.

Two con­straints be­long on this list that are not yet on it, and both are struc­tural rather than cyc­lical. The first is clin­ical sup­ply. Roughly 1.1 mil­lion re­gistered doc­tors serve 1.4 bil­lion people, and med­ical prac­tice is reg­u­lated by state med­ical coun­cils. Cross-state tele­con­sulta­tion there­fore re­quires mul­tiple re­gis­tra­tions, and the li­cen­sure fric­tion is per­man­ent rather than trans­itional. The second is the data re­gime. Full com­pli­ance with the DPDP Rules falls due from about 13 May 2027, with pen­al­ties up to ₹250 crore, and the cost falls hard­est on the roughly 90 per cent of the base that is sub-scale (MeitY, 2025).

Cash con­ver­sion is the con­straint that kills firms be­fore any of the above re­solves. Re­im­burse­ment cycles of 60 to 90 days are nor­mal in cor­por­ate and gov­ern­ment chan­nels. Pub­lic re­im­burse­ment runs at ₹50 to ₹200 a con­sulta­tion on cycles of 90 days or more. That strains work­ing cap­ital

in ex­actly the chan­nels that offer the low­est ac­quis­i­tion cost. Rural last-mile lo­gist­ics and cold chain com­pound the same prob­lem on the ful­fil­ment side.

The ex­pec­ted shape of the con­trac­tion is now quan­ti­fied. An es­tim­ated 20 to 30 per cent of the roughly 11,000-firm base is likely to fail or be ab­sorbed within two years. The top five firms already hold about 60 per cent of rev­enue in tele­con­sulta­tion and e-phar­macy (Tracxn and in­dustry track­ers, 2026). The risk to the sec­tor is there­fore not col­lapse but con­cen­tra­tion. It is a mar­ket that func­tions for five or six plat­forms and for al­most nobody else.

The risk to the sector is concentration rather than collapse
per cent
01530456020Firms to exit, low30Firms to exit, high60Top five revenue
Source: Tracxn and industry trackers, 2026

The bind­ing ques­tion is the payer. The rails are built and the de­mand is proven; whether the mar­ket be­comes large and prof­it­able, rather than

Digital HealthState of Play44 •

large and loss-mak­ing, comes down to how fast a payer for out­pa­tient di­gital health emerges. The smart po­s­i­tion, for op­er­ator and in­vestor alike, is to build the bundle that sur­vives without a payer, and to be ready to be paid by one when it comes.

The next two to three years

What Indian digital health should look like by 2028, if the next three years run true to form.

Over the next two to three years, the sec­tor will con­sol­id­ate around the firms that have solved the unit eco­nom­ics, and its centre of grav­ity will shift to­ward the payer. Four de­vel­op­ments look most likely:

  • Con­sol­id­a­tion com­pletes. A few in­teg­rated, prof­it­able plat­forms (Tata 1mg, Apollo, the asset-light sur­viv­ors) ab­sorb or out­last the single-product loss-makers; IPOs test pub­lic ap­pet­ite for the proven.
  • Dia­gnostics and in­sur­ance lead. The two seg­ments with real eco­nom­ics, the mar­gin key­stone and the emer­gent payer, grow fast­est and at­tract the most cap­ital.
  • The payer be­gins to ar­rive. Out­pa­tient health in­sur­ance, GST-re­formed and con­sent-en­abled, slowly starts to fund di­gital care, the early stages of the es­cape route, vis­ible by 2028 but not yet com­plete.
  • AI leads the new build­ing. Clin­ical and frugal AI, sold partly to in­sti­tu­tions, be­comes the most-fun­ded and most glob­ally-com­pet­it­ive layer, and the one that sidesteps the miss­ing payer.

The quant­it­at­ive frame for the period is a mar­ket of roughly $15 bil­lion to $18 bil­lion in 2025, com­pound­ing at 20 to 25 per cent. The $100 bil­lion-plus fig­ure for 2033 is best read as dir­ec­tion rather than fore­cast (Cus­tom Mar­ket In­sights and Mordor In­tel­li­gence, 2026). The nar­rower tele­health sub-mar­ket, at about $3.9 bil­lion in 2025 and some $9.8 bil­lion by 2030, is the more use­ful series for any­one un­der­writ­ing a con­sulta­tion-led busi­ness. The gap between the two defines how much of the head­line be­longs to en­ter­prise soft­ware rather than to con­sumer care.

Indian digital-health market trajectory
US$ bn
02550751001520241720251002033 (projected)
Source: Custom Market Insights and Mordor Intelligence, 2026
Digital HealthState of Play45 •

Three de­vel­op­ments can be dated rather than es­tim­ated. Con­sent-man­ager du­ties under the DPDP Rules fall due from about Novem­ber 2026 and full com­pli­ance from about May 2027, which will clear a tranche of sub-scale op­er­at­ors out of the re­cords busi­ness. The GST ex­emp­tion on in­di­vidual health premi­ums, ef­fect­ive 22 Septem­ber 2025, works through re­newal cycles over the same period. And the device-ad­ja­cent clin­ical-AI layer con­tin­ues to sell to in­sti­tu­tions and gov­ern­ments, which is the only part of the sec­tor that already has a payer.

The value mi­gra­tion is the fore­cast worth hold­ing. Value is ex­pec­ted to move from acute tele­con­sulta­tion to­wards chronic care, pro­vider soft­ware and in­fra­struc­ture, where re­ten­tion and mar­gin are stronger. The pub­lic rails are ex­pec­ted to be­come the de­fault sub­strate, so that ABDM-nat­ive and gov­ern­ment-chan­nel mod­els gain ground against dir­ect-to-con­sumer plays. The bind­ing ques­tion re­mains ex­e­cu­tion on unit eco­nom­ics rather than the ar­rival of the mar­ket.

The read, on a page

The whole argument, in one place, with the evidence behind it.

India has built pub­lic rails for di­gital health that rank with any, 90 crore iden­tit­ies, a bil­lion re­cords, 43 crore free con­sulta­tions, on top of vast, struc­tural de­mand driven by a doc­tor short­age and a heavy dis­ease

bur­den. And yet the private mar­ket run­ning on those rails is al­most en­tirely loss-mak­ing, be­cause of a unit-eco­nom­ics ceil­ing no pure-play model clears: every leader still spends more to win a cus­tomer than that cus­tomer is worth. The deep­est reason is the miss­ing payer, India’s pub­lic in­sur­ance cov­ers the hos­pital but not the clinic, so no one but the pa­tient pays for the out­pa­tient care di­gital health sells.

The sur­viv­ors answered the ceil­ing by stack­ing, an­chor­ing a prof­it­able bundle on dia­gnostics, as Tata 1mg did, or strip­ping out in­vent­ory en­tirely, as Practo did, while the over-ex­ten­ded, PharmEasy chief among them, be­came cau­tion­ary tales. The struc­tural fix is a payer, and the like­li­est one is private health in­sur­ance, rid­ing the con­sent rails the state has already laid. And the one fron­tier where India can lead rather than fol­low is soft­ware, clin­ical and frugal AI, which scales scarce ex­pert­ise and sells, in part, to in­sti­tu­tions that ac­tu­ally pay.

The rails rank with any; the demand is real; the payer is missing. Whoever builds it captures the market.

For the op­er­ator and the in­vestor, the read is to build for the ceil­ing and the payer at once: a bundle that sur­vives the unit eco­nom­ics today, po­si­tioned to be fun­ded by the payer that ar­rives to­mor­row.

The fig­ures on which the ar­gu­ment rests have been re-based since this read was first set, and all of them move in the same dir­ec­tion. The pub­lic

Digital HealthState of Play46 •

iden­tity layer stands at about 93.95 crore ABHA health ac­counts and some 105 crore linked re­cords (Na­tional Health Au­thor­ity, July 2026), roughly two thirds of the pop­u­la­tion. The free na­tional tele­con­sulta­tion ser­vice passed 50 crore cu­mu­lat­ive con­sulta­tions on 15 Septem­ber 2026. De­liv­ery runs through more than 142,000 Ay­ush­man Arogya Mandirs, the fa­cil­it­ies re­named from Health and Well­ness Centres in 2023 (MoHFW, 2026). The rails are lar­ger, and so is the free al­tern­at­ive.

The payer side has moved for the first time in the series. Health in­sur­ance be­came the largest line in India’s non-life mar­ket in FY26, at 40.8 per cent of gross premium against 38.6 per cent in FY25, with re­tail health up 19.9 per cent. That fol­lowed the re­moval of GST on in­di­vidual health and life premi­ums from 22 Septem­ber 2025 (IRDAI, CareEdge Rat­ings and the 56th GST Coun­cil, 2026). PM-JAY, at 48.5 crore cards and more than 38,000 em­pan­elled hos­pit­als as at 21 Septem­ber 2026, has begun re­im­burs­ing tele­con­sulta­tion in se­lec­ted states while still ex­clud­ing out-pa­tient care gen­er­ally.

The con­clu­sion is there­fore un­changed in struc­ture and sharper in tim­ing. The ceil­ing is in­tact, the rails are stronger, and the payer is closer than at any point since the sec­tor began. What re­mains un­re­solved is whether out-pa­tient cover deep­ens fast enough to fund di­gital care be­fore con­sol­id­a­tion leaves five or six plat­forms and little else to fund.

The free public service has drawn level with the public payer, while the identity layer runs at twice their scale
crore
037.575112.5150105Linked records94ABHA accounts50Free consultations48.5PM-JAY cards
Source: National Health Authority, July 2026

Key takeaways

Nine conclusions for the people who must act on this market.

  1. The rails are pub­lic; the payer is miss­ing. In­fra­struc­ture that ranks with any (90cr IDs, 100cr re­cords, 43cr free con­sults) sits atop a mar­ket with no third-party payer.
  2. Unit eco­nom­ics is the bind­ing con­straint. Lead­ers still spend ₹1.12–1.21 to earn ₹1, the product works, the maths does not.
Digital HealthState of Play47 •
  1. PM-JAY ex­cludes OPD. India’s biggest payer cov­ers the hos­pital, not the clinic: ex­actly what di­gital health sells.
  2. No single product is a busi­ness. Sur­vival means stack­ing con­sult + dia­gnostics + phar­macy + sub­scrip­tion until value clears cost.
  3. Dia­gnostics is the key­stone. Higher mar­gin and fre­quency make it the profit lever, Tata 1mg’s an­swer, PharmEasy’s gamble.
  4. The free in­cum­bent caps will­ing­ness-to-pay. eSanjeevani gives con­sulta­tions away, sup­press­ing private pri­cing at the source.
  5. The es­cape is a payer. Private health in­sur­ance, rid­ing the Ac­count Ag­greg­ator con­sent rails, is the vis­ible can­did­ate.
  6. Soft­ware is where India leads. Clin­ical and frugal AI scales scarce ex­pert­ise and is sold to in­sti­tu­tions: sidestep­ping the payer gap.
  7. The cap­ital has ma­tured. After the reset, money backs the stacked and prof­it­able; the di­li­gence ques­tion is “does it clear the ceil­ing?”
Platform and clinical engineering
  • Tele­con­sulta­tion and e-phar­macy plat­form en­gin­eer­ing, in­clud­ing the pre­scrip­tion con­trols.
  • Dia­gnostics plat­form and lo­gist­ics sys­tems, from sample to re­port.
  • Clin­ical ar­ti­fi­cial-in­tel­li­gence val­id­a­tion and model gov­ernance for reg­u­lated soft­ware.
  • In­ter­op­er­ab­il­ity as­sur­ance and con­form­ance test­ing be­fore go-live.

Volge's expertise in digital health

The engineering work the sector asks for, and the form it takes on an engagement.

India's di­gital health mar­ket runs on pub­lic rails and private unit eco­nom­ics, so the en­gin­eer­ing it needs is in­teg­ra­tion on one side and in­stru­ment­a­tion on the other. The work below is what pro­viders, plat­forms and in­surers in this mar­ket com­mis­sion. Each is de­livered by senior en­gin­eers work­ing in­side the cli­ent's own team, with the Global De­liv­ery Centres run­ning what has been built once it is in pro­duc­tion.

A plat­form in this mar­ket needs its unit eco­nom­ics in­stru­mented be­fore it needs more fea­tures. Con­tri­bu­tion per user, meas­ured per trans­ac­tion rather than per co­hort, is the num­ber that de­cides whether in­teg­ra­tion with the pub­lic rails is an asset or an ex­pense. Few plat­forms can pro­duce it on de­mand. Volge treats the in­stru­ment­a­tion as the first de­liv­er­able, be­cause every later ar­gu­ment about at­tach rates and re­ten­tion is settled with that num­ber or not settled at all.

Con­sent is a stat­utory ob­lig­a­tion in India now, and it is not a user-in­ter­face prob­lem. The data pro­tec­tion re­gime re­quires a re­cord of what was con­sen­ted to and when, re­triev­able on re­quest (Gov­ern­ment of India, 2023).

Digital HealthState of Play48 •

The health ac­count and re­cord-link­ing in­ter­faces of the na­tional mis­sion im­pose their own con­form­ance tests be­fore go-live (Na­tional Health Au­thor­ity, 2021). Both move. A plat­form that passes once and stops test­ing will fail quietly, usu­ally at the point a payer wants to con­nect to it.

This work is se­quenced, not par­al­lel­ised. Iden­tity and con­sent are settled first, be­cause claims and re­cords in­teg­ra­tion is worth noth­ing without them, and the in­stru­ment­a­tion goes in along­side rather than af­ter­wards. The open­ing quarter should close with one live in­teg­ra­tion and a cost per trans­ac­tion that the fin­ance team re­cog­nises as its own. Volge staffs it with a small em­bed­ded team under one ar­chi­tect, who stays through op­er­a­tions rather than hand­ing over at the end of the build.

Meas­ure the plat­form, not the pro­gramme. Con­tri­bu­tion per trans­ac­tion and the share of claims ad­ju­dic­ated without manual in­ter­ven­tion tell a board more than a re­lease count ever will, and both are avail­able weekly. The fail­ures here are com­mer­cial as often as tech­nical. Plat­forms build on the pub­lic rails with no payer at the other end, and they treat dia­gnostics or phar­macy at­tach as a growth num­ber when it is in fact the only mar­gin in the busi­ness.

Building on the public rails
  • Ay­ush­man Bharat Di­gital Mis­sion in­teg­ra­tion, cov­er­ing health ac­counts, re­cord link­ing and the re­gis­tries.
  • HL7 FHIR pro­file en­gin­eer­ing against the na­tional spe­cific­a­tions.
  • Health Claims Ex­change in­teg­ra­tion for claims sub­mis­sion and ad­ju­dic­a­tion.
  • Con­sent man­age­ment built to the Di­gital Per­sonal Data Pro­tec­tion re­gime.
Making the economics visible
  • Unit-eco­nom­ics in­stru­ment­a­tion, meas­ur­ing ac­quis­i­tion cost against con­tri­bu­tion per user.
  • At­tach and re­ten­tion ana­lyt­ics across con­sulta­tion, phar­macy and dia­gnostics.
  • In­sur­ance and payer in­teg­ra­tion, in­clud­ing the re­tail health product set.
  • Plat­form op­er­a­tions and ser­vice man­age­ment once the sys­tem is live.
How an engagement runs
  • A dia­gnosis of two to eight weeks, led on site by senior ar­chi­tects, es­tab­lish­ing where a plat­form stands on the pub­lic rails.
  • A se­quenced pro­gramme, be­cause con­sent and iden­tity have to be settled be­fore claims or re­cords in­teg­ra­tion is use­ful.
  • Build teams em­bed­ded along­side the cli­ent's own en­gin­eers rather than work­ing to a spe­cific­a­tion at arm's length.
  • Run and op­er­ate from the Global De­liv­ery Centres, with unit eco­nom­ics in­stru­mented from the first re­lease.
Digital HealthState of Play49 •
The Read

The market does not need a better app. It needs a payer, and insurance, riding the consent rails, is the one in sight.

Sources

The bodies cited in this read for market size, adoption, funding and regulation, with the year the text attributes to each.

Digital HealthState of Play50 •
Version · VSP-IDH-001 · 2026
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About Volge

Volge is an engineering firm providing enterprise technology transformation services to clients across the Middle East, India, APAC, Europe, and North America.

Delivery stands on two pillars: Forward Deployed Engineering, with senior specialists embedded in the client’s own team, and Intelligent Command Centre Operations, run from our Global Delivery Centres, which keeps what they build running. Senior engineers stay with an engagement from the first diagnosis through to production.

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