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volge

A Desert Full of Servers : Sovereign AI and Data Centre Capacity in the GCC

GCC SOVEREIGN AI · STATE OF PLAY 2026
Twelve gigawatts have been announced across the Gulf and a few hundred megawatts energised: the distance between the two is where this read sits.
3 GW
HUMAIN target by 2030
467 MW
Saudi operational, Q1 2026
3.6x
Announced against measured, 2030
GCC 2026

State of Play is a read on a sector: its size, its structure, where the money moves and what moves it. Each edition takes one market and sets out what is known, what is claimed, and what the difference between the two is worth to anyone deciding where to commit.

Twelve gigawatts have been announced across the Gulf and a few hundred megawatts energised: the distance between the two is where this read sits. Sovereign artificial-intelligence compute across the six Gulf states: what has been announced, what has been financed, what is energised, and why those three numbers differ by a factor of about three.

Figures carry their basis and their date. Where published estimates disagree, the range is given and the basis named rather than averaged away, and where a widely quoted number does not survive checking it is corrected here rather than repeated. Every chart plots a figure stated in the text, and nothing is projected beyond what a named source projects.

Contents

01Introduction
  1. 02Announcement against energisation
  2. 03What sovereign AI means here
  3. 04Six bases, none interchangeable
  4. 06The installed base, measured
  5. 07Power, not chips, is the constraint
  6. 08The run-rate test
  7. 10The war that changed the asset base
02Deep dive
  1. 13HUMAIN after 1 November 2026
  2. 14A substation tender, not a chip order
  3. 16Announced, contracted, energised
  4. 17Chip access is entity-based
  5. 18The rule never rescinded
  6. 19Circular capital, anchor tenants
  7. 21The colocation market actually built
  8. 22How double counting happens
03The landscape
  1. 25Saudi Arabia: the measured series
  2. 26Saudi Arabia: the operator ledger
  3. 28The UAE: base and nameplate
  4. 30The UAE: what is not disclosed
  5. 31Qatar: the only financed pipeline
  6. 33Kuwait: the substation gate
  7. 35Bahrain and Oman
04Outlook
  1. 39The 2030 reconciliation
  2. 40The case for the high numbers
  3. 42What could break the build
  4. 43Contract against energisation
  5. 45What is not known
  6. 46The read to 2030
  7. 47Key takeaways
  8. 49Volge's expertise in sovereign compute
  9. •Sources
Sovereign AIState of Play01 •
01

The Problem

Why the Gulf’s announced compute and its energised compute are not the same subject.

Announcement against energisation

The Gulf’s capacity divergence is not a disagreement between analysts. It is the difference between measured load and press-release nameplate.

The two num­bers in cir­cu­la­tion for Gulf ar­ti­fi­cial-in­tel­li­gence ca­pa­city in 2030 are not two es­tim­ates of one thing. The low fam­ily, of the order of 3.3 gigawatts across the six states, is built on a meas­ured op­er­a­tional base and pro­jec­ted for­ward (FTI Con­sult­ing via Arab News, 21 Au­gust 2025). ValuStrat echoed it in its GCC Data Centre Mar­ket Re­view 2025. The high fam­ily, of the order of twelve gigawatts, is the arith­metic sum of an­nounce­ments. Some are dated 2034 and some are multi-coun­try. None car­ries a doc­u­mented grid con­nec­tion. The ratio between them, about 3.6 times, is a defin­i­tional arte­fact rather than a fore­cast­ing dis­pute.

The two fam­il­ies are re­con­cil­able, and the re­con­cili­ation factor is about three. In the Gulf’s most ma­ture mar­ket, the live-to-total-tracked mul­tiple can be de­rived from two fig­ures pub­lished by DC Byte. Self-built ca­pa­city of ap­prox­im­ately 65 mega­watts rep­res­ents 5.44 per cent of total tracked United Arab Emir­ates sup­ply, which im­plies a tracked de­nom­in­ator near 1,195 mega­watts. That sits against Knight Frank’s live print of 376 mega­watts of in­form­a­tion-tech­no­logy load (DC Byte via Data Cen­ter Know­ledge, 19 Feb­ru­ary 2026; Knight Frank, 14 Oc­to­ber 2025). That mul­tiple of

roughly 3.2 times, ap­plied in re­verse to a twelve-gigawatt an­nounced pipeline, im­plies about 3.7 gigawatts even­tu­ally live. The two prints de­scribe one mar­ket.

The 2030 divergence is a definitional one
GW, GCC total
03.87.511.2151Measured base, 20253.3Low/mid 203012Announced nameplate
Source: FTI Consulting 2025; sum of public announcements, 2026

Three cor­rec­tions frame what fol­lows. The flag­ship Saudi vehicle changed hands on 1 Novem­ber 2026. The Pub­lic In­vest­ment Fund and Ara­mco closed the HUMAIN trans­ac­tion at 51 per cent and 49 per cent re­spect­ively. Their joint state­ment gives a planned de­ploy­ment of three gigawatts of ar­ti­fi­cial-in­tel­li­gence data centre ca­pa­city by 2030, not the six gigawatts widely re­por­ted (Ara­mco, 1 Novem­ber 2026). An­nounced ca­pa­city and op­er­a­tional ca­pa­city are dif­fer­ent ledgers. They are kept sep­ar­ate through­out. The bind­ing con­straint on de­liv­ery is power rather than sil­icon,

Sovereign AIState of Play02 •

a po­s­i­tion stated plainly by Cush­man and Wake­field in its 2026 global com­par­ison of 107 mar­kets.

Key takeaways
  • The 3.6 times di­ver­gence in 2030 es­tim­ates is defin­i­tional, not ana­lyt­ical: meas­ured load against summed name­plate.
  • A live-to-tracked mul­tiple of roughly 3.2 times re­con­ciles the two fam­il­ies and is de­rived from UAE data.
  • HUMAIN’s of­fi­cial 2030 fig­ure is 3 GW, stated by both share­hold­ers on 1 Novem­ber 2026.
  • Power de­liv­ery, not chip sup­ply, gates every Gulf pro­gramme ex­amined in this read.

A mega­watt fig­ure without a stated basis and without evid­ence of a grid con­nec­tion is not a ca­pa­city es­tim­ate, and any party con­tract­ing into this mar­ket should treat it as a head­line. Ap­plied con­sist­ently, that test re­moves most of the Gulf’s an­nounced pipeline from the in­stalled column without as­sert­ing that any single pro­ject has failed.

The two numbers in circulation for Gulf artificial-intelligence capacity in 2030 are not two estimates of one thing.

What sovereign AI means here

In the Gulf, sovereign artificial intelligence mostly means in-country data residency and state-adjacent ownership, not a domestic frontier-model capability.

The term sov­er­eign ar­ti­fi­cial in­tel­li­gence is used in the Gulf to de­scribe four dis­tinct things, and the dif­fer­ences are con­sequen­tial for any­one siz­ing the mar­ket. The first is state or state-fund own­er­ship of com­pute as­sets, as with HUMAIN under the Pub­lic In­vest­ment Fund and Ara­mco, or Qai under the Qatar In­vest­ment Au­thor­ity. The second is in-coun­try data res­id­ency on com­mer­cial cloud, which is what Or­acle Alloy de­liv­ers for Bahrain’s In­form­a­tion and eGovernment Au­thor­ity and what the Kuwait launch ar­range­ments with Google de­scribe. The third is do­mestic model de­vel­op­ment. The fourth is do­mestic sil­icon. Only the first two are ma­ter­i­ally present in the re­gion.

Qatar il­lus­trates the dis­tinc­tion cleanly, and cor­rects a com­mon mis­de­scrip­tion. Syntys, the Doha-headquartered car­rier-neut­ral plat­form carved out of Oore­doo Group and launched to mar­ket on 11 March 2025, is a host­ing land­lord. It owns build­ings and sells ca­pa­city. It is neither a model de­veloper nor a graph­ics-pro­cessing-unit owner. Qatar’s na­tional ar­ti­fi­cial-in­tel­li­gence com­pany is Qai, wholly owned by the Qatar In­vest­ment Au­thor­ity, launched on 8 Decem­ber 2025 under chair­man Ab­dulla Al-Misnad,

Sovereign AIState of Play03 •

and Qai has stated ex­pli­citly that it is not build­ing fron­tier large lan­guage mod­els. The vehicle with the cap­ital and the vehicle with the floor space are dif­fer­ent com­pan­ies.

The fourth defin­i­tion, do­mestic sil­icon, has in one in­stance been aban­doned. Alat, the PIF com­pany launched in Feb­ru­ary 2024 with a stated hun­dred-bil­lion-dol­lar budget, re­moved its found­ing chief ex­ec­ut­ive and aban­doned semi­con­ductor man­u­fac­tur­ing in April 2026, re­dir­ect­ing re­sources to­wards the data centre build-out rather than to­wards own­ing fa­cil­it­ies. It holds no ca­pa­city. The re­port­ing on that re­treat was not re­triev­able at source and is treated here as un­veri­fied de­tail around a veri­fied dir­ec­tion of travel.

Quick facts · four meanings of sovereign
State-owned computeHUMAIN (PIF 51 / Aramco 49); Qai (QIA)
In-country residencyOracle Alloy with Bahrain iGA; Google Cloud Kuwait
Domestic frontier modelsNot present; Qai states it is not pursuing them
Domestic siliconAbandoned by Alat, April 2026

A fur­ther qual­i­fic­a­tion ap­plies to the word sov­er­eign where it is used by op­er­at­ors. Oore­doo Kuwait de­scribed its fa­cil­ity with NVIDIA, an­nounced on 9 Novem­ber 2025, as the na­tion’s first sov­er­eign ar­ti­fi­cial-in­tel­li­gence data centre. In that usage sov­er­eign de­notes in-coun­try data res­id­ency rather than state own­er­ship. The op­er­ator is Syntys, so Kuwait’s single

ar­ti­fi­cial-in­tel­li­gence fa­cil­ity is ma­jor­ity Qatari-group owned. Label and own­er­ship di­verge. The label is the com­pany’s own.

For the pur­poses of this read, sov­er­eign ar­ti­fi­cial-in­tel­li­gence ca­pa­city is there­fore defined nar­rowly: com­pute plant in­side a Gulf state, owned or anchored by a state en­tity or state fund, and en­er­gised. On that defin­i­tion the re­gional in­stalled total is meas­ured in hun­dreds of mega­watts. Live train­ing ca­pa­city is close to nil. Saudi Ar­a­bia’s op­er­at­ing base is coloca­tion, two pub­lic cloud re­gions, two re­search clusters and one in­fer­ence re­gion. Google’s live Dammam re­gion offered no A2, A3 or A4 ac­cel­er­ator ma­chine fam­il­ies when its re­gion list­ing was read on 31 July 2026.

Six bases, none interchangeable

Six different definitions of a data centre megawatt are in circulation in the Gulf, and the spread between them is wider than most of the growth being debated.

The single most use­ful dis­cip­line in this mar­ket is to ask what a mega­watt fig­ure meas­ures be­fore ask­ing whether it is large. Six bases are in live cir­cu­la­tion. In­form­a­tion-tech­no­logy load, the power de­livered to com­put­ing equip­ment, is the ref­er­ence at one times. Gross or fa­cil­ity power, which adds cool­ing and light­ing as well as losses, runs at roughly 1.2 to 1.5 times that ref­er­ence and is rarely la­belled. Grid or util­ity sup­ply,

Sovereign AIState of Play04 •

mean­ing mega­watts re­ques­ted or con­trac­ted from a util­ity, runs at roughly 1.3 to 2.0 times. Op­er­a­tional ca­pa­city, as pub­lished by Saudi Ar­a­bia’s Min­istry of Com­mu­nic­a­tions and In­form­a­tion Tech­no­logy, car­ries no pub­lished defin­i­tion at all. Con­trac­ted ca­pa­city at full oc­cu­pancy is sale­able design ca­pa­city rather than en­er­gised load. An­nounced ca­pa­city is not ca­pa­city.

Quick facts · the six bases
IT load1.00x reference; Knight Frank, Arizton, DC Byte
Gross / facility power1.20x to 1.50x; rarely labelled
Grid / utility supply1.30x to 2.00x; Kuwait substations, HUMAIN tender
Operational, undefinedUnknowable; Saudi MCIT national series
Contracted at full occupancy1.00x but not yet energised; MEEZA, Khazna
Announced onlyNot capacity; HUMAIN, UAE-US campus, DataVolt

Two fur­ther traps ap­pear in the live re­cord. One is the present­a­tion of solar gen­er­a­tion mega­watts ad­ja­cent to data centre mega­watts. Beyon’s Bahrain Solar Park Phase 5 at 1.5 mega­watts-peak and Oman Data Park’s 1.4 mega­watt cap­tive plant are gen­er­a­tion, not in­form­a­tion-tech­no­logy load, and must not be added to ca­pa­city. The other is double count­ing through the own­er­ship stack, which Part II takes in de­tail. Both traps in­flate totals without any party mak­ing a false state­ment.

Where a pub­lisher does define its basis, the defin­i­tion should be used. Knight Frank’s gloss­ary defines a data centre mega­watt as the amount of

in­form­a­tion-tech­no­logy load or com­put­ing power that can be sup­por­ted. It defines live in­form­a­tion-tech­no­logy ca­pa­city as power cur­rently op­er­a­tional and avail­able for use. Ar­izton defines power ca­pa­city as the total in­form­a­tion-tech­no­logy load a fa­cil­ity is de­signed to sup­port. Those two defin­i­tions, taken to­gether, make the United Arab Emir­ates and the small-state coloca­tion fig­ures in this read com­par­able with each other. Saudi Ar­a­bia’s na­tional series is not com­par­able with either. Its basis is un­stated.

A megawatt figure without a stated basis is not a measurement. It is a headline.

The con­sequence for the Saudi data­set in par­tic­u­lar is large. If the Min­istry’s 467 mega­watt print for the first quarter of 2026 is gross fa­cil­ity power rather than in­form­a­tion-tech­no­logy load, every de­rived Saudi fig­ure shifts by 20 to 50 per cent. No meth­od­o­logy note and no defin­i­tion have been pub­lished along­side the series. Nor has any load-versus-gross state­ment. That is the most con­sequen­tial single meas­ure­ment gap in the Gulf data­set, and it sits at the centre of the re­gion’s largest pro­gramme.

Fa­cil­ity counts cor­rob­or­ate the con­cen­tra­tion. There were 112 op­er­a­tional data centres in the Gulf and 78 up­com­ing de­vel­op­ments as re­por­ted on 27 Oc­to­ber 2026. A sep­ar­ate count puts the na­tional dis­tri­bu­tion at the start of March 2026 at 61 in Saudi Ar­a­bia, 57 in the United Arab Emir­ates, 16 in Oman, 11 in Qatar, 8 in Bahrain and 5 in Kuwait. It is also re­por­ted that

Sovereign AIState of Play05 •

Khazna, stc and Gulf Data Hub to­gether rep­res­ent more than half of total Gulf in­form­a­tion-tech­no­logy power ca­pa­city. That con­cen­trates coun­ter­party risk as much as it con­cen­trates ca­pa­city.

The installed base, measured

Gulf operational capacity in 2026 is of the order of 880 megawatts of information-technology load, with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates holding more than 85 per cent of it.

The meas­ured re­gional base can be con­struc­ted two ways. The two agree. Taken from the top down, Ar­izton via Re­search and Mar­kets re­por­ted on 27 Oc­to­ber 2026 that the United Arab Emir­ates holds more than 400 mega­watts and over 45 per cent of total op­er­a­tional in­form­a­tion-tech­no­logy power in the Gulf. That im­plies a re­gional total of the order of 880 mega­watts. The same re­port puts Saudi Ar­a­bia and the Emir­ates to­gether at more than 85 per cent of op­er­a­tional ca­pa­city, leav­ing under about 130 mega­watts for the other four states. Taken from the bot­tom up, Qatar sits at roughly 40 to 45 mega­watts and Kuwait at 2 to 10 mega­watts, with Bahrain in the low tens and Oman at 10 to 20 mega­watts. Those sum to roughly 75 to 105 mega­watts, in­side the top-down en­vel­ope.

~880 MW
GCC operational IT power, 2026
>85%
Held by Saudi Arabia and the UAE
112
Operational GCC data centres
78
Upcoming developments
Operational data centres by state, March 2026
facilities
02040608061Saudi Arabia57UAE16Oman11Qatar8Bahrain5Kuwait
Source: AGBI, 2026

One in­de­pend­ent series ap­plies a single method to both lead­ers and should be noted with its weak­ness. The In­ter­na­tional Data Cen­ter Au­thor­ity, pub­lished on 21 July 2026 via Arab News, gives Saudi Ar­a­bia 440 mega­watts against the Emir­ates at 340 mega­watts, the pair hold­ing roughly 80 per cent of a re­gional total near one gigawatt. That series is cited here through a sec­ond­ary ag­greg­a­tion, be­cause the art­icle it­self re­turned nav­ig­a­tion con­tent only and could not be opened. It is not in­de­pend­ently

Sovereign AIState of Play06 •

echoed else­where. Its value is as a cross-check on the shape of the re­gion rather than as a level.

The hon­est state­ment of pre­ci­sion mat­ters more than the level. Re­search and Mar­kets pub­lished United Arab Emir­ates fig­ures of more than 400 mega­watts and more than 430 mega­watts on the same day, 27 Oc­to­ber 2026, both de­scribed as cur­rent in­form­a­tion-tech­no­logy load ca­pa­city in 2026, in re­leases of dif­fer­ent geo­graphic scope. The pre­ci­sion of these data­sets is there­fore not bet­ter than plus or minus 10 per cent. They should not be quoted to three sig­ni­fic­ant fig­ures. Us­able ca­pa­city, in the for­mu­la­tion of Data Cen­ter World Middle East, is what has been built, en­er­gised and cooled, and then cer­ti­fied and con­nec­ted. It is still coun­ted in hun­dreds of mega­watts.

Power, not chips, is the constraint

Export control is the subject of most commentary on Gulf compute. Grid interconnection is the subject that actually gates delivery.

Power de­liv­ery is the bind­ing con­straint on Gulf ar­ti­fi­cial-in­tel­li­gence ca­pa­city, and the evid­ence for that pro­pos­i­tion is both dir­ect and struc­tural. Cush­man and Wake­field com­pared 107 mar­kets across 24 vari­ables in its 2026 global data centre com­par­ison, pub­lished on 18 May

2026. That re­port states that power is still the primary con­straint across global data centre mar­kets, and that an ar­ti­fi­cial-in­tel­li­gence in­fra­struc­ture bubble ap­pears un­likely be­cause struc­tural fric­tions con­strain over­build­ing. It also finds that in Europe, the Middle East and Africa the pro­por­tion of real­ist­ic­ally de­liv­er­able pipeline ca­pa­city is de­clin­ing even as pipeline ca­pa­city ex­pands. Those are the pub­lisher’s own stated takeaways. They cut against an over­sup­ply thesis.

The struc­tural evid­ence is that the Gulf’s largest com­mit­ments entered the pub­lic re­cord as power pro­cure­ment. The only grid-con­nec­tion datum in the en­tire Saudi re­cord is a tender is­sued on 4 May 2026 (MEED, 4 May 2026). It cov­ers a 380/132/33 kilo­volt net­work, 500 mega­volt-ampere and 200 mega­volt-ampere sub­sta­tions and a 2,000 mega­volt-ampere bulk sup­ply point for HUMAIN’s Al-Saad cam­pus in east Riy­adh. In Kuwait, three 132/11 kilo­volt main trans­former sta­tions es­tim­ated above 22 mil­lion dinars, about 71.5 mil­lion dol­lars, gate the coun­try’s hy­per­scaler re­gions en­tirely. That con­struc­tion con­tract was not con­firmed as awar­ded as at 4 Novem­ber 2026.

The counter-ex­ample that proves the point is the United Arab Emir­ates. En­ergy con­sump­tion is not cur­rently a bind­ing con­straint on growth there, in DC Byte’s as­sess­ment of Feb­ru­ary 2026. Abu Dhabi and Dubai were named by Cush­man and Wake­field in Septem­ber 2026 among mar­kets be­ne­fit­ing from faster power de­liv­ery, avail­able land and strong con­nectiv­ity. Emir­ati power costs ap­prox­im­ately 0.11 dol­lars per kilo­watt-hour,

Sovereign AIState of Play07 •
Where Gulf programmes meet the grid
MVA or MW, as stated by source
05001,0001,5002,0002,000HUMAIN bulk supplypoint (MVA)700HUMAIN substations(MVA)72Kuwait substationnameplate (MW)60Google Kuwait gridrequest (MW)
Source: MEED 2026; Kuwait MEW tender documents 2026

nearly double Saudi Ar­a­bia and more than double Qatar. The Emir­ates buy speed at a price. Where power is not the con­straint the mar­ket grows; where it is, the pipeline stalls ir­re­spect­ive of cap­ital.

Key takeaways
  • Power is named by Cush­man and Wake­field as the primary con­straint across global mar­kets, in­clud­ing the Gulf.
  • Saudi Ar­a­bia’s largest pipeline item is evid­enced only by a sub­sta­tion and bulk-sup­ply-point tender.
  • Kuwait can­not en­er­gise its hy­per­scaler re­gions until three trans­former sta­tions are built and con­trac­ted.
  • New ca­pa­city ar­rives in 100 to 200 MW in­cre­ments gated by grid in­ter­con­nec­tion, not land or cap­ital.

Chip ac­cess, by con­trast, is a polit­ical risk rather than a phys­ical one. Part II takes it sep­ar­ately. A fa­cil­ity without sil­icon can be filled later, while a fa­cil­ity without a con­nec­tion agree­ment can­not be en­er­gised at all. New ca­pa­city in the re­gion ar­rives in in­cre­ments of 100 to 200 mega­watts, gated by grid in­ter­con­nec­tion and gen­er­a­tion rather than by land or cap­ital. Con­tract against en­er­gisa­tion dates rather than cam­pus mas­ter­plans, be­cause that dis­tinc­tion de­cides when rev­enue starts.

The run-rate test

Saudi Arabia has added about 94 megawatts a year for four years. Every published 2030 target requires between two and six times that rate.

The run-rate test dis­cip­lines the Gulf’s 2030 range, and noth­ing else does. Saudi Ar­a­bia’s own min­is­terial series gives 68 mega­watts of op­er­a­tional ca­pa­city in 2021, 440 mega­watts in 2025 and 467 mega­watts in the first quarter of 2026 (Min­istry of Com­mu­nic­a­tions and In­form­a­tion Tech­no­logy, 5 May 2026). That is 399 mega­watts added over four and a quarter years, or roughly 94 mega­watts a year. The most re­cent quarter an­nu­al­ises to about 108 mega­watts a year. Against that de­livered rate, the

Sovereign AIState of Play08 •

na­tional tar­get of about 1.5 gigawatts by 2030 re­quires some 218 mega­watts a year sus­tained for five years. That is twice the his­tor­ical rate.

Delivery rate required by each Saudi target
MW added per year to 2030 or 2034
020040060080094Historical, 2021 toQ1 2026218National 1.5 GW by2030302HUMAIN 1.9 GW by2030533PIF/Aramco 3.0 GWby 2030700HUMAIN 6.6 GW by2034
Source: Volge analysis of MCIT series, 2026

The higher tar­gets re­quire step changes that no pub­lished de­liv­ery sched­ule sup­ports. The three-gigawatt fig­ure stated jointly by the Pub­lic In­vest­ment Fund and Ara­mco on 1 Novem­ber 2026 im­plies about 533 mega­watts a year, 4.9 times the his­tor­ical rate. HUMAIN’s own 6.6 gigawatt pipeline by 2034 im­plies about 700 mega­watts a year, 6.5 times the his­tor­ical rate, sus­tained for nine years. A fore­cast that re­quires a six­fold step change in de­liv­ery, with no pub­lished de­liv­ery sched­ule and no dis­ag­greg­ated con­nec­tion queue, is not a fore­cast. The arith­metic for the three-gigawatt row is this prac­tice’s own. It is ap­plied to the min­is­terial base.

Two mod­er­at­ing ob­ser­va­tions are owed. Run rates are not phys­ical laws: the 2021 to 2026 period largely pred­ates the ar­ti­fi­cial-in­tel­li­gence cap­ital cycle, and a mar­ket can re-rate. The in­cre­ments now being built are also lar­ger than those his­tor­ic­ally de­livered, which is pre­cisely why grid con­nec­tion rather than con­struc­tion has be­come the gate. Neither ob­ser­va­tion closes a 6.5 times gap, and neither comes with a pub­lished sched­ule that would allow it to be tested.

Four and a quarter years delivered 399 megawatts. The 2034 pipeline asks for 700 a year.
Saudi installed IT load, independently measured
MW of IT load
075150225300122.42023290.52024
Source: KAPSARC DP00503, December 2025
Sovereign AIState of Play09 •

The test ap­plies with equal force out­side Saudi Ar­a­bia. Or­ganic growth rates there are smal­ler still. Knight Frank re­cor­ded 19.2 mega­watts of new Emir­ati ca­pa­city com­ing on­line dur­ing 2025 against a live base above 376 mega­watts. DC Byte re­cor­ded nearly 20 mega­watts of ar­ti­fi­cial-in­tel­li­gence in­form­a­tion-tech­no­logy power going live in the Emir­ates in the year to Feb­ru­ary 2026. Those are the ob­served rates in the re­gion’s most cap­able mar­ket. They are the cor­rect start­ing point for any pro­jec­tion, and they are an order of mag­nitude below the an­nounced pipeline.

The war that changed the asset base

Physical security entered the Gulf data centre column in 2026. One market’s installed capacity went backwards and one masterplan is being revised.

The 2026 re­gional war has changed the Gulf asset base in ways that no ca­pa­city fore­cast pub­lished be­fore it re­flects. United States and Is­raeli strikes on Iran began on 28 Feb­ru­ary 2026. On 11 March 2026 Iran’s Is­lamic Re­volu­tion­ary Guard Corps de­clared that tar­gets in­cluded in­fra­struc­ture of Google, Mi­crosoft, Pa­lantir, IBM, NVIDIA and Or­acle in Gulf states. Iran also pub­lished a list of 29 tech­no­logy tar­gets across Bahrain, the Emir­ates, Qatar and Is­rael. Ir­a­nian drone strikes dam­aged three

Amazon Web Ser­vices data centres from early March 2026, two in the Emir­ates and one in Bahrain (CSIS, 15 July 2026; Al Jaz­eera cit­ing Re­u­ters, 24 March 2026).

The op­er­ator’s own de­scrip­tion of the dam­age is spe­cific. Two Emir­ati fa­cil­it­ies were dir­ectly struck. In Bahrain a drone strike in close prox­im­ity to a fa­cil­ity caused struc­tural dam­age, dis­rup­ted power de­liv­ery and fire sup­pres­sion activ­ity that res­ul­ted in ad­di­tional water dam­age. On 15 Septem­ber 2026 Amazon Web Ser­vices de­clared that it was un­able to re­store ac­cess to re­sources and data hos­ted ex­clus­ively in the Bahrain re­gion, me-south-1, and in the Emir­ati avail­ab­il­ity zone mec1-az2. That re­gion had launched on 30 July 2019 with three avail­ab­il­ity zones in Man­ama. The dam­age spanned mul­tiple avail­ab­il­ity zones and ex­ceeded what re­gional and multi-zone ser­vices are de­signed to with­stand. A fur­ther up­date was prom­ised for early 2027.

28 Feb 2026
Strikes on Iran begin
3
AWS data centres damaged
15 Sep 2026
Bahrain region written off
29
Technology targets listed by Iran

Two con­sequences fol­low for the num­bers used here. Bahrain is the one Gulf mar­ket whose in­stalled ca­pa­city went back­wards dur­ing 2026, and any pre-March-2026 Bahrain total that in­cluded Amazon Web Ser­vices is now over­stated. The Emir­ates’ five-gigawatt ar­ti­fi­cial-in­tel­li­gence cam­pus

Sovereign AIState of Play10 •

mas­ter­plan is mean­while under re­vi­sion. Re­u­ters re­por­ted on 11 Septem­ber 2026 that the ori­ginal single-cam­pus plan in Abu Dhabi may be split into a net­work of sites, with of­fi­cials weigh­ing air de­fences and partly un­der­ground con­struc­tion. G42 told Re­u­ters that cam­pus work re­mains on sched­ule. Re­u­ters could not de­term­ine how close of­fi­cials were to ap­prov­ing a new plan or what the ef­fect on cost and tim­ing would be.

The stated cause of that re­vi­sion is phys­ical se­cur­ity and in­fra­struc­ture re­si­li­ence fol­low­ing the war, not power. It is the one place in this read where the con­straint is some­thing other than the grid. Amazon Web Ser­vices ad­vised cli­ents to con­sider mi­grat­ing work­loads out of the Middle East, which is a de­mand-side ef­fect as con­sequen­tial as the sup­ply-side loss.

Saudi Ar­a­bia’s ex­pos­ure is dif­fer­ent in kind. No fa­cil­ity in­side the King­dom has been re­por­ted struck. On 27 July 2026 Saudi air de­fences in­ter­cep­ted drones aimed at oil in­fra­struc­ture in the East­ern Province and Riy­adh, all des­troyed, with no dam­age, and the tar­gets were en­ergy as­sets rather than data centres. A fur­ther claim by the Re­volu­tion­ary Guard Corps of a July 2026 strike on the same Bahrain site is un­veri­fied and is not used here: it could not be con­firmed be­cause Bahraini ser­vices had already been off­line for months.

The war also re­priced the asset base. That mat­ters to any­one un­der­writ­ing Gulf com­pute. Be­fore the fight­ing the re­gional mar­ket would write as much as a bil­lion dol­lars of polit­ical-vi­ol­ence cover on a single risk, at an an­nual premium of between 0.1 and 0.3 per cent of the policy limit. By

Oc­to­ber 2026 avail­able ca­pa­city had fallen to between 100 and 300 mil­lion dol­lars, and premi­ums ran from 2 to 10 per cent of limit (Marsh, 2026). Crit­ical in­fra­struc­ture and large data centre pro­jects sit at the upper end of that range. Cover con­trac­ted as de­mand for it grew.

The in­surers' own losses ex­plain why the re­pri­cing is likely to hold. Polit­ical-vi­ol­ence claims from the early rounds of mis­sile and drone strikes came to about 2 bil­lion dol­lars (Marsh, 2026). Global an­nual premium for that en­tire class of cover is roughly 1.5 bil­lion dol­lars. The broker's head of global place­ment for the re­gion ex­pects two years from any last­ing cease­fire be­fore pri­cing ap­proaches its pre-war level, and al­lows that it may never fully re­turn. One in­surer once wrote 100 mil­lion dol­lars on a single risk. It now of­fers about 10 mil­lion. A pro­gramme of any size must there­fore be placed across many more bal­ance sheets.

The con­sequence for this read is a new entry in the cost of a Gulf mega­watt. In­sur­ance was a round­ing item in a data centre op­er­at­ing budget be­fore 2026 and is now a sig­ni­fic­ant one. For the largest cam­puses it has be­come a con­di­tion of fin­an­cing rather than a line within it. Gross in­sured polit­ical-vi­ol­ence losses across the re­gion ran above 3 bil­lion dol­lars between the start of March and late July 2026 (Marsh, 2026). Pre-war fore­casts carry none of this. A mega­watt costs more than it did, and the premium is the meas­ure of how much more.

Sovereign AIState of Play11 •

The part in brief

  1. 01The low and high Gulf capacity families, about 3.3 gigawatts and about twelve gigawatts for 2030, differ by a definitional gate rather than by forecasting judgement.
  2. 02HUMAIN's shareholders stated a planned deployment of three gigawatts by 2030 on 1 November 2026, half the six gigawatts widely carried in trade coverage.
  3. 03Saudi operational capacity rose from 68 megawatts in 2021 to 467 megawatts by the first quarter of 2026, a build rate well short of what the 2030 target implies.
  4. 04The measured Gulf installed base is of the order of 880 megawatts, with the United Arab Emirates holding more than 400 megawatts and over 45 per cent of operational load.
  5. 05Iranian drone strikes from early March 2026 damaged three Gulf cloud facilities, and on 15 September 2026 the operator declared data hosted only in Bahrain unrecoverable.
Sovereign AIState of Play12 •
The Problem

The two numbers in circulation for Gulf artificial-intelligence capacity in 2030 are not two estimates of one thing.

02

The Mechanics

How the capacity is structured, how it is financed, and what gates it on power and on policy.

HUMAIN after 1 November 2026

The Gulf’s flagship compute vehicle is no longer wholly state-fund owned, and its official 2030 target is half the figure most commentary carries.

The Pub­lic In­vest­ment Fund and Ara­mco closed the HUMAIN trans­ac­tion on 1 Novem­ber 2026, with the Fund hold­ing 51 per cent and Ara­mco 49 per cent. Con­sid­er­a­tion was ap­prox­im­ately 9.9 bil­lion riy­als, about 2.6 bil­lion dol­lars, in 2026 cash con­tri­bu­tions from Ara­mco, to­gether with the trans­fer of ar­ti­fi­cial-in­tel­li­gence, com­pute and di­gital as­sets. The joint share­holder state­ment gives the planned de­ploy­ment of three gigawatts of ar­ti­fi­cial-in­tel­li­gence data centre ca­pa­city by 2030. That is the only ca­pa­city fig­ure for HUMAIN car­ried in a formal re­lease nam­ing both share­hold­ers. It is pre­ferred through­out this read.

Trade press and com­pany brief­ings carry six gigawatts by 2030 and 6.6 gigawatts by 2034 (Middle East AI News, 4 Septem­ber 2026). On the avail­able evid­ence the six-gigawatt fig­ure is the site en­vel­ope of the Al-Saad cam­pus, six plots of one gigawatt each, rather than a de­liv­ery com­mit­ment. Where the lar­ger num­ber is used it should be quoted along­side the three-gigawatt share­holder fig­ure and la­belled as a cam­pus en­vel­ope. The dis­tinc­tion mat­ters. The two num­bers imply de­liv­ery rates of 533 and more than 1,000 mega­watts a year re­spect­ively against a na­tional his­tor­ical rate near 94.

Quick facts · HUMAIN
Ownership, from 1 Nov 2026PIF 51 per cent, Aramco 49 per cent
Considerationcirca SAR 9.9bn (USD 2.6bn) plus asset transfer
Stated 2030 target3 GW of AI data centre capacity
Widely reported figures6 GW by 2030; 6.6 GW by 2034
Live capacity, verifiedGroqCloud Dammam inference region, circa 50 MW
Land position211 plots disclosed, locations withheld
HUMAIN: four capacity figures in circulation
GW
024683PIF/Aramco, 20301.9HUMAIN JV, 20306Trade press, 20306.6Company pipeline, 2034
Source: PIF and Aramco 2026; AMD 2025; trade press 2026

HUMAIN’s veri­fied live ca­pa­city is mod­est. The GroqCloud Dammam in­fer­ence re­gion, built with Groq and Ara­mco Di­gital, runs at roughly 50 mega­watts with 19,000 lan­guage pro­cessing units and its ser­vice is live. The

Sovereign AIState of Play13 •

com­pany’s Riy­adh and Dammam ar­ti­fi­cial-in­tel­li­gence factor­ies, each stated at at least 100 mega­watts, both broke ground in Au­gust 2025 with go-live stated as the second quarter of 2026. That quarter closed on 30 June 2026 with no launch an­nounce­ment, and in­de­pend­ent track­ers con­tinue to class both fa­cil­it­ies as under con­struc­tion. The hon­est for­mu­la­tion is that no pub­lic evid­ence con­firms that they opened. This is the largest single un­re­solved item in the Saudi ledger.

Two doc­u­mented re­fus­als to dis­close bear on how this com­pany should be read. On 18 June 2026 HUMAIN de­clined to de­tail loc­a­tions or pro­jects when dis­clos­ing its 211 land plots. On 24 July 2026 it de­clined to re­veal the spe­cific re­quire­ments of its NVIDIA ar­range­ment or to say how many chips had been de­livered. The com­pany’s own do­main is rendered in cli­ent-side script and re­turns noth­ing to a plain fetch, so the flag­ship Saudi ar­ti­fi­cial-in­tel­li­gence vehicle pub­lishes noth­ing ma­chine-veri­fi­able. A sep­ar­ate trap should be noted, since NVIDIA’s own May 2025 re­lease con­tained it. The do­main hu­main.ai be­longs to an un­re­lated Bel­gian con­sultancy.

The struc­tural read­ing is that HUMAIN has be­come an an­chor ten­ant as much as a de­veloper. Its 36 mega­watt an­chor com­mit­ment in­side DataVolt’s 44 mega­watt Riy­adh East fa­cil­ity rep­res­ents more than 80 per cent of that fa­cil­ity’s planned ca­pa­city and con­verts HUMAIN, in that in­stance, from builder to cus­tomer. That is not a cri­ti­cism of the model. It is a cor­rec­tion to the as­sump­tion that HUMAIN’s tar­get ca­pa­city will sit on its own bal­ance sheet.

A substation tender, not a chip order

The largest line item in the Saudi pipeline entered the public record as a procurement for switchgear. That is the most instructive fact in the dataset.

HUMAIN’s Al-Saad cam­pus in east Riy­adh car­ries a name­plate of 6,000 mega­watts, six plots of 1,000 mega­watts each, and its status is the ten­der­ing of en­abling works. The only grid-con­nec­tion datum in the en­tire Saudi re­cord at­taches to it: a tender is­sued on 4 May 2026 for a 380/132/33 kilo­volt net­work, 500 and 200 mega­volt-ampere sub­sta­tions, and a 2,000 mega­volt-ampere bulk sup­ply point (MEED, 4 May 2026). The 2,000 mega­volt-ampere fig­ure is util­ity ap­par­ent power. It is not in­form­a­tion-tech­no­logy load and it is not mega­watts.

The Gulf’s largest announced compute project is documented by its switchgear, not its silicon.

The se­quen­cing im­plied by that tender is the use­ful part. A bulk sup­ply point of that scale is a multi-year util­ity un­der­tak­ing, and it pre­cedes rather than fol­lows the de­liv­ery of com­pute. Read for­ward, it means the Al-Saad

Sovereign AIState of Play14 •

en­vel­ope can­not en­er­gise in any ma­ter­ial quant­ity in­side the cur­rent dec­ade on the evid­ence avail­able. Read back­ward, it means the pro­ject is real. En­abling works are being pro­cured, which is more than can be said for sev­eral lar­ger name­plates else­where in the re­gion. Both read­ings should be held at once.

The same dis­cip­line ap­plied to the Emir­ates yields a com­par­able res­ult. The five-gigawatt UAE-US AI Cam­pus in Abu Dhabi is veri­fied from two in­de­pend­ent of­fi­cial sources, G42 on 15 May 2025 and the UAE Em­bassy, whose cur­rent text states that con­struc­tion is un­der­way with the first 200 mega­watts ready in 2026. Only the one-gigawatt first-phase cluster is spe­cified, and of that only the 200 mega­watt tranche is dated. The re­main­ing four gigawatts has no phas­ing, no fin­an­cing de­tail and no com­mis­sion­ing dates in the pub­lic re­cord. The basis of the five-gigawatt fig­ure is not stated. It is as­pir­a­tional.

The op­er­a­tional status of the most-cited Emir­ati pro­ject is zero veri­fied mega­watts. Star­gate UAE was an­nounced on 22 May 2025 as the first in­ter­na­tional Star­gate de­ploy­ment and the first part­ner­ship under OpenAI for Coun­tries. It com­prises a one-gigawatt cluster with a 200 mega­watt first phase ex­pec­ted to go live in 2026, firmed to the third quarter of 2026 by Mubadala’s man­aging dir­ector in Decem­ber 2025. No com­mis­sion­ing, en­er­gisa­tion or go-live an­nounce­ment ex­ists from any of its six named part­ners. The G42 news­room index, read cur­rent to 2 Novem­ber 2026, car­ries no Star­gate UAE op­er­a­tional re­lease at any point after the launch.

Nameplate against specified phase, two flagship campuses
MW
01,5003,0004,5006,0005,000UAE-US campusnameplate1,000UAE-US phasespecified200UAE-US tranchedated 20266,000HUMAIN Al-Saadnameplate0HUMAIN Al-Saadenergised
Source: G42 2025; UAE Embassy 2026; MEED 2026

G42’s own Novem­ber 2025 in­vent­ory of live su­per­com­put­ing as­sets does not in­clude it.

Two fur­ther cor­rec­tions apply to that pro­ject. The Star­gate brand has been re­tired from the cam­pus phase one. OpenAI has stepped back from other in­ter­na­tional Star­gate loc­a­tions and dropped the label from newer ef­forts, and the UAE-US AI Cam­pus no longer uses it for phase one (re­por­ted 4 Septem­ber 2026). Con­flict­ing sec­ond­ary claims of a Feb­ru­ary 2026 com­mis­sion­ing should be re­jec­ted in fa­vour of the ab­sence of any part­ner com­mis­sion­ing re­lease. So should one tracker that sim­ul­tan­eously lists the pro­ject as under con­struc­tion and as 1,000 mega­watts op­er­a­tional. Whether the first phase uses GB200 or GB300 sil­icon is un­re­solved in the pub­lic re­cord and is not as­ser­ted here.

Sovereign AIState of Play15 •

Announced, contracted, energised

An independent audit of thirteen Saudi and Emirati projects found none at the firm-connection gate and one in seven defining its own load basis.

The Gulf’s an­nounced pipeline has been audited once, and that audit car­ries much of the ar­gu­ment here. Madar Strategy, in re­search note 01 of 22 July 2026, ex­amined thir­teen Saudi and Emir­ati cases against a gross an­nounce­ment uni­verse of 4,000 mega­watts, a fig­ure the au­thor la­bels ex­pli­citly as not a mar­ket total. Of seven head­line pro­jects, one in seven defines in­form­a­tion-tech­no­logy load, three in seven meet the pro­ject-site test, and none pub­lishes firm con­nec­tion terms. Across all thir­teen cases, el­even sit at the low­est power-evid­ence gate with no pro­ject-spe­cific power evid­ence, one at the next and one above that. None reaches the firm-con­nec­tion or en­er­gised gates.

The in­di­vidual grad­ings are in­struct­ive. Star­gate UAE at 1,000 mega­watts is graded at the low­est gate on both dis­clos­ure and power. The Mi­crosoft and G42 Emir­ati ex­pan­sion at 200 mega­watts is graded at the low­est gate on dis­clos­ure, site and power. DataVolt at Oxagon, car­ry­ing a 1,500 mega­watt cam­pus name­plate, is site-iden­ti­fied only, with its latest mile­stone dated 10 Feb­ru­ary 2025. The au­thor’s own caveat must be car­ried with the find­ing, and is car­ried here: the audit does not es­tab­lish that any pro­ject is

Thirteen audited projects by power-evidence gate
cases
03.87.511.21511P0 no project powerevidence1P11P20P3 firm connection0P4 energised
Source: Madar Strategy, research note 01, 2026

can­celled, delayed, un­fun­ded or un­able to se­cure power. It es­tab­lishes only what is evid­enced.

The au­thor is an in­de­pend­ently pub­lished in­di­vidual ana­lyst rather than an in­sti­tu­tion, and the find­ing is cited as such. Its value is not au­thor­ity but method: it is the only pub­lished at­tempt to grade Gulf an­nounce­ments against power evid­ence rather than to ag­greg­ate them. Its con­clu­sion is cor­rob­or­ated struc­tur­ally by the ab­sence of a pub­lished con­nec­tion queue in Saudi Ar­a­bia, by the fact that of­fi­cial Saudi stat­ist­ics do not dis­ag­greg­ate data centre con­sump­tion at all, and by the un­awar­ded Kuwaiti sub­sta­tion con­tract.

  1. An­nounced. A press-re­lease name­plate, often cam­pus-level, often multi-coun­try, fre­quently un­dated. Not ca­pa­city.
Sovereign AIState of Play16 •
  1. Con­trac­ted. Sale­able design ca­pa­city sold for­ward, as with MEEZA’s 8 MW hy­per­scaler lease at a fa­cil­ity not yet built. A for­ward com­mit­ment, not plant.
  2. Fin­anced. Ex­ecuted debt and an awar­ded con­struc­tion con­tract. In the Gulf this gate is met by MEEZA in Qatar and by few oth­ers.
  3. Con­nec­ted. Firm con­nec­tion terms pub­lished or an en­er­gisa­tion date con­trac­ted. On the audited evid­ence, no Saudi or Emir­ati head­line pro­ject reaches this gate.
  4. En­er­gised. Built, powered, cooled, cer­ti­fied and car­ry­ing load. Still coun­ted in hun­dreds of mega­watts across the whole re­gion.

A reader who ap­plies those five gates to any Gulf an­nounce­ment will ar­rive at the low-mid fam­ily of es­tim­ates without need­ing a model. The prac­tical in­struc­tion, in the words of Data Cen­ter World Middle East, is to con­tract against en­er­gisa­tion dates rather than cam­pus mas­ter­plans. It should be noted along­side that an ar­ti­fi­cial-in­tel­li­gence train­ing rack draws above 100 kilo­watts against 5 to 10 kilo­watts for tra­di­tional equip­ment. That is why floor space counts tell a reader little about load.

The pre­amble adds the con­di­tion that de­term­ines what fol­lows. If the two en­tit­ies fail to be­come United States com­pan­ies on or be­fore 6 April 2027, they will need to apply for au­thor­isa­tion under the li­cens­ing pro­cess at sec­tion 748.3(c). Against that, eight United States-headquartered com­pan­ies and their sub­si­di­ar­ies re­ceive li­cence-free items and full Stra­tegic Trade Au­thor­iz­a­tion with no ex­piry: Amazon, Apple, Google, Meta, Mi­crosoft, OpenAI Group PBC, Or­acle and X.AI. The asym­metry is the

point. Amer­ican op­er­at­ors hold dur­able ac­cess; the Emir­ati na­tional cham­pion holds a five-month-dated au­thor­isa­tion con­di­tional on a change of dom­i­cile.

Chip access is entity-based

Only the Emirates holds a country rule, it names two companies, and its authorisation expires on 6 April 2027.

United States chip ac­cess to the Gulf is en­tity-based rather than coun­try-based, and the one coun­try frame­work that ex­ists car­ries an ex­piry date. The Bur­eau of In­dustry and Se­cur­ity final rule titled En­hanced Fa­vor­able Treat­ment for the United Arab Emir­ates was pub­lished at 91 Fed­eral Re­gister 43034 and took ef­fect on 10 July 2026. It cre­ates a new sup­ple­ment nam­ing ex­actly two Emir­ati com­mer­cial en­tit­ies, Group 42 Hold­ing Ltd, trad­ing as G42 and in­clud­ing G42 Cloud Tech­no­logy LLC, and Core42 Tech­no­logy Pro­jects LLC. Neither re­ceives Stra­tegic Trade Au­thor­iz­a­tion eli­gib­il­ity. The rule states ver­batim that ab­sent sub­sequent no­tice the au­thor­isa­tion for those two en­tit­ies shall auto­mat­ic­ally ex­pire on 6 April 2027.

Saudi Ar­a­bia has no coun­try frame­work at all. That find­ing was es­tab­lished by ex­haust­ive query of the Fed­eral Re­gister across all Bur­eau of In­dustry and Se­cur­ity doc­u­ments pub­lished from 1 Janu­ary 2026. The

Sovereign AIState of Play17 •

query re­turned 45 doc­u­ments, of which one is a Gulf rule, being the Emir­ati rule above. Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain and Oman have no rule, no pub­lished au­thor­isa­tion and no named en­tity. The prac­tical read­ing is that the King­dom’s ac­cess runs through li­cences is­sued to its Amer­ican coun­ter­parties and through case-by-case au­thor­isa­tions rather than through a pub­lished na­tional frame­work. That is a weaker po­s­i­tion than is gen­er­ally as­sumed of the re­gion’s largest pro­gramme.

2
UAE entities named
8
US companies, no expiry
6 Apr 2027
UAE authorisation expires
0
Saudi country frameworks

One widely used plan­ning fig­ure should be dis­carded. The claim that 500,000 chips a year would flow to the Emir­ates ori­gin­ates in Re­u­ters re­port­ing of 14 to 15 May 2025, cit­ing two un­named sources on a pre­lim­in­ary agree­ment still under ne­go­ti­ation. It ap­pears in no pub­lished gov­ern­ment doc­u­ment: not in the Com­merce frame­work text of 15 May 2025, not in the Bur­eau’s press re­lease of 10 July 2026, and not in the final rule it­self. It should not be used as a plan­ning fig­ure.

Key takeaways
  • The only Gulf coun­try rule cov­ers the UAE and names two en­tit­ies, G42 and Core42.
  • That au­thor­isa­tion ex­pires 6 April 2027 un­less the en­tit­ies be­come US com­pan­ies.
  • Eight US com­pan­ies hold equi­val­ent Gulf ac­cess with no ex­piry date.
  • Saudi Ar­a­bia, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain and Oman have no pub­lished coun­try frame­work.
  • The 500,000-chips-a-year fig­ure was never form­al­ised and should not be used.

The rule never rescinded

The AI Diffusion Rule still sits in the Code of Federal Regulations, unenforced by executive discretion and reactivatable without new rulemaking.

The strongest single fact sup­port­ing the polit­ical re­vers­ib­il­ity of Gulf com­pute ac­cess is that the in­stru­ment most com­ment­ary treats as re­pealed has never been res­cin­ded in the Fed­eral Re­gister. A full-text search for Ar­ti­fi­cial In­tel­li­gence Dif­fu­sion from 1 Janu­ary 2025 re­turns five doc­u­ments only. They are the two rules of 15 Janu­ary 2025 at 90 Fed­eral Re­gister 4544 and 90 Fed­eral Re­gister 5298, and the amend­ment of 14 Feb­ru­ary 2025 at 90 Fed­eral Re­gister 9604. The oth­ers are the Emir­ati rule of 14 July 2026 and the Uni­fied Agenda in­tro­duc­tion of 14 Au­gust 2026 at 91 Fed­eral Re­gister 52792. No pub­lished res­cis­sion or re­place­ment for 90 Fed­eral Re­gister 4544 ex­ists as of the last Bur­eau rule in­dexed, 24 Septem­ber 2026.

Sovereign AIState of Play18 •

What ex­ists in place of a res­cis­sion is a press re­lease of 13 May 2025 to­gether with a non-en­force­ment pos­ture. The Emir­ati rule it­self states that the Bur­eau is only en­for­cing the rel­ev­ant li­cence re­quire­ment to des­tin­a­tions in Coun­try Groups D:1, D:4 or D:5. That is en­force­ment dis­cre­tion rather than re­peal. The in­stru­ment there­fore sits in the Code of Fed­eral Reg­u­la­tions, un­en­forced by ex­ec­ut­ive choice, and re­act­ivat­able without new rule­mak­ing. Any Gulf com­pute plan with a ho­ri­zon bey­ond the cur­rent United States ad­min­is­tra­tion should be stress-tested against that fact.

The rule was not repealed. It was simply left unenforced, and it can be picked up again.

The stat­utory po­s­i­tion re­in­forces the same con­clu­sion. The GAIN AI Act was not en­acted. It passed the Sen­ate as an amend­ment to the fiscal year 2026 Na­tional De­fense Au­thor­iz­a­tion Act by 77 votes to 20 on 9 Oc­to­ber 2025, was ex­cluded by the House, and was stripped in con­fer­ence. It does not ap­pear in the en­acted Act. The White House op­posed it. The net stat­utory po­s­i­tion is that there is no en­acted stat­utory chip-ex­port con­straint on the Gulf, and the re­gime rests en­tirely on ex­ec­ut­ive dis­cre­tion. A re­por­ted fol­low-on, the AI OVERWATCH Act in the Sen­ate fiscal year 2027 bill, is un­veri­fied and is not re­lied upon here.

Two as­sump­tions about the reg­u­lat­ory en­vir­on­ment in­side the re­gion should also be cor­rec­ted. Saudi Ar­a­bia re­pealed its gov­ern­ment cloud

Quick facts · the policy instrument stack
AI Diffusion Rule90 FR 4544, 15 Jan 2025; in CFR, unenforced
RescissionPress release 13 May 2025; no FR rescission
UAE country rule91 FR 43034, effective 10 Jul 2026
GAIN AI ActSenate 77-20; stripped in conference, not enacted
Net positionNo statutory constraint; executive discretion only

loc­al­isa­tion man­date, mov­ing from the Na­tional Cy­ber­se­cur­ity Au­thor­ity’s cloud con­trols of 2020 to the 2024 re­vi­sion, which changes the res­id­ency cal­cu­lus for any party as­sum­ing a hard loc­al­isa­tion re­quire­ment. And xAI’s Gulf money came from the Qatar In­vest­ment Au­thor­ity rather than from MGX, a dis­tinc­tion that mat­ters when map­ping which sov­er­eign fund is ex­posed to which model de­veloper.

Circular capital, anchor tenants

The same institutions appear as investor, landlord and customer in the same transactions. That circularity is a structural feature of Gulf compute, not an anomaly.

Gulf ar­ti­fi­cial-in­tel­li­gence cap­ital is cir­cu­lar in a way that com­plic­ates both de­mand sig­nals and risk as­sess­ment. HUMAIN in­ves­ted three bil­lion dol­lars in xAI’s Series E, an­nounced in Feb­ru­ary 2026, in a round

Sovereign AIState of Play19 •

that raised twenty bil­lion dol­lars at a valu­ation of 230 bil­lion. xAI is sim­ul­tan­eously the an­chor cus­tomer of HUMAIN’s flag­ship. A sep­ar­ate agree­ment between the two parties cov­ers a data centre above 500 mega­watts, whose status, basis and com­mis­sion­ing date are all un­veri­fied. The in­vestor is also the off­taker. That holds on both sides of the trade.

The pat­tern re­peats at the asset level. HUMAIN an­chors 36 mega­watts of DataVolt’s 44 mega­watt Riy­adh East fa­cil­ity, more than 80 per cent of its planned ca­pa­city, sup­port­ing a pack­age of about 500 mil­lion dol­lars with banks ex­pec­ted to fund roughly three quar­ters of it. DataVolt is wholly owned by Vis­ion In­vest, so the cap­ital is private rather than gov­ern­ment, and NEOM is land­lord rather than com­pute buyer in the Oxagon pro­ject. A single an­chor com­mit­ment is there­fore doing the work of a fin­an­cing cov­en­ant, and the an­chor is the state-owned cham­pion.

The Emir­ates presents the same struc­ture through equity rather than ten­ancy. Mi­crosoft holds a 1.5 bil­lion dol­lar minor­ity stake in G42 and is sep­ar­ately a cus­tomer of Khazna, a G42-linked op­er­ator, through a 200 mega­watt ex­pan­sion an­nounced on 5 Novem­ber 2025. Mubadala speaks pub­licly for Star­gate UAE tim­ing. Core42, also G42-linked, is both a sov­er­eign cloud op­er­ator and a buyer of the chips its par­ent is named for in the Bur­eau of In­dustry and Se­cur­ity sup­ple­ment. Each re­la­tion­ship is dis­closed; the ag­greg­ate ex­pos­ure is not dis­closed any­where in one place.

Qatar shows a cleaner but still re­lated-party pat­tern. Syntys ac­quired Q Data QFZ LLC from Doha Ven­ture Cap­ital, the ven­ture sub­si­di­ary of the

Anchor concentration in financed Saudi capacity
MW, DataVolt Riyadh East
012.52537.55044Facility planned capacity36Anchored by HUMAIN8Uncommitted
Source: Enterprise AM, 2026

Qatar Free Zones Au­thor­ity, which makes the trans­ac­tion a state-linked asset trans­fer into an Oore­doo-carved-out vehicle rather than third-party ac­quis­i­tion. The price was not dis­closed. Kuwait’s only ar­ti­fi­cial-in­tel­li­gence fa­cil­ity is op­er­ated by that same Qatari group.

None of this is im­proper, and none of it is hid­den. The ana­lyt­ical con­sequence is nar­rower. In a mar­ket where the in­vestor, the land­lord and the off­taker are fre­quently the same in­sti­tu­tion or its af­fil­i­ates, a signed ca­pa­city com­mit­ment is weaker evid­ence of in­de­pend­ent de­mand than it would be in a mar­ket with arm’s-length ten­ants. De­mand should there­fore be tested against third-party con­trac­ted ca­pa­city, of which Qatar holds the clearest ex­amples, rather than against intra-group com­mit­ments.

Sovereign AIState of Play20 •

The colocation market actually built

Close to 95 per cent of Emirati capacity is delivered through colocation, and more than 85 per cent of hyperscaler power in the country sits inside someone else’s building.

Close to 95 per cent of total United Arab Emir­ates ca­pa­city is de­livered through coloca­tion mod­els, and self-built data centres ac­count for just 5.44 per cent of total ca­pa­city, ap­prox­im­ately 65 mega­watts. More than 85 per cent of hy­per­scaler in­form­a­tion-tech­no­logy power in the coun­try is de­ployed via coloca­tion rather than self-build. Ex­cept for Amazon Web Ser­vices, hy­per­scalers act­ive in the Emir­ates op­er­ate and ex­pand through leased space (DC Byte via Data Cen­ter Know­ledge, 19 Feb­ru­ary 2026). These are the most use­ful struc­tural num­bers in the Gulf re­cord.

Those two fig­ures also yield the most use­ful re­con­cili­ation key in this read. Di­vid­ing 65 mega­watts by 5.44 per cent gives a total tracked de­nom­in­ator of ap­prox­im­ately 1,195 mega­watts, roughly three times Knight Frank’s 376 mega­watt live print. The two are not in con­flict. DC Byte meas­ures total tracked sup­ply across all phases, while Knight Frank meas­ures live in­form­a­tion-tech­no­logy load only. The live-to-total mul­tiple in the Gulf’s most ma­ture mar­ket is there­fore about 3.2 times. That arith­metic is this

UAE capacity by delivery model
MW of tracked supply
03757501,1251,5001,130Colocation65Self-build
Source: DC Byte via Data Center Knowledge, 2026; Volge derivation

prac­tice’s own, de­rived from two fig­ures DC Byte pub­lished, and is la­belled as such.

Three fur­ther struc­tural facts fol­low from the same source. They bear on cost and sit­ing. Emir­ati power costs ap­prox­im­ately 0.11 dol­lars per kilo­watt-hour, nearly double Saudi Ar­a­bia and more than double Qatar. Re­new­able en­ergy ac­counts for only 5 per cent of the Emir­ati en­ergy mix, and sus­tain­ab­il­ity has not yet shaped Emir­ati site se­lec­tion or design at scale. En­ergy con­sump­tion is not cur­rently a bind­ing con­straint on Emir­ati growth, un­like Kuwait. The Emir­ates has, in ef­fect, chosen speed and re­li­ab­il­ity over price.

Geo­graphy is shift­ing in­side the coun­try. Dubai re­mains the primary com­mer­cial hub, but land and zon­ing con­straints in premium loc­a­tions are

Sovereign AIState of Play21 •

push­ing the mar­ket out­ward. Abu Dhabi is the fast­est-grow­ing stra­tegic re­gion for sov­er­eign and ar­ti­fi­cial-in­tel­li­gence-grade ca­pa­city, clus­ter­ing in KEZAD, Mas­dar City and the Ma­fraq De­vel­op­ment Zone. Ajman is emer­ging as a sec­ond­ary ar­ti­fi­cial-in­tel­li­gence-ready node, and Fu­jairah mat­ters for sub­sea con­nectiv­ity. Cush­man and Wake­field ranked Abu Dhabi third and Dubai eighth among primary mar­kets in Europe, the Middle East and Africa in May 2026. Dammam ranked fourth and Riy­adh sixth among sec­ond­ary mar­kets, with Doha second and Jed­dah third among ter­tiary mar­kets.

The im­plic­a­tion for a party seek­ing Gulf ca­pa­city is that the coun­ter­party is usu­ally a land­lord rather than a cloud. The ca­pa­city ques­tion is there­fore a leas­ing ques­tion, and the rel­ev­ant cov­en­ants are de­liv­ery dates, power pass-through and the land­lord’s own con­nec­tion po­s­i­tion rather than a vendor’s re­gional roadmap.

How double counting happens

The same physical plant is routinely counted twice: once by its owner and once by its operator. Two Gulf examples are documented.

Double count­ing through the own­er­ship stack is the most com­mon arith­metic error in Gulf ca­pa­city ag­greg­a­tion, and it oc­curs without any party mis­stat­ing its own po­s­i­tion. In Qatar, Syntys owns build­ings and

counts 26 mega­watts of live in­form­a­tion-tech­no­logy ca­pa­city, while Quantum Switch leases and op­er­ates those same build­ings and counts 10 mega­watts. Data Cen­ter Dy­nam­ics pub­lished a formal cor­rec­tion cla­ri­fy­ing that Quantum Switch leases the build­ings from Q Data and that the change of own­er­ship does not change its op­er­a­tions. The 10 mega­watts is al­most cer­tainly the same phys­ical plant as part of Q Data’s 12.5 mega­watts. The owner-level fig­ure should be pre­ferred. The two should never be summed.

In the Emir­ates the same error is avail­able at lar­ger scale. Hy­per­scaler ca­pa­city sits in­side coloca­tion op­er­at­ors’ num­bers, with more than 85 per cent of hy­per­scaler in­form­a­tion-tech­no­logy power de­ployed via coloca­tion, so adding a hy­per­scaler’s stated re­gional foot­print to a coloca­tion op­er­ator’s port­fo­lio double counts the same halls. Within the G42 group spe­cific­ally, Khazna’s stated 673 mega­watt port­fo­lio and Core42’s world­wide 150 mega­watts of man­aged de­ploy­ments must not be summed: both are group-linked and the over­lap risk is real.

  • Owner against op­er­ator. Syntys 26 MW owned against Quantum Switch 10 MW op­er­ated in Qatar: one plant, two ledgers.
  • Land­lord against ten­ant. Hy­per­scaler ca­pa­city in­side coloca­tion port­fo­lios in the Emir­ates, above 85 per cent of hy­per­scaler IT power.
  • Group against sub­si­di­ary. Khazna 673 MW port­fo­lio against Core42 150 MW world­wide, both G42-linked.
Sovereign AIState of Play22 •
  • Cloud re­gion against host. Azure Qatar Cent­ral runs with MEEZA, so Azure Qatar ca­pa­city must not be added to MEEZA’s fig­ure.
  • Gen­er­a­tion against load. Solar peak mega­watts presen­ted be­side data centre mega­watts in Bahrain and Oman.
One Qatari plant, two ledgers
MW
07.51522.53026Syntys, owner level12.5Q Data, acquired10Quantum Switch, operator
Source: Ooredoo and Quantum Switch disclosures, 2026

The cloud-re­gion case is coun­ter­in­tu­it­ive and needs stat­ing plainly. Mi­crosoft’s Azure Qatar Cent­ral re­gion has been live since Au­gust 2022 with MEEZA across three avail­ab­il­ity zones in Doha. Qatar’s Min­istry of Com­mu­nic­a­tions and In­form­a­tion Tech­no­logy signed a co­oper­a­tion agree­ment with MEEZA to ex­pand that re­gion by adding ca­pa­cit­ies of 4 and 6 mega­watts. That im­plies both that MEEZA’s un­named global hy­per­scaler is very prob­ably Mi­crosoft, and that Azure Qatar ca­pa­city must not be added on top of MEEZA’s pub­lished fig­ure. The pub­lic­a­tion date of that

min­istry item could not be veri­fied, be­cause the page is rendered in cli­ent-side script.

A re­lated class of error is the multi-coun­try port­fo­lio fig­ure at­trib­uted to a single state. Qareeb’s stated rol­lout of more than 50 mega­watts spans seven coun­tries. It is not Bahrain. O-Green’s tar­get of more than 200 mega­watts of ar­ti­fi­cial-in­tel­li­gence-ready ca­pa­city by 2028 spans Oman, Spain and other mar­kets and is not Oman. Syntys’ tar­get of more than 120 mega­watts of in­stalled ca­pa­city by 2030 spans Qatar, Kuwait, Oman, Iraq and Tunisia and is not a Qatar fig­ure. Gulf Data Hub’s claimed 90 mega­watts under con­struc­tion is group-wide, and no part of it should be at­trib­uted to Kuwait.

One en­tity error should be re­tired from the re­gional ledger en­tirely. Zankore, the Oore­doo, In­dosat, NVIDIA and Nokia neo­cloud, tar­gets South­east Asia and prin­cip­ally In­done­sia, with about 200 mega­watts of ini­tial ca­pa­city to be sourced from In­done­sian pro­viders for the first half of 2027. Count­ing it as Qatari sov­er­eign com­pute is a cat­egory error.

Qareeb’s stated rollout of more than 50 megawatts spans seven countries and is not Bahrain.
Sovereign AIState of Play23 •

The part in brief

  1. 01Saudi Arabia's one grid-connection datum is a tender of 4 May 2026 for a 2,000 megavolt-ampere bulk supply point, which is utility apparent power, not load.
  2. 02An audit of thirteen Saudi and Emirati cases on 22 July 2026 placed eleven at the lowest power-evidence gate and none at the firm-connection or energised gates.
  3. 03Owner and operator figures can describe the same halls, with Syntys counting 26 megawatts of live capacity and Quantum Switch 10 megawatts in buildings it leases.
  4. 04Close to 95 per cent of Emirati capacity is delivered through colocation and self-build accounts for 5.44 per cent, approximately 65 megawatts, so the counterparty is usually a landlord.
  5. 05HUMAIN invested three billion dollars in xAI while xAI anchors its flagship, and HUMAIN anchors 36 megawatts of DataVolt's 44 megawatt Riyadh East facility.
Sovereign AIState of Play24 •
The Mechanics

The Gulf’s largest announced compute project is documented by its switchgear, not its silicon.

03

The Gulf, State by State

Six markets, six evidence bases, and a concentration of capacity in two of them.

Saudi Arabia: the measured series

The Kingdom publishes the region’s only government capacity series, on an undefined basis, and four official 2030 targets that no authority has reconciled.

Saudi Ar­a­bia re­por­ted 467 mega­watts of op­er­a­tional ca­pa­city in the first quarter of 2026, up from 440 mega­watts in 2025, a rise the Min­istry of Com­mu­nic­a­tions and In­form­a­tion Tech­no­logy framed as more than 6 per cent. The pub­lished series runs 68 mega­watts in 2021, 440 mega­watts in 2025 and 467 mega­watts in the first quarter of 2026. It cov­ers more than 60 data centres built by over 20 com­pan­ies, with cu­mu­lat­ive in­vest­ment above 16 bil­lion riy­als, about 4.3 bil­lion dol­lars (Min­istry state­ment, 5 May 2026). The ratio of 467 to 440 re­pro­duces the Min­istry’s own growth fig­ure, so the pair is in­tern­ally con­sist­ent. Any source present­ing 440 mega­watts as cur­rent is one print be­hind.

The basis of that series is un­defined, its scope is in­ferred rather than stated, and the gap mat­ters. No defin­i­tion, no load-versus-gross state­ment and no meth­od­o­logy note has been pub­lished. The scope ap­pears to cover all own­ers, in­clud­ing coloca­tion, en­ter­prise and gov­ern­ment self-build. In­de­pend­ent meas­ure­ments of the same mar­ket show the res­ult­ing spread. Mordor In­tel­li­gence gives 410 mega­watts of

Saudi operational capacity, the government series
MW, basis undefined
01252503755006820214402025467Q1 2026
Source: Saudi Ministry of Communications and Information Technology, 2026

in­form­a­tion-tech­no­logy load for 2025, S&P Global above 300 mega­watts for 2025, and a tracker 290.5 mega­watts for 2024. Ar­izton gives 222 mega­watts of third-party coloca­tion power for the first quarter of 2025, and the In­ter­na­tional Data Cen­ter Au­thor­ity 440 mega­watts in July 2026.

One in­de­pend­ent primary meas­ure­ment ex­ists and should be used where an in­form­a­tion-tech­no­logy-load basis is re­quired. KAPSARC gives 290.5 mega­watts of in­stalled in­form­a­tion-tech­no­logy load across 58 fa­cil­it­ies in 2024, up from 122.4 mega­watts in 2023. Its 2024 geo­graphic split is Dammam 41 per cent, Riy­adh 38 per cent, Jed­dah 7 per cent and other loc­a­tions 14 per cent (dis­cus­sion paper DP00503, Decem­ber 2025). Mordor at 410 mega­watts of in­form­a­tion-tech­no­logy load against the

Sovereign AIState of Play25 •
Six measurements of one Saudi market
MW
MCIT, Q1 2026, undefined467IDCA, Jul 2026440Mordor, 2025, IT load410S&P Global, 2025, IT load300Tracker, 2024, operational290.5Arizton, Q1 2025, colocation222
Source: As tabulated by vision2030.ai, 2026

Min­istry at 467 mega­watts un­defined is con­sist­ent with the Min­istry count­ing gross power, or a wider owner set, or both.

The tar­get set is un­re­con­ciled, and the con­tra­dic­tion is not minor. Al­varez and Marsal’s base case gives 1.0 gigawatt by 2030, KAPSARC de­scribes 1.3 gigawatts as the na­tional tar­get, and the Min­istry and SDAIA Na­tional Data Cen­ter Strategy gives about 1.5 gigawatts by 2030. The In­ter­na­tional En­ergy Agency at­trib­utes 1.9 gigawatts by 2030 and 6.6 gigawatts by 2034 to SDAIA, while the Fund and Ara­mco give 3.0 gigawatts by 2030. The HUMAIN, AMD and Cisco joint ven­ture gives 1.9 gigawatts by 2030 and 6.0 gigawatts by 2034. Ar­izton gives 3.81 gigawatts of up­com­ing in­form­a­tion-tech­no­logy ca­pa­city with no date gate at all.

The un­ad­dressed policy con­tra­dic­tion is that HUMAIN’s 2030 in­terim fig­ure of 1.9 gigawatts ex­ceeds the en­tire na­tional 2030 tar­get of 1.5

gigawatts by 27 per cent, from a single com­pany. Either the na­tional strategy was over­taken within a year of pub­lic­a­tion and has not been re­stated, or the com­pany fig­ure will not be met. No Saudi au­thor­ity has ad­dressed the gap. Both can­not be cur­rent policy. The of­fi­cial na­tional num­ber also moved by 46 per cent in­side twelve months, from 1.3 to 1.9 gigawatts, which is it­self a reason to show all vin­tages rather than a single tar­get.

Saudi Arabia: the operator ledger

The hardest signed numbers in the Kingdom are a contractor’s stock-exchange disclosures. The softest is a gigawatt of telecommunications capacity that is not contracted.

Only a short list of Saudi rows car­ries evid­ence of en­er­gisa­tion. The list is led by stc and center3 in Riy­adh at 60 mega­watts on a fa­cil­ity basis, with Mo­bily above 100 mega­watts com­pany-stated across eight sites, of which 39 mega­watts is being built for ar­ti­fi­cial in­tel­li­gence. HUMAIN’s GroqCloud Dammam in­fer­ence re­gion is at about 50 mega­watts with ser­vice live. Google Cloud’s Dammam re­gion has been gen­er­ally avail­able since 15 Novem­ber 2023, and Or­acle’s Jed­dah and Riy­adh re­gions date from 2020 and 2024. Ara­mco’s Dammam-7

Sovereign AIState of Play26 •

high-per­form­ance com­puter at Dhahran is at 12 mega­watts, and KAUST’s Shaheen III at Thuwal at 8 mega­watts.

Two tracker fig­ures must be dis­carded from that ledger. Fig­ures of about 350 mega­watts for Google Dammam and about 400 mega­watts for Or­acle come from a third-party tracker rather than from either com­pany. Neither com­pany pub­lishes a Saudi ca­pa­city fig­ure, and if both fig­ures were real they would alone ex­ceed the Min­istry’s en­tire 467 mega­watt na­tional total. This is the clearest ex­ample in the Gulf data­set of tracker fig­ures that can­not be re­con­ciled with a na­tional ag­greg­ate, and it is a reason to treat tracker totals for every state in this read with cau­tion.

The hard­est signed num­bers in the Saudi set be­long to a con­tractor. Al Moam­mar In­form­a­tion Sys­tems dis­closed to Tadawul on 23 Decem­ber 2025 an award from HUMAIN to design and build a private ar­ti­fi­cial-in­tel­li­gence data centre. It was val­ued at above 155 per cent of its 2024 total rev­enue in­clud­ing value-added tax, which on 2024 rev­enue of about 1.21 bil­lion riy­als im­plies roughly 1.88 bil­lion riy­als, about 501 mil­lion dol­lars. That fig­ure is de­rived from a per­cent­age-of-rev­enue dis­clos­ure rather than stated by the com­pany. The award was ex­pan­ded on 20 Septem­ber 2026 from 50 to 250 mega­watts, at above 689 per cent of 2025 total rev­enue in­clud­ing tax, about 8.76 bil­lion riy­als. It is ex­ecuted through suc­cess­ive work or­ders is­sued by HUMAIN, with the third and fourth dis­closed in Oc­to­ber 2026.

Saudi committed and announced capacity, selected items
MW
0125250375500480SDAIAHexagon,…250MIS forHUMAIN,…200KhaznaDammam, land…187ICS Arabia /China Mobile100EquinixJeddah, IT…50AWS AI Zoneby 202844DataVoltRiyadh East
Source: Company and exchange disclosures, 2025 to 2026

The struc­tural point about that con­tract is that 689 per cent of rev­enue is a ceil­ing rather than booked back­log, and the work-order struc­ture is it­self evid­ence of phas­ing. Other rows sit in the com­mit­ted column. SDAIA’s Hexagon in Riy­adh is at 480 mega­watts, found­a­tion stone laid in Janu­ary 2026 to a Tier IV cer­ti­fied design with dir­ect li­quid and hy­brid cool­ing, basis not stated. DataVolt at NEOM Oxagon has a 1,500 mega­watt cam­pus and a first phase re­por­ted vari­ously at 300 and 360 mega­watts for 2028. Sahayeb is at 24 mega­watts ini­tial and 120 mega­watts ex­pand­able, one of only two Saudi rows in the ledger that states an in­form­a­tion-tech­no­logy-load basis. Equinix is at 100 mega­watts in Jed­dah, also ex­pli­citly in­form­a­tion-tech­no­logy load, in pre-de­vel­op­ment.

Sovereign AIState of Play27 •

The most over-stated item in Saudi cov­er­age is the stc ar­range­ment. A memor­andum of un­der­stand­ing signed on 18 Decem­ber 2025 via center3 con­tem­plates up to 1,000 mega­watts, struc­tured as HUMAIN 51 per cent and stc 49 per cent, with an ini­tial phase of up to 250 mega­watts de­pend­ing on cus­tomer com­mit­ments. A Tadawul fil­ing of 18 June 2026 dis­closed a six-month ex­ten­sion rather than an ex­ecuted agree­ment, cit­ing out­stand­ing reg­u­lat­ory and op­er­a­tional re­quire­ments, with stc stat­ing no sig­ni­fic­ant fin­an­cial im­pact and ex­piry fall­ing on or about 18 Decem­ber 2026. One gigawatt of stc ca­pa­city is not con­trac­ted. It is also a single ex­ten­sion, so the char­ac­ter­isa­tion of re­peated delay is not sup­por­ted by the fil­ings.

Hy­per­scaler status di­vides cleanly between live and an­nounced. Or­acle in Jed­dah and Riy­adh, Google Cloud in Dammam and Alibaba Cloud in Riy­adh through the Saudi Cloud Com­put­ing Com­pany joint ven­ture are live. The Amazon Web Ser­vices Saudi re­gion is an­nounced only, at 5.3 bil­lion dol­lars an­nounced on 13 May 2025 and stated as on track to launch in Decem­ber 2026. It is the only hy­per­scaler Saudi cap­ital fig­ure veri­fied to a primary vendor re­lease. Mi­crosoft’s Azure Saudi Ar­a­bia East was struc­tur­ally com­plete in Decem­ber 2024 with cus­tomer work­loads tar­geted for the fourth quarter of 2026, a two-year gap between con­crete and en­d­point in one of the most cap­able op­er­at­ors in the mar­ket. The as­so­ci­ated AWS ar­ti­fi­cial-in­tel­li­gence zone, at up to 50 mega­watts by 2028, is about 1.7 per cent of the three-gigawatt tar­get and should not be presen­ted as a mean­ing­ful ca­pa­city block.

The UAE: base and nameplate

The Emirates has the Gulf’s cleanest measured base, its largest announced nameplate, and the widest gap between the two.

The United Arab Emir­ates pub­lishes, through Knight Frank, the only Gulf ca­pa­city fig­ure ac­com­pan­ied by a pub­lished basis gloss­ary. Live ca­pa­city sur­passed 376 mega­watts with 19.2 mega­watts of new ca­pa­city com­ing on­line dur­ing 2025, against a na­tional va­cancy rate of 2.4 per cent, one of the low­est in Europe, the Middle East and Africa (Knight Frank, 14 Oc­to­ber 2025). The basis is in­form­a­tion-tech­no­logy load, ex­pli­citly, and the scope is live coloca­tion only, since Knight Frank defines ag­greg­ate sup­ply sep­ar­ately as live plus planned. The 19.2 mega­watt fig­ure should be car­ried for­ward. It is the or­ganic coloca­tion growth rate.

Later prints move the base up­ward without chan­ging its shape. ValuStrat re­por­ted more than 400 mega­watts of op­er­a­tional coloca­tion in July 2026, the largest base in the Gulf, along­side more than 30 bil­lion dol­lars of an­nounced ar­ti­fi­cial-in­tel­li­gence and data centre in­vest­ment. Ar­izton via Re­search and Mar­kets cor­rob­or­ated more than 400 mega­watts and over 45 per cent of total Gulf op­er­a­tional in­form­a­tion-tech­no­logy power on 27 Oc­to­ber 2026. Knight Frank’s Data Centre Atlas 2026 gives ex­ist­ing ca­pa­city above 400 mega­watts and a pipeline of about 1.8 gigawatts. The Knight Frank series should be pre­ferred. It ap­plies a single con­sist­ent meth­od­o­logy across two vin­tages.

Sovereign AIState of Play28 •
Four live-capacity prints for the UAE
MW
0125250375500250C&W, Jul 2025, narrow376Knight Frank, Oct 2025400Knight Frank Atlas, Jun2026430R&M, Oct 2026, MEAscope
Source: Cushman and Wakefield 2025; Knight Frank 2025 and 2026

Against that base sits the largest name­plate in the re­gion. The five-gigawatt UAE-US AI Cam­pus in Abu Dhabi is of­fi­cially sourced but its basis is not stated. Only the first one-gigawatt cluster is spe­cified. Of that, only 200 mega­watts is dated to 2026. Strip­ping the cam­pus out nar­rows the Emir­ati 2030 range to roughly 0.5 to 1.8 gigawatts, and that re­sid­ual gap is purely live-only against all-phases meas­ure­ment. The en­tire Emir­ati di­ver­gence is there­fore at­trib­ut­able to one pro­ject, whose re­main­ing four gigawatts has no phas­ing, no fin­an­cing de­tail and no com­mis­sion­ing dates.

Three dif­fer­ent 200 mega­watt fig­ures cir­cu­late for Abu Dhabi and are routinely con­flated. The first is Star­gate UAE phase one, de­veloped by Khazna for OpenAI and Or­acle, with chips not yet de­livered. The second is a sep­ar­ate Mi­crosoft 200 mega­watt ex­pan­sion de­livered through Khazna

as part of Mi­crosoft’s 15.2 bil­lion dol­lar Emir­ati in­vest­ment. The third is loose mar­ket com­ment­ary. Mi­crosoft’s 1.5 bil­lion dol­lar minor­ity stake in G42 is a fourth and sep­ar­ate item. The cam­pus first 200 mega­watts and Star­gate’s phase-one 200 mega­watts ap­pear to be the same tranche, but no source dis­tin­guishes them, so they must not be added.

Key takeaways
  • Knight Frank’s 376 MW live print, on a stated IT-load basis, is the Gulf’s clean­est meas­ure­ment.
  • Or­ganic coloca­tion growth ran at 19.2 MW in 2025; AI load added nearly 20 MW to Feb­ru­ary 2026.
  • The whole UAE 2030 di­ver­gence is one pro­ject: the 5 GW Abu Dhabi cam­pus.
  • Three sep­ar­ate 200 MW fig­ures cir­cu­late for Abu Dhabi and must be kept apart.
  • The cam­pus is re­cip­rocal: the UAE will fin­ance or build equi­val­ent fa­cil­it­ies in the United States.

Two fea­tures of the cam­pus bear hold­ing in view. The Emir­ates will fin­ance or build equi­val­ent fa­cil­it­ies in the United States, which makes the ar­range­ment re­cip­rocal rather than straight­for­ward in­ward in­vest­ment, and the pro­ject draws on nuc­lear, solar and gas gen­er­a­tion. The foot­print claim of ten square miles ap­pears only in sec­ond­ary re­port­ing and is un­veri­fied. Taken to­gether with the mas­ter­plan re­vi­sion de­scribed in chapter seven, the cam­pus should be treated as a pro­gramme under act­ive re­design rather than as a fixed quant­ity of ca­pa­city on a known date.

Sovereign AIState of Play29 •

The UAE: what is not disclosed

The largest Gulf operator declines to publish information-technology load, and the leading sovereign cloud publishes two incompatible chip counts.

Khazna provides the only real oc­cu­pancy proxy in the Gulf, and it must be used care­fully. Its first stan­dalone en­vir­on­mental, so­cial and gov­ernance re­port, pub­lished 6 Oc­to­ber 2026, states that Khazna leads the Gulf mar­ket with more than 450 mega­watts of con­trac­ted ca­pa­city. That ca­pa­city sits across 28 owned and op­er­ated data centres and two leased, 30 fa­cil­it­ies in total, of which 24 are cer­ti­fied by the Up­time In­sti­tute. Its pub­lic web­site states a 673 mega­watt port­fo­lio with 30 live data centres and six on­go­ing pro­jects. Four hun­dred and fifty of 673 is about 67 per cent of port­fo­lio mega­watts con­trac­ted, leav­ing roughly 223 mega­watts un­con­trac­ted or under con­struc­tion.

That ratio car­ries heavy caveats and should be read as a con­trac­ted-to-port­fo­lio ratio rather than an oc­cu­pancy rate. The two fig­ures are dif­fer­ent, un­defined met­rics from two doc­u­ments, and the 673 may in­clude ca­pa­city under con­struc­tion. Khazna’s live port­fo­lio is it­self con­tested. S&P Global Mar­ket In­tel­li­gence re­por­ted 25 fa­cil­it­ies and over 360 mega­watts op­er­at­ing in Oc­to­ber 2025, while sec­ond­ary re­port­ing in Decem­ber 2025 claimed 30 live data centres totalling al­most 650 mega­watts. The

com­pany’s own doc­u­ments give the two fig­ures above. The S&P 360 mega­watts should be pre­ferred as a sourced op­er­at­ing floor, 650 mega­watts should be marked un­veri­fied, and no single live fig­ure should be pub­lished as fact.

Khazna: four figures, four definitions
MW
02505007501,000360Operating, S&P, Oct2025450Contracted, ESG report673Portfolio, website1,000Five-year expansion
Source: S&P Global 2025; Khazna ESG report and website, 2026

Khazna re­fuses to dis­close in­form­a­tion-tech­no­logy load, and does so ex­pli­citly. Its re­port states that the com­pany re­ports the met­ric for mech­an­ical cool­ing load, and that in­form­a­tion-tech­no­logy loads are tracked and ac­coun­ted for in cli­ents’ con­sump­tion re­ports. The re­port adds that the mech­an­ical load fig­ure should not be read as total elec­tri­city con­sump­tion or total op­er­a­tional emis­sions. The hy­po­thesis that power-usage-ef­fect­ive­ness re­port­ing forces in­form­a­tion-tech­no­logy-load dis­clos­ure there­fore does not hold in this mar­ket. Its pipeline is more than one gigawatt of

Sovereign AIState of Play30 •

op­er­a­tional ex­pan­sion over five years, an­nounced on 14 Oc­to­ber 2025. More than 400 mega­watts of that is in in­ter­na­tional mar­kets in­clud­ing Saudi Ar­a­bia and Italy, leav­ing under 600 mega­watts of the in­cre­ment do­mestic.

Core42 does not dis­close how much com­pute is in­stalled and en­er­gised as dis­tinct from ordered. Its pub­lished met­rics are all la­belled world­wide rather than Emir­ati. They run to more than 150 mega­watts of man­aged de­ploy­ments, 76,000 graph­ics pro­cessing units de­scribed as de­ployed or planned, nine global data centres, 310 ex­a­flops, 20 mil­li­seconds to first token and more than ten bil­lion tokens weekly. The same page, read on 4 Novem­ber 2026, states in fea­ture copy that cus­tom­ers may ac­cess more than 86,000 units across sov­er­eign data centres glob­ally. Two pub­lished fig­ures from one page on one day dif­fer by 10,000 units. Neither should be used as an in­stalled count.

No per-op­er­ator Emir­ati mega­watt fig­ure could be ob­tained for Equinix, Moro Hub or G42 and Core42 in­di­vidu­ally. What is known at fa­cil­ity level is par­tial. Khazna’s QAJ1 in Ajman is at 100 mega­watts across twenty five-mega­watt halls with air-as­sisted dir­ect-to-chip li­quid cool­ing from day one. The owner it­self moved ini­tial-phase com­ple­tion from a third-quarter 2025 tar­get to Decem­ber 2026, a slip of roughly fif­teen months. Khazna AUH4 at Ma­fraq and AUH8 run to 60 mega­watts com­bined, and Moro Hub’s solar-powered Warsan fa­cil­ity is above 100 mega­watts planned, with phase two ap­proved by DEWA in Janu­ary 2026. The Mi­crosoft and

du fa­cil­ity at 544 mil­lion dol­lars car­ries no pub­lished mega­watt fig­ure, and the cap­ital fig­ure it­self ap­pears only in a re­search table at study stage.

Qatar: the only financed pipeline

Qatar has the smallest credible installed base of the three large programmes and the only Gulf pipeline backed by executed debt and an awarded construction contract.

De­fens­ible live Qatari ca­pa­city in 2026 is ap­prox­im­ately 40 to 45 mega­watts, built as MEEZA at 18 mega­watts plus Syntys at 26 mega­watts of live in­form­a­tion-tech­no­logy ca­pa­city. Both are op­er­ator-pub­lished 2026 fig­ures, but on mixed bases: Syntys states in­form­a­tion-tech­no­logy load, while MEEZA’s basis is un­stated and car­ries an at-full-oc­cu­pancy qual­i­fier, which means design or sale­able ca­pa­city rather than en­er­gised and util­ised load. The fig­ure should be presen­ted as a range rather than a point, and neither Quantum Switch’s 10 mega­watts nor Azure Qatar should be added to it.

The cross-checks on each op­er­ator are good by re­gional stand­ards. MEEZA’s 18 mega­watts fol­lows a four-mega­watt ex­pan­sion handed over on 21 June 2026 on sig­na­ture of the ready-for-ser­vice cer­ti­fic­ate, nine months ahead of the con­trac­tual dead­line, across more than 871,000 work­ing hours with no lost-time in­cid­ent. Its prior baseline of 14

Sovereign AIState of Play31 •

mega­watts across M-Vault 1 to 5 was stated ex­pli­citly as in­form­a­tion-tech­no­logy ca­pa­city. The sum of 14 and 4 re­con­ciles. Syntys’ 26 mega­watts fol­lows the ac­quis­i­tion of Q Data QFZ LLC, which brought 12.5 mega­watts of hy­per­scale ca­pa­city, 5 live and 7.5 under de­vel­op­ment, across two Tier III cer­ti­fied car­rier-neut­ral fa­cil­it­ies in the Qatar Free Zones. Group-level con­firm­a­tion on the third-quarter call of 2 Novem­ber 2026 gives Syntys 34 mega­watts of act­ive ca­pa­city across Qatar, Kuwait and Tunisia, with Qatar about 88 per cent of that.

Qatar: live capacity and contracted increments
MW
012.52537.55026Syntys live IT, Qatar18MEEZA at full occupancy26Syntys underconstruction44MEEZA further pipeline
Source: MEEZA and Ooredoo disclosures, 2026

Qatar’s pipeline is bet­ter evid­enced than any other small Gulf state’s be­cause it is fin­anced. MEEZA’s M-Vault 6, 7 and 8 add about 44 mega­watts, tak­ing the com­pany to more than 60 mega­watts over three years from a 2026 base. The Um Garn cam­pus is at 24 mega­watts total, with its first 6

mega­watts tar­geted op­er­a­tional by end-2027, and M-Vault 7 at 16 mega­watts is in final design. Fund­ing is a 1.6 bil­lion riyal Com­mod­ity Mura­baha fa­cil­ity from Dukhan Bank, about 439 mil­lion dol­lars, long-term and Sharia-com­pli­ant, agreed in Au­gust 2026 and ad­di­tional to an ex­ist­ing fa­cil­ity. A con­struc­tion con­tract above 500 mil­lion riy­als, about 137 mil­lion dol­lars, was awar­ded to El­eg­an­cia Con­tract­ing and In­dus­tries at Qatar Sci­ence and Tech­no­logy Park, an­nounced via the Qatar Stock Ex­change on 24 Septem­ber 2026. No mega­watt fig­ure was stated in that award. None should be at­tached to it.

For­ward con­tract­ing is the other dis­tin­guish­ing fea­ture. MEEZA signed an eight-mega­watt hy­per­scaler lease on 7 Septem­ber 2026 above one bil­lion riy­als, about 270 to 275 mil­lion dol­lars, its largest con­tract to date, at a new cam­pus. That is con­trac­ted ca­pa­city at a fa­cil­ity not yet built, a for­ward com­mit­ment rather than in­stalled plant. Ten­ant iden­tity and dur­a­tion are un­dis­closed, as are pri­cing, the de­liv­ery sched­ule and the site. Earlier phases ran at four mega­watts con­trac­ted in 2025 and de­livered in June 2026, and six mega­watts worth above 750 mil­lion riy­als signed in Oc­to­ber 2025. It is not dis­closed whether the four, six and eight mega­watt con­tracts are with the same coun­ter­party; Mi­crosoft is strongly im­plied but un­con­firmed.

Fore­casts for Qatar should come from the op­er­at­ors rather than from re­search houses. The re­search-house fig­ures con­tra­dict each other. Ar­izton gives about 120 mega­watts of util­ised in­form­a­tion-tech­no­logy power by

Sovereign AIState of Play32 •

2030, ex­pli­citly a de­mand-side util­isa­tion meas­ure im­ply­ing a lar­ger in­stalled base, while a dif­fer­ent Ar­izton re­port gives 27 mega­watts of power ca­pa­city for 2031. The 27 mega­watts is ir­re­con­cil­able with MEEZA’s fin­anced 60 mega­watts alone. A sep­ar­ate 120 mega­watt fig­ure, Syntys’ tar­get by 2030, is a MENA-wide num­ber across Qatar, Kuwait, Oman, Iraq and Tunisia and is not a Qatar fig­ure. No na­tional Qatari mega­watt tar­get ap­pears to exist in the pub­lic re­cord at all.

MEEZA contracted increments, by value
QAR m
05001,0001,5002,0003504 MW, 20257506 MW, Oct 20251,0008 MW, Sep 20261,600Dukhan facility, Aug2026
Source: MEEZA disclosures, 2025 to 2026

That one fa­cil­ity is also the coun­try’s only ar­ti­fi­cial-in­tel­li­gence site. Oore­doo Kuwait an­nounced the na­tion’s first ar­ti­fi­cial-in­tel­li­gence-en­abled data centre with NVIDIA on H200 ac­cel­er­at­ors on 9 Novem­ber 2025 in Kuwait City. An im­port­ant qual­i­fier ap­pears in the com­pany’s own re­lease. The H200 units had only just begun to be in­stalled at an­nounce­ment.

Com­pet­ing fig­ures for the same site give one mega­watt on one dir­ect­ory and ten mega­watts on a tracker. The in­vestor deck fig­ure should be pre­ferred and the ten-mega­watt fig­ure should not be used.

Kuwait: the substation gate

Kuwait has two announced hyperscaler regions, one issuer-sourced megawatt figure, and three transformer stations that were not confirmed as contracted at the time of writing.

Kuwait is ma­ter­i­ally worse evid­enced than any other Gulf state, and should be re­por­ted with ex­pli­cit un­cer­tainty or not at all. No op­er­ator-pub­lished mega­watt fig­ure could be veri­fied for any Kuwaiti fa­cil­ity ex­cept one. The most solid data point is a fa­cil­ity count of five data centres at the start of March 2026. A sep­ar­ate dir­ect­ory-based ac­count lists four, op­er­ated by Zajil Tele­com, stc and Oore­doo. The only is­suer-sourced mega­watt fig­ure is two mega­watts, from Oore­doo’s own in­vestor deck of Novem­ber 2025. It is now a year old.

Everything else in Kuwait is un­veri­fied on mega­watts. One tracker gives five mega­watts for a Zain fa­cil­ity in Kuwait City and marks it veri­fied. A sec­ond­ary over­view dated Oc­to­ber 2026 states plainly that no re­li­able pub­lic source ex­ists for the ca­pa­city of Zain’s Shuwaikh fa­cil­ity, and that Zain’s sus­tain­ab­il­ity re­port­ing con­tains no Kuwait-spe­cific fa­cil­ity sheet. One

Sovereign AIState of Play33 •

tracker against an ex­pli­cit state­ment that no pub­lic source ex­ists is not suf­fi­cient, and five mega­watts should not be pub­lished. No fig­ure was loc­ated for stc Kuwait and Qual­itynet, Zajil Tele­com, Kuwait Fin­ance House or the Na­tional Bank of Kuwait. The reg­u­lator is not a ca­pa­city source. No li­cence re­gister and no pub­lished ca­pa­city stat­ist­ics exist.

Kuwait: the one issuer figure against the estimates
MW
02550751002Issuer-sourced live10Tracker operational19Arizton 2029 forecast90Tracker known capacity
Source: Ooredoo investor deck 2025; Arizton 2026; tracker 2026

The gat­ing item is elec­trical. Kuwait’s Min­istry of Elec­tri­city and Water is pro­cur­ing three 132/11 kilo­volt main trans­former sta­tions at Al-Mut­laa, Su­laib­iya and north of South Saad Al-Ab­dul­lah City, at an es­tim­ated cost above 22 mil­lion dinars, about 71.5 mil­lion dol­lars. The tender dead­line was set for 4 Janu­ary 2026, post­poned to 20 Janu­ary and then to 10 Feb­ru­ary 2026, with a Septem­ber 2026 re­port ex­pect­ing con­tract award in the fourth quarter. As at 4 Novem­ber 2026 the con­struc­tion con­tract was not

con­firmed as awar­ded. Kuwait’s hy­per­scaler re­gions can­not en­er­gise until those sub­sta­tions are built.

The hard­est avail­able Kuwaiti num­ber il­lus­trates the basis prob­lem ex­actly. A gov­ern­ment of­fi­cial stated that the three sta­tions will have a total ca­pa­city of 72 mega­watts and that Google re­ques­ted 60 mega­watts, 20 mega­watts for each centre. That is grid or util­ity sup­ply, ex­pli­citly, since these are trans­former sta­tions. The 60 mega­watts is a re­ques­ted sup­ply fig­ure, not in­form­a­tion-tech­no­logy load and not in­stalled ca­pa­city, and the load be­hind it would be sub­stan­tially lower. Google’s re­gion re­mains under de­vel­op­ment, with land se­cured under a lease signed with the reg­u­lator in Decem­ber 2024 at 12.6 mil­lion dinars over twenty years and ap­proved by the State Audit Bur­eau. Mi­crosoft’s an­nounced Kuwaiti re­gion, from a part­ner­ship of 6 March 2025, car­ries no timeline and no in­vest­ment com­mit­ment. The 50 mega­watt fig­ure at­tached to it on one tracker is not a Mi­crosoft fig­ure.

Two fur­ther Kuwaiti items should be handled with care. Di­gitus DC, a sub­si­di­ary of Hayat Com­mu­nic­a­tions, provides coloca­tion host­ing of sev­eral un­quan­ti­fied mega­watts for Google at Al-Mut­laa, po­ten­tially worth up to 50 mil­lion dol­lars. It is a bridge ar­range­ment rather than the re­gion it­self, and the site is not op­er­a­tional. The one-gigawatt Om­niva claim, ori­gin­at­ing about 2023 and fun­ded privately, should be ex­cluded from every pipeline total. Satel­lite im­agery from 2026 shows work on­go­ing with most of the site un­developed, and the com­pany’s own web­site lists no act­ive data

Sovereign AIState of Play34 •

centres. Gulf Data Hub plans about three Kuwaiti fa­cil­it­ies at around 80,000 square feet each with no mega­watt fig­ure, and no part of its claimed 90 mega­watts group-wide should be at­trib­uted to Kuwait.

As at 4 November 2026 the construction contract was not confirmed as awarded.

Bahrain and Oman

Bahrain’s installed capacity went backwards in 2026. Oman has the region’s most developed policy architecture and almost no operating compute.

Bahrain is the one Gulf mar­ket whose in­stalled ca­pa­city fell dur­ing 2026. Its veri­fi­able op­er­ator-dis­closed coloca­tion base on 4 Novem­ber 2026 is in the low tens of mega­watts. Batelco by Beyon at Hamala is at 2.75 mega­watts across 250 racks, Tier III, live since 2021 and powered en­tirely by re­new­able en­ergy fol­low­ing phase three of the Beyon Solar Park. A re­por­ted 3.0 mega­watts is given for stc Bahrain in Man­ama, on a third-party ag­greg­ator list­ing of low con­fid­ence, and the Beyon White Space fa­cil­ity, Ka­laam and Gulf Data Hub are at un­dis­closed mega­watts. The com­mis­sioned White Space fa­cil­ity at Beyon Data Oasis, 6,000 square

metres, is leased long-term to and op­er­ated by Qareeb Data Cen­ters and pub­lishes no load fig­ure.

The reason ca­pa­city went back­wards is the Amazon Web Ser­vices write-off de­scribed in chapter seven. The mega­watt size of me-south-1 was never pub­lished by Amazon. A 60 mega­watt fig­ure and a 70 mega­watt na­tional total ap­pear on one tracker whose page re­turned empty on dir­ect fetch, with no vendor, reg­u­lator or re­search-house con­firm­a­tion. On third-party track­ers Amazon was the ma­jor­ity of Bahrain’s tracked ca­pa­city, which is why the write-off mat­ters. Even if 60 mega­watts was once cor­rect, it is not in­stalled op­er­a­tional ca­pa­city in Novem­ber 2026, and the 70 mega­watt na­tional fig­ure should not be used.

Bahrain’s for­ward coloca­tion pipeline is about 68 mega­watts of in­form­a­tion-tech­no­logy load added across 2026 to 2031, on a third-party coloca­tion scope that ex­cludes hy­per­scaler, en­ter­prise and gov­ern­ment self-build and un­fin­anced ar­ti­fi­cial-in­tel­li­gence cam­puses. The same pub­lisher, on the same page and in the same edi­tion, also gives power ca­pa­city of 14 mega­watts for 2031 along­side a mar­ket size of 226 mil­lion dol­lars in 2025 rising to 393 mil­lion in 2031. The res­ol­u­tion ad­op­ted here is that 14 mega­watts is an in­cre­mental ad­di­tion in the 2031 re­port­ing year and 68 mega­watts is cu­mu­lat­ive across six years. The 14 mega­watt fig­ure is in­tern­ally con­sist­ent with the dol­lar and floor-area fig­ures in the same table, and 53,000 square feet can­not host 68 mega­watts of load. The pub­lisher la­bels neither. Neither should be cited as a stan­dalone na­tional ca­pa­city fig­ure.

Sovereign AIState of Play35 •
Bahrain and Oman: operator-disclosed against announced
MW
01002003004002.8Batelco Hamala,live3stc Bahrain,reported10Oman Data Park,total capacity150Oman: RINAconsortium,…400Oman: MubbadrahSalalah, announced
Source: Operator disclosures and announcements, 2025 to 2026

Bahrain has no pub­lished na­tional ar­ti­fi­cial-in­tel­li­gence strategy. The Min­is­ter of Trans­port­a­tion and Tele­com­mu­nic­a­tions con­firmed that his min­istry was de­vel­op­ing one at MEET ICT and BITEX 2026 on 27 to 28 Oc­to­ber 2026. No of­fi­cial Bahraini ca­pa­city fig­ure ex­ists from the reg­u­lator, the Eco­nomic De­vel­op­ment Board or the min­istry, so the in­stalled fig­ure rests en­tirely on op­er­ator dis­clos­ures and com­mer­cial re­search. Or­acle ap­pears through Beyon Solu­tions’ Or­acle Alloy sov­er­eign ar­range­ment with the In­form­a­tion and eGovernment Au­thor­ity, an­nounced in early Novem­ber 2025 with cap­ital, ca­pa­city, host­ing loc­a­tion and go-live all un­dis­closed: that is a cloud-res­id­ency con­tract, not ar­ti­fi­cial-in­tel­li­gence com­pute. There is no Mi­crosoft or Google re­gion in the coun­try.

Oman’s in­stalled base is roughly 10 to 20 mega­watts across about el­even third-party coloca­tion fa­cil­it­ies, mostly Tier III, across seven loc­a­tions. The only op­er­ator-at­trib­uted fig­ure is Oman Data Park’s total ca­pa­city of over 10 mega­watts, with a stated plan to double to 20 mega­watts in five to ten years. That fig­ure is sourced from a trade-body re­pub­lic­a­tion of a com­pany in­ter­view rather than an audited dis­clos­ure. The op­er­at­ing en­tity has changed name and own­er­ship. Oman Data Park was rebranded Otech in early 2026 with Oman­tel tak­ing full own­er­ship, and the Omani gov­ern­ment holds 51 per cent of Oman­tel. Equinix launched SN1 in Sala­lah with Oman­tel in Novem­ber 2024 with no mega­watt fig­ure pub­lished. Claims that Omani cloud cam­puses have been up­graded with H200 ac­cel­er­at­ors rest on a single stale third-party source and are marked un­veri­fied.

Oman’s an­nounced pipeline ex­ceeds its in­stalled ca­pa­city by roughly thirty to fifty times and none of it is fin­anced. A Mub­bad­rah-led con­sor­tium signed a frame­work agree­ment for up to 400 mega­watts at Sala­lah at three bil­lion dol­lars dur­ing the Sul­tan’s United King­dom state visit in late Oc­to­ber 2026. The con­sor­tium’s own ac­count dis­closes no com­mit­ted fin­an­cing and no elec­tri­city sup­ply ar­range­ments. It gives no con­struc­tion timetable, no first-phase ca­pa­city and no load basis. A sep­ar­ate 400 mega­watts of solar and stor­age in the same pro­ject is gen­er­a­tion and must not be double coun­ted. Yamna signed a stra­tegic co­oper­a­tion agree­ment with the min­istry for a first phase stated above one bil­lion pounds with no ca­pa­city fig­ure of any basis, no ten­ants and no timeline. A

Sovereign AIState of Play36 •

150 mega­watt pro­ject was an­nounced in May 2026 by an Italian-Omani group with no site, fin­an­cing or com­mis­sion­ing date. O-Green’s tar­get of more than 200 mega­watts by 2028 spans Oman, Spain and other mar­kets and must not be at­trib­uted to Oman. There is no Duqm ar­ti­fi­cial-in­tel­li­gence or data centre pro­ject. Omani activ­ity is in Sala­lah and in the Seeb AI Spe­cial Zone under Royal De­cree 50/2026.

The Omani policy ar­chi­tec­ture ad­vanced again dur­ing 2026, and still with no mega­watt at­tached to it. OPAZ con­firmed through its quarterly Duqm Eco­nom­ist that the ar­ti­fi­cial-in­tel­li­gence zone will oc­cupy about 104,000 square metres in the Wilayat of Seeb, be­side the Civil Avi­ation Au­thor­ity build­ing near Mus­cat In­ter­na­tional Air­port (Oman Ob­server, 2026). That was the first of­fi­cial word on the site. The au­thor­ity's board has been told to ap­point a de­veloper in co­ordin­a­tion with the Min­istry of Trans­port, Com­mu­nic­a­tions and In­form­a­tion Tech­no­logy. The im­ple­ment­a­tion roadmap was still being draf­ted at the time of writ­ing. Data centres ap­pear on the tar­get-sec­tor list along­side semi­con­duct­ors and ro­bot­ics. A tar­get list is not a load.

A private op­er­ator has now been li­censed, which is fur­ther than any Omani ca­pa­city fig­ure has trav­elled. Afouq In­vest­ment and De­vel­op­ment United said in early May 2026 that it held a li­cence to de­velop and op­er­ate a plot of roughly 105,000 square metres in­side the zone. It had been en­trus­ted at Comex 2025 with a first phase of 100,000 square metres car­ry­ing about 100 mil­lion rial of en­vis­aged in­flows along­side Egypt's Prime Group (Oman

Ob­server, 2026). The li­cence names semi­con­duct­ors and quantum com­put­ing as the sec­tors it will court. It names no com­pute at all. The five-year plan ex­pects the di­gital eco­nomy to reach about 4.2 per cent of gross do­mestic product, which is a share of out­put rather than a plant.

Bahrain's for­ward case is bet­ter evid­enced in dol­lars and square metres than in load, which is the same prob­lem in an­other cur­rency. The king­dom's Eco­nomic De­vel­op­ment Board de­scribes stc Bahrain build­ing a park above 55,000 square metres within a 300 mil­lion dol­lar in­vest­ment. Batelco is work­ing with Qareeb Data Centres under a 250 mil­lion dol­lar com­mit­ment on a Man­ama site above 140,000 square metres (Ar­a­bian Gulf Busi­ness In­sight, 2025). Neither of those is a mega­watt. The same ac­count car­ries a third-party fore­cast of about 66 mega­watts of in­form­a­tion-tech­no­logy power added across 2024 to 2029, and an of­fi­cial ex­pect­ing tens of mega­watts for data centres within eight months of Oc­to­ber 2025. That win­dow has since closed with no en­er­gisa­tion fig­ure pub­lished.

Oman Observer put it best: a significant infrastructure plan, not evidence that capacity is already operational.
Sovereign AIState of Play37 •

The part in brief

  1. 01Published Saudi 2030 targets run from 1.0 to 3.0 gigawatts, and HUMAIN's interim 1.9 gigawatts exceeds the national target of about 1.5 gigawatts by 27 per cent.
  2. 02Emirati live capacity surpassed 376 megawatts with 19.2 megawatts added during 2025 and vacancy at 2.4 per cent, on the only Gulf figure carrying a published basis.
  3. 03Qatar holds the Gulf's only financed pipeline, with MEEZA's 1.6 billion riyal Murabaha facility of August 2026 and a construction contract above 500 million riyals awarded.
  4. 04Kuwait's hyperscaler regions cannot energise until three main transformer stations are built, and that construction contract was not confirmed as awarded on 4 November 2026.
  5. 05Bahrain's installed capacity fell during 2026 after a written-off cloud region, while Oman's announced pipeline exceeds its installed base roughly thirty to fifty times and is unfinanced.
Sovereign AIState of Play38 •
The Gulf, State by State

Oman Observer put it best: a significant infrastructure plan, not evidence that capacity is already operational.

04

The Read to 2030

Which family of estimates to prefer, what could break the build, and how to contract into it.

The 2030 reconciliation

The low family should be preferred: about 3.3 gigawatts across the Gulf by 2030, stated as a range, on an information-technology-load basis, with every component dated.

The pre­ferred es­tim­ate is a Gulf total of roughly 3.3 gigawatts by 2030. It is com­posed of Saudi Ar­a­bia at about 1.5 gigawatts, the United Arab Emir­ates at about 1.2 to 1.8 gigawatts, and the other four states at about 200 to 300 mega­watts com­bined. It should be stated as a range, on an in­form­a­tion-tech­no­logy-load basis, with each com­pon­ent date-stamped to its pub­lisher. That fig­ure is con­sist­ent with FTI Con­sult­ing via Arab News on 21 Au­gust 2025, and with ValuStrat’s ex­pect­a­tion that ca­pa­city triples by 2030. It also matches Knight Frank’s re­gional tra­ject­ory of 1.2 gigawatts at end-2025, 2.2 gigawatts in 2026 and 3.2 gigawatts in 2027.

Five reas­ons sup­port that pref­er­ence, in order of weight. First, it is the only fam­ily anchored on a meas­ured base rather than on an­nounce­ments. Saudi Ar­a­bia has a dated gov­ern­ment series and the Emir­ates has a basis-defined live print, while the high fam­ily has no base at all. Second, the run-rate test dis­cip­lines it. The na­tional Saudi tar­get already re­quires 218 mega­watts a year sus­tained for five years against roughly 94 de­livered, and the 2034 pipeline re­quires about 700. Third, the in­de­pend­ent audit of

Middle East capacity trajectory, the low-mid family
GW
012341.2End 20252.220263.22027
Source: Knight Frank Global Data Centres Forecast 2026

thir­teen Saudi and Emir­ati cases found no pro­ject at the firm-con­nec­tion or en­er­gised gate. Fourth, the grid-con­nec­tion re­cord is ab­sent in ex­actly the places the high fam­ily de­pends upon. Fifth, two in­de­pend­ent con­struc­tions of the low fam­ily agree, while the high fam­ily re­con­ciles with noth­ing, in­clud­ing it­self.

The per-state spreads show where the di­ver­gence lives. Saudi Ar­a­bia runs from 1.0 to about 4.3 gigawatts, a spread of 4.3 times, which rep­res­ents three or four dif­fer­ent ob­jects rather than three es­tim­ates of one. The Emir­ates runs from about 0.47 gigawatts to above 5 gigawatts, a spread above ten times, al­most en­tirely at­trib­ut­able to one cam­pus. Qatar runs 27 to 120 mega­watts, a spread of 4.4 times cre­ated by one pub­lisher con­tra­dict­ing it­self. Kuwait runs 19 to 90 mega­watts on a basis dif­fer­ence

Sovereign AIState of Play39 •

between grid sup­ply and load. Bahrain runs 14 to 70 mega­watts, where the high fig­ure is simply dead. Oman runs 18 to above 550 mega­watts, a spread above thirty times, which is the an­nounced-against-fin­anced prob­lem in its purest form.

Preferred 2030 composition against the announced sum
GW
03.87.511.2151.5Saudi Arabia, preferred1.5UAE, preferred midpoint0.3Other four states12Announced sum, allstates
Source: Volge synthesis of publisher ranges, 2026

Sec­ond­ary pref­er­ences should be ap­plied by use case. For in­stalled ca­pa­city, prefer Knight Frank for the Emir­ates as the only source with a pub­lished basis gloss­ary, the Saudi min­istry for the King­dom with an ex­pli­cit un­defined-basis caveat, and op­er­ator dis­clos­ures for the four small states. For fin­anced pipeline, prefer MEEZA’s Qatari fig­ures, which are the only Gulf num­bers backed by ex­ecuted debt and an awar­ded con­struc­tion con­tract. For any­thing la­belled 2030 ar­ti­fi­cial-in­tel­li­gence ca­pa­city,

prefer noth­ing: re­port the an­nounce­ment with its date, its pub­lisher and the words an­nounced, not fin­anced.

If a single con­ver­sion key is un­avoid­able, the live-to-total-tracked mul­tiple of about 3.2 times should be used. Ap­plied in re­verse to a twelve-gigawatt an­nounced pipeline it im­plies about 3.7 gigawatts even­tu­ally live, which lands al­most ex­actly on the 3.3 gigawatt es­tim­ate. The two fam­il­ies are re­con­cil­able and the re­con­cili­ation factor is about three.

The case for the high numbers

The high family is poorly evidenced, not impossible. Four arguments can be made for it, and each is testable.

The case for the high es­tim­ates de­serves to be stated at its strongest. The first ar­gu­ment con­cerns dis­clos­ure. The audit evid­ence is about dis­clos­ure rather than de­liv­ery, and the au­thor of the thir­teen-case audit states ex­pli­citly that it does not es­tab­lish that any pro­ject is can­celled, delayed, un­fun­ded or un­able to se­cure power. A state-owned de­veloper with sov­er­eign-fund back­ing has little com­mer­cial reason to pub­lish con­nec­tion terms. Ab­sence of pub­lished evid­ence is there­fore weaker evid­ence of ab­sence here than it would be in a lis­ted-util­ity mar­ket.

The second ar­gu­ment is that cap­ital is genu­inely present and in mo­tion. Ara­mco con­trib­uted about 9.9 bil­lion riy­als in cash in 2026 alone, and

Sovereign AIState of Play40 •

MEEZA has ex­ecuted a 1.6 bil­lion riyal fa­cil­ity and awar­ded con­struc­tion. HUMAIN has is­sued suc­cess­ive work or­ders to a lis­ted con­tractor against a ceil­ing of about 8.76 bil­lion riy­als. The Emir­ates has more than 30 bil­lion dol­lars of an­nounced ar­ti­fi­cial-in­tel­li­gence and data centre in­vest­ment, and Khazna has com­mit­ted to more than one gigawatt of ex­pan­sion over five years. Cap­ital of that order does not guar­an­tee de­liv­ery, but it is not a press re­lease either.

The third ar­gu­ment is that the re­gion is adding ca­pa­city in in­cre­ments far lar­ger than those re­flec­ted in his­tor­ical run rates. Khazna’s Ajman fa­cil­ity is a single 100 mega­watt site. Al Moam­mar’s award moved from 50 to 250 mega­watts in nine months, and SDAIA’s Hexagon is 480 mega­watts in one build­ing. If even a minor­ity of such items en­er­gise on sched­ule, the de­livered rate steps up dis­con­tinu­ously rather than con­tinu­ing a four-year trend line. A fourth ar­gu­ment fol­lows. De­mand ap­pears to be real. Emir­ati va­cancy was 2.4 per cent in 2025, among the low­est in Europe, the Middle East and Africa, and Khazna re­ports about 67 per cent of port­fo­lio mega­watts con­trac­ted.

Key takeaways
  • The audit es­tab­lishes an ab­sence of dis­clos­ure, not an ab­sence of cap­ab­il­ity.
  • Ex­ecuted debt, ex­change-dis­closed work or­ders and cash con­sid­er­a­tion are all present in the re­cord.
  • Ca­pa­city is now ar­riv­ing in 100 to 480 MW in­cre­ments, which breaks trend-line pro­jec­tion.
  • UAE va­cancy at 2.4 per cent and Khazna con­tract­ing at about 67 per cent sug­gest real de­mand.
  • Cush­man and Wake­field judges an AI in­fra­struc­ture bubble un­likely, be­cause fric­tions con­strain over­build­ing.
EMEA operational capacity against committed pipeline
GW
03.87.511.21512.1Operational, H1 20263.8Under construction14.5Planned
Source: Cushman and Wakefield, 14 September 2026

The widest com­par­at­ive study in the mar­ket does not ex­pect over­sup­ply either. Cush­man and Wake­field, across 107 mar­kets, judges that an ar­ti­fi­cial-in­tel­li­gence in­fra­struc­ture bubble ap­pears un­likely be­cause struc­tural fric­tions con­strain over­build­ing, while sim­ul­tan­eously find­ing that the pro­por­tion of real­ist­ic­ally de­liv­er­able pipeline in Europe, the Middle East and Africa is de­clin­ing. Those two find­ings to­gether de­scribe a mar­ket that

Sovereign AIState of Play41 •

under-de­liv­ers against its pipeline without col­lapsing, which is the cent­ral ex­pect­a­tion of this read.

Each of those ar­gu­ments is test­able, and the tests should be run on a known cal­en­dar. Cer­tain items would move this read to­wards the high fam­ily. They are a part­ner com­mis­sion­ing re­lease for the Abu Dhabi cam­pus phase one, a HUMAIN an­nounce­ment of en­er­gisa­tion at Riy­adh or Dammam, and award of the Kuwaiti sub­sta­tion con­tract. The oth­ers are a pub­lished Saudi con­nec­tion queue or a defined na­tional ca­pa­city basis, and an ex­ecuted stc and HUMAIN joint ven­ture be­fore the memor­andum ex­pires on or about 18 Decem­ber 2026. None had oc­curred as at 4 Novem­ber 2026.

What could break the build

Five risks are documented rather than speculative: power, policy reversibility, physical security, circular demand and the expiry of entity authorisations.

The first risk is power. It is already bind­ing in two states. Kuwait can­not en­er­gise its hy­per­scaler re­gions until three trans­former sta­tions are built. That con­tract was un­con­firmed as awar­ded at the time of writ­ing, with no major new Kuwaiti gen­er­a­tion ex­pec­ted be­fore 2028. Saudi Ar­a­bia pub­lishes no con­nec­tion queue and its of­fi­cial stat­ist­ics do not

dis­ag­greg­ate data centre con­sump­tion at all, so the de­liv­ery sched­ule of its pipeline can­not be ex­tern­ally veri­fied. The largest item in that pipeline is evid­enced by a bulk sup­ply point tender.

The second risk is policy re­vers­ib­il­ity. The AI Dif­fu­sion Rule sits in the Code of Fed­eral Reg­u­la­tions, un­en­forced by ex­ec­ut­ive dis­cre­tion and re­act­ivat­able without new rule­mak­ing, and no stat­utory con­straint was en­acted to re­place it. The third is the ex­piry built into the one coun­try frame­work that ex­ists. The au­thor­isa­tion for G42 and Core42 ex­pires auto­mat­ic­ally on 6 April 2027 un­less those en­tit­ies be­come United States com­pan­ies, in which case they must apply through the stand­ard li­cens­ing pro­cess. Both risks are polit­ical rather than phys­ical, and neither is within the con­trol of any Gulf op­er­ator.

6 Apr 2027
UAE entity authorisation expires
18 Dec 2026
stc and HUMAIN MoU expiry
Early 2027
Next AWS Bahrain update promised
Q4 2026
Kuwait substation award expected

The fourth risk is phys­ical se­cur­ity, which entered the column in 2026 and has already des­troyed ca­pa­city. Three fa­cil­it­ies were dam­aged and one re­gional foot­print was writ­ten off with per­man­ent data loss. The op­er­ator ad­vised cli­ents to con­sider mi­grat­ing work­loads out of the re­gion. The largest Emir­ati mas­ter­plan is being re­con­sidered, with air de­fences and partly un­der­ground con­struc­tion under dis­cus­sion. The cost and

Sovereign AIState of Play42 •

tim­ing con­sequences of that re­design are not de­term­in­able from the pub­lic re­cord.

The fifth risk is the cir­cu­lar­ity of de­mand. Where the in­vestor, the land­lord and the an­chor ten­ant are the same in­sti­tu­tion or its af­fil­i­ates, a signed com­mit­ment car­ries less in­form­a­tion about in­de­pend­ent de­mand. HUMAIN in­ves­ted three bil­lion dol­lars in xAI while xAI an­chors HUMAIN’s flag­ship; HUMAIN an­chors more than 80 per cent of a third party’s fin­anced fa­cil­ity; Mi­crosoft holds equity in G42 and leases from its af­fil­i­ate. None of this is im­proper and all of it is dis­closed, but a mar­ket whose de­mand is sub­stan­tially intra-group is more ex­posed to a single spon­sor’s change of plan than its con­trac­ted-ca­pa­city fig­ures sug­gest.

  1. Power. Un­awar­ded sub­sta­tions in Kuwait; no pub­lished con­nec­tion queue in Saudi Ar­a­bia; bulk sup­ply points years ahead of load.
  2. Policy. An un­rescin­ded rule in the CFR and no en­acted stat­ute; ac­cess rests on ex­ec­ut­ive dis­cre­tion.
  3. Ex­piry. The UAE en­tity au­thor­isa­tion lapses on 6 April 2027 ab­sent a change of dom­i­cile or new no­tice.
  4. Se­cur­ity. Three fa­cil­it­ies dam­aged, one re­gion writ­ten off, one mas­ter­plan under re­design.
  5. Cir­cu­lar­ity. An­chor de­mand con­cen­trated in the same in­sti­tu­tions that fund and host the ca­pa­city.

A sixth item is not a risk but a dis­clos­ure gap with the same prac­tical ef­fect. The largest op­er­ator in the re­gion de­clines to pub­lish

in­form­a­tion-tech­no­logy load. The lead­ing sov­er­eign cloud pub­lishes two chip counts dif­fer­ing by 10,000 units on the same page on the same day. The flag­ship Saudi vehicle pub­lishes noth­ing ma­chine-veri­fi­able and has twice de­clined to dis­close loc­a­tions or de­liv­er­ies. A mar­ket that can­not be meas­ured can­not be un­der­writ­ten on its own fig­ures, whatever the un­der­ly­ing phys­ical po­s­i­tion.

The cost and timing consequences of that redesign are not determinable from the public record.

Contract against energisation

The practical instruction for any buyer, lender or landlord is to replace masterplan language with energisation dates and stated measurement bases.

The single most use­ful op­er­at­ing rule in this mar­ket is to con­tract against en­er­gisa­tion dates rather than cam­pus mas­ter­plans. That for­mu­la­tion be­longs to Data Cen­ter World Middle East, and the reas­on­ing be­hind it is the whole of this read. Us­able ca­pa­city is what has been built, en­er­gised and cooled, and then cer­ti­fied and con­nec­ted. New ca­pa­city ar­rives in in­cre­ments of 100 to 200 mega­watts. Those in­cre­ments are gated by grid in­ter­con­nec­tion and gen­er­a­tion rather than by land or cap­ital.

Sovereign AIState of Play43 •

A second rule fol­lows for any­one quot­ing a fig­ure. Re­quire the basis in writ­ing. Of seven audited head­line pro­jects, one defined in­form­a­tion-tech­no­logy load. Two Saudi rows in the en­tire na­tional ledger state their basis, being Sahayeb and Equinix Jed­dah. Knight Frank and Ar­izton pub­lish defin­i­tions and should be pre­ferred for that reason alone. Where a basis is not stated, the fig­ure should be car­ried with the words basis not stated, which is what this read does through­out.

  1. Ask what the mega­watt meas­ures. IT load, gross fa­cil­ity power, grid sup­ply, con­trac­ted design ca­pa­city or an­nounce­ment. The spread across those bases ex­ceeds two times.
  2. Ask for the con­nec­tion po­s­i­tion. A firm con­nec­tion offer or an en­er­gisa­tion date, not a sub­sta­tion tender and not a mas­ter­plan.
  3. Sep­ar­ate owner from op­er­ator. Count the plant once, at owner level, and never sum a land­lord with its ten­ant.
  4. Dis­count multi-coun­try fig­ures to the state in ques­tion. Sev­eral of the re­gion’s largest head­line num­bers span five or more coun­tries.
  5. Date every fig­ure. Sev­eral na­tional fig­ures moved by double di­gits in­side twelve months, and one mar­ket’s ca­pa­city fell.
  6. Treat solar gen­er­a­tion as gen­er­a­tion. Peak mega­watts of photo­vol­taic ca­pa­city are not in­form­a­tion-tech­no­logy load.

A third rule con­cerns coun­ter­party con­cen­tra­tion. Khazna, stc and Gulf Data Hub to­gether rep­res­ent more than half of total Gulf in­form­a­tion-tech­no­logy power ca­pa­city, and close to 95 per cent of Emir­ati ca­pa­city is

de­livered through coloca­tion. A buyer con­tract­ing for Gulf ca­pa­city is there­fore usu­ally con­tract­ing with a land­lord whose own po­s­i­tion de­pends on a util­ity con­nec­tion and, in one case, on an en­tity au­thor­isa­tion ex­pir­ing in April 2027. Those de­pend­en­cies should ap­pear in the con­tract as con­di­tions, not as as­sump­tions.

A fourth rule con­cerns re­si­li­ence, and it is new. Single-re­gion de­ploy­ment in this mar­ket now car­ries a doc­u­mented pre­ced­ent of per­man­ent data loss. Amazon Web Ser­vices was un­able to re­store re­sources and data hos­ted ex­clus­ively in one Gulf re­gion, and dam­age ex­ceeded what re­gional and multi-zone ser­vices were de­signed to with­stand. Multi-re­gion ar­chi­tec­ture, with at least one re­gion out­side the Gulf, has moved from best prac­tice to a min­imum stand­ard on the evid­ence of 2026.

Contract against energisation dates, not campus masterplans.

The second ab­sence is the op­er­a­tional status of HUMAIN’s Riy­adh and Dammam ar­ti­fi­cial-in­tel­li­gence factor­ies. Both broke ground in Au­gust 2025. A second-quarter 2026 go-live was stated. The quarter closed with no launch an­nounce­ment, and in­de­pend­ent track­ers still class both as under con­struc­tion. No pub­lic evid­ence con­firms that they opened, and the com­pany has twice de­clined to dis­close loc­a­tions or chip de­liv­er­ies. The third ab­sence is any part­ner com­mis­sion­ing re­lease for Star­gate UAE

Sovereign AIState of Play44 •

or the Abu Dhabi cam­pus phase one, con­firmed by read­ing the lead part­ner’s news­room index cur­rent to 2 Novem­ber 2026.

What is not known

The largest gaps in this market are absences rather than disagreements, and several of them sit at the centre of the largest programmes.

What could not be es­tab­lished mat­ters here as much as what could. The largest ab­sence is the basis of Saudi Ar­a­bia’s na­tional ca­pa­city series. No defin­i­tion, no load-versus-gross state­ment and no meth­od­o­logy note ac­com­pan­ies the 68, 440 and 467 mega­watt prints. The choice between in­form­a­tion-tech­no­logy load and gross fa­cil­ity power changes every de­rived Saudi fig­ure by 20 to 50 per cent. That gap sits be­neath the re­gion’s largest pro­gramme. It sits be­neath every tar­get in cir­cu­la­tion.

The fourth group of ab­sences is na­tional. No of­fi­cial ca­pa­city fig­ure ex­ists for Bahrain or Oman from any reg­u­lator, in­vest­ment au­thor­ity or min­istry, so both na­tional fig­ures rest en­tirely on op­er­ator dis­clos­ure and com­mer­cial re­search. No Qatari na­tional mega­watt tar­get ap­pears in the pub­lic re­cord. Kuwait’s reg­u­lator main­tains no li­cence re­gister and pub­lishes no ca­pa­city stat­ist­ics, so far as could be es­tab­lished. Four of six Gulf states there­fore can­not be meas­ured from of­fi­cial sources at all.

Quick facts · the principal gaps
Saudi series basisUndefined; shifts derived figures by 20 to 50 per cent
HUMAIN factoriesNo evidence of go-live; still classed under construction
Abu Dhabi campus phase oneNo commissioning release from any of six partners
Khazna IT loadExplicitly not disclosed; cooling load reported instead
Core42 installed GPUsTwo published counts differing by 10,000 units
Kuwait capacityOne issuer figure, 2 MW, a year old
Qatar national targetNone located in the public record
Bahrain AI strategyNot published; in development as at October 2026

The fifth group con­cerns fig­ures that exist but should not be used. The 500,000-chips-a-year Emir­ati fig­ure was never form­al­ised. The one-gigawatt Om­niva claim in Kuwait has no op­er­at­ing plant. The 70 mega­watt Bahrain na­tional total is dom­in­ated by a writ­ten-off re­gion. A 10 mega­watt tracker fig­ure for Kuwait’s ar­ti­fi­cial-in­tel­li­gence fa­cil­ity con­tra­dicts the only is­suer dis­clos­ure. A 350 mega­watt Google Dammam fig­ure and a 400 mega­watt Or­acle Saudi fig­ure, if both were real, would ex­ceed the en­tire Saudi na­tional total. A re­por­ted Ir­a­nian strike on the Bahrain site in July 2026 could not be con­firmed and is not used.

The final ob­ser­va­tion is meth­od­o­lo­gical. Sev­eral of the con­flicts in this data­set are in­ternal to a single pub­lisher. The same re­search house gives

Sovereign AIState of Play45 •

27 mega­watts and 120 mega­watts for Qatar, 14 mega­watts and 68 mega­watts for Bahrain, and 18 mega­watts and about 80 mega­watts for Oman, with two dif­fer­ent Emir­ati fig­ures pub­lished on the same day. Where a pub­lisher con­tra­dicts it­self, op­er­ator and gov­ern­ment dis­clos­ures should be pre­ferred. Where those are ab­sent the hon­est an­swer is a range with its reason stated.

A 10 megawatt tracker figure for Kuwait’s artificial-intelligence facility contradicts the only issuer disclosure.

The read to 2030

The Gulf will build a substantial compute base by 2030 and will not build the one it has announced. The gap is about three times and it is mostly power.

The Gulf en­er­gises of the order of 3.3 gigawatts of in­form­a­tion-tech­no­logy load by 2030 on the cent­ral ex­pect­a­tion here, against about 880 mega­watts op­er­a­tional in 2026 and about twelve gigawatts an­nounced. That is roughly a quad­rupling of the in­stalled base in four years, which would be a sub­stan­tial in­dus­trial achieve­ment by any meas­ure, and

it is also roughly a quarter of what has been an­nounced. Both state­ments are true at once, and most com­ment­ary on this mar­ket picks one of them.

The three numbers that describe the Gulf in 2030
GW of IT load
03.87.511.2150.9Operational, 20263.3Expected, 203012Announced
Source: Volge synthesis, 2026

The dis­tri­bu­tion is ex­pec­ted to re­main highly con­cen­trated. Saudi Ar­a­bia and the Emir­ates held more than 85 per cent of op­er­a­tional ca­pa­city in 2026, and noth­ing in the evid­ence sug­gests that share fall­ing. Qatar’s fin­anced pipeline takes one op­er­ator above 60 mega­watts, while Kuwait’s de­pends on three un­awar­ded sub­sta­tions. Bahrain’s pipeline is coloca­tion-only and its base has fallen, and Oman’s an­nounce­ments are un­fin­anced. The four small states to­gether are ex­pec­ted to hold 200 to 300 mega­watts in 2030, against roughly 75 to 105 mega­watts today.

Three dates will test this read. All fall be­fore the end of 2027. The stc and HUMAIN memor­andum ex­pires on or about 18 Decem­ber 2026, which will

Sovereign AIState of Play46 •

show whether a gigawatt of tele­com­mu­nic­a­tions-linked ca­pa­city con­verts into an ex­ecuted joint ven­ture. The Kuwaiti sub­sta­tion award, ex­pec­ted in the fourth quarter of 2026, de­term­ines whether two hy­per­scaler re­gions can en­er­gise at all. The en­tity au­thor­isa­tion for G42 and Core42 ex­pires on 6 April 2027. That date will show whether the Emir­ati cham­pion re­lo­cates its dom­i­cile, ob­tains fresh no­tice, or moves to case-by-case li­cens­ing.

Two fur­ther dates mat­ter for the in­stalled re­cord rather than for policy. Amazon Web Ser­vices prom­ised a fur­ther up­date on the Bahrain and Emir­ati loss po­s­i­tions in early 2027, which will de­term­ine whether any of that ca­pa­city re­turns. And the Amazon Saudi re­gion, stated as on track for Decem­ber 2026, to­gether with Mi­crosoft’s Saudi re­gion tar­geted for the fourth quarter of 2026, would mark the first ma­ter­ial hy­per­scaler self-build ca­pa­city in the King­dom if both land on sched­ule.

The struc­tural con­clu­sion is that the Gulf is build­ing a coloca­tion and in­fer­ence mar­ket with sov­er­eign brand­ing, not yet a fron­tier train­ing mar­ket. Live train­ing ca­pa­city in Saudi Ar­a­bia is ef­fect­ively nil; the op­er­at­ing base is coloca­tion, two pub­lic cloud re­gions, two re­search clusters and one in­fer­ence re­gion. The Emir­ates de­liv­ers close to 95 per cent of its ca­pa­city through coloca­tion and more than 85 per cent of its hy­per­scaler load through leased space. That is a real and in­vestable mar­ket. It is a dif­fer­ent mar­ket from the one de­scribed by the an­nounce­ment re­cord, and it is gated by the grid.

A desert full of servers is being built. It is about a quarter of the desert that was announced.

Key takeaways

Nine conclusions for the people who must act on this market.

  1. The di­ver­gence is defin­i­tional. About 3.3 GW meas­ured against about 12 GW an­nounced is the dif­fer­ence between en­er­gised load and summed name­plate, not a dis­pute between fore­casters.
  2. HUMAIN’s of­fi­cial tar­get is 3 GW by 2030. Stated jointly by PIF at 51 per cent and Ara­mco at 49 per cent on 1 Novem­ber 2026, against the 6 GW widely re­por­ted, which is a cam­pus en­vel­ope.
  3. Power is the bind­ing con­straint, not chips. Kuwait’s re­gions can­not en­er­gise until three un­awar­ded sub­sta­tions are built, and the largest Saudi pro­ject is doc­u­mented by a 2,000 MVA bulk sup­ply point tender.
  4. An­nounced, con­trac­ted and en­er­gised are three ledgers. Of thir­teen audited Saudi and Emir­ati pro­jects, none evid­enced a firm con­nec­tion and one in seven defined its load basis.
Sovereign AIState of Play47 •
  1. The basis ques­tion pre­cedes the ca­pa­city ques­tion. Six meas­ure­ment bases cir­cu­late and the spread between them ex­ceeds two times; Saudi Ar­a­bia’s na­tional series has no pub­lished basis at all.
  2. The re­gion builds coloca­tion, not train­ing. Live Saudi train­ing ca­pa­city is ef­fect­ively nil, and close to 95 per cent of Emir­ati ca­pa­city is de­livered through coloca­tion.
  3. Chip ac­cess is en­tity-based and dated. One coun­try rule ex­ists, it names G42 and Core42, and that au­thor­isa­tion ex­pires on 6 April 2027; eight US com­pan­ies hold equi­val­ent ac­cess with no ex­piry.
  4. The policy re­gime is re­vers­ible. The AI Dif­fu­sion Rule sits un­rescin­ded in the CFR, un­en­forced by dis­cre­tion, and no stat­utory con­straint was en­acted in its place.
  5. Phys­ical se­cur­ity now des­troys ca­pa­city. Three fa­cil­it­ies were dam­aged in 2026, one re­gional foot­print was writ­ten off with per­man­ent data loss, and Bahrain’s in­stalled base fell.

Nine con­clu­sions sur­vive the evid­ence, and they are not the nine that most Gulf com­ment­ary of­fers. First, the head­line di­ver­gence re­solves. The factor is about three. It is the live-to-total-tracked mul­tiple de­rived from Emir­ati data, so the two fam­il­ies of es­tim­ates de­scribe one mar­ket at two gates. Second, the re­gion’s meas­ured op­er­a­tional base in 2026 is of the order of 880 mega­watts, with Saudi Ar­a­bia and the Emir­ates hold­ing more than 85 per cent of it and three op­er­at­ors hold­ing more than half. Third, every pub­lished Saudi 2030 tar­get re­quires between two and five times

the de­livered rate of the past four years, and the 2034 pipeline re­quires six and a half times.

Fourth, the only Gulf pipeline backed by ex­ecuted debt and an awar­ded con­struc­tion con­tract is Qatari, which is a re­versal of the usual re­gional hier­archy and makes MEEZA’s fig­ures the most re­li­able for­ward num­bers in the data­set. Fifth, the largest single un­re­solved item in the re­gion is whether HUMAIN’s Riy­adh and Dammam factor­ies opened: a stated second-quarter 2026 go-live passed without an­nounce­ment and both re­main classed as under con­struc­tion. Sixth, the en­tire Emir­ati di­ver­gence is at­trib­ut­able to one cam­pus whose mas­ter­plan is being re­vised for phys­ical-se­cur­ity reas­ons, and whose phase one has no com­mis­sion­ing re­lease from any of six named part­ners.

Sev­enth, four of six Gulf states can­not be meas­ured from of­fi­cial sources at all, so their fig­ures rest on op­er­ator dis­clos­ure and on re­search houses that in sev­eral cases con­tra­dict them­selves within a single pub­lic­a­tion. Eighth, the de­mand sig­nal is partly cir­cu­lar. The in­vestor, the land­lord and the an­chor ten­ant are fre­quently the same in­sti­tu­tion or its af­fil­i­ates, which means con­trac­ted ca­pa­city car­ries less in­form­a­tion about in­de­pend­ent de­mand than it would else­where. Ninth, the prac­tical in­struc­tion that fol­lows from all of the above is nar­row and op­er­a­tional. Con­tract against en­er­gisa­tion dates rather than cam­pus mas­ter­plans, and re­quire the meas­ure­ment basis in writ­ing.

Sovereign AIState of Play48 •
~880 MW
Operational, 2026
~3.3 GW
Expected by 2030
~12 GW
Announced nameplate
3.2x
Live-to-tracked multiple

Volge's expertise in sovereign compute

The engineering work the sector asks for, and the form it takes on an engagement.

Sov­er­eign com­pute is a power and prop­erty pro­gramme be­fore it is a sil­icon one, so the en­gin­eer­ing it needs runs from the sub­sta­tion to the model. The work below is what op­er­at­ors, state pro­grammes and their an­chor ten­ants in this mar­ket com­mis­sion. Each is de­livered by senior en­gin­eers work­ing in­side the cli­ent's own team, with the Global De­liv­ery Centres run­ning what has been built once it is in pro­duc­tion.

An op­er­ator or an­chor ten­ant in this mar­ket should hold two doc­u­ments be­fore com­mit­ting cap­ital. They are the signed grid con­nec­tion offer, with its en­er­gisa­tion date, and the ten­ancy terms that say who gets ca­pa­city when the hall is over­sub­scribed. Everything else can be en­gin­eered later. Ca­pa­city stated in an­nounced mega­watts is not ca­pa­city, and Volge's first

task on most of these pro­grammes is to re­state a pipeline in con­trac­ted and en­er­gised terms. That gen­er­ally yields a smal­ler num­ber than the one in cir­cu­la­tion.

Staff­ing fol­lows the se­quence of the build rather than the shape of the or­gan­isa­tion. Power and prop­erty ques­tions dom­in­ate the early months, so the lead is an en­gin­eer who has read a con­nec­tion agree­ment and un­der­stood what it does not prom­ise. Plat­form and ten­ancy ques­tions dom­in­ate later. Gov­ernance is a fort­nightly re­con­cili­ation of the con­nec­tion date against the hall han­dover, and of both against cluster ac­cept­ance, be­cause the con­nec­tion agree­ment sets the crit­ical path and the pro­cure­ment plan does not. Slip­page com­pounds in one dir­ec­tion only, so re­port­ing that hides it buys noth­ing.

The first ninety days pro­duce a re­con­ciled ca­pa­city ledger and a work­load place­ment policy, with little else of sub­stance, which is the right am­bi­tion for the quarter. Meas­ure­ment af­ter­wards is util­isa­tion against con­trac­ted ca­pa­city, and cost per unit of use­ful com­pute rather than per ac­cel­er­ator in­stalled. The fail­ures are pre­dict­able. Pro­grammes order sil­icon against a hall that is not yet en­er­gised, and they run a shared na­tional asset on single-ten­ant habits until the second ten­ant ar­rives and the schedul­ing ar­gu­ment be­gins.

Capacity and the grid
  • Ca­pa­city plan­ning against the con­nec­tion queue, stated in en­er­gised mega­watts rather than an­nounced ones.
Sovereign AIState of Play49 •
  • Power and sub­sta­tion read­i­ness re­view, in­clud­ing the lead times that gate a cam­pus.
  • Site and coloca­tion due di­li­gence for an an­chor ten­ant.
  • En­er­gisa­tion track­ing and re­port­ing, so a pro­gramme is meas­ured against con­trac­ted dates.
Building the platform
  • Sov­er­eign land­ing-zone ar­chi­tec­ture, with data res­id­ency and key cus­tody de­signed in.
  • Ac­cel­er­ated com­pute cluster design, from fab­ric and stor­age to schedul­ing.
  • Plat­form op­er­a­tions, ca­pa­city man­age­ment and ten­ancy for a shared na­tional asset.
  • Ex­port-con­trol and en­tity-list map­ping across the hard­ware sup­ply chain.
Putting it to work
  • Work­load place­ment, de­cid­ing what runs sov­er­eign and what does not.
  • Model gov­ernance, eval­u­ation and as­sur­ance for sys­tems used in pub­lic ser­vice.
  • Data pipeline en­gin­eer­ing for Ar­abic-lan­guage and na­tional data­sets.
  • Cost and util­isa­tion in­stru­ment­a­tion, so com­pute is man­aged as an asset.
How an engagement runs
  • A dia­gnosis of two to eight weeks, led on site by senior ar­chi­tects, es­tab­lish­ing what is en­er­gised rather than what is an­nounced.
  • A se­quenced pro­gramme, be­cause the grid con­nec­tion gates the hall and the hall gates the cluster.
  • Build teams em­bed­ded along­side the cli­ent's own en­gin­eers rather than work­ing to a spe­cific­a­tion at arm's length.
  • Run and op­er­ate from the Global De­liv­ery Centres, with ca­pa­city and util­isa­tion re­por­ted against con­trac­ted dates.
Sovereign AIState of Play50 •
The Read to 2030

A 10 megawatt tracker figure for Kuwait’s artificial-intelligence facility contradicts the only issuer disclosure.

Sources

Every body cited in this read for a capacity, chip or contract figure, with the year the text attributes to it.

Sovereign AIState of Play51 •
Version · VSP-SAI-001 · 2026
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